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ABSTRACT 
Essays on Commercial Banking: Survival, Performance, and Heterogeneous 
Technologies 
Pavlos Almanidis 
In the first chapter, we focus on explaining the U.S. commercial banking fail-
ures during the recent financial crisis. We employ the semi-parametric mixture 
hazard model (MHM) with both continuous and discrete time specifications to 
first, distinguish between troubled and healthy banks and second, to estimate the 
probability and the timing of their failure. We combine the MHM with the sto-
chastic frontier model (SFM) to explore the role of managerial inefficiency on a 
bank's longer term viability. We find that the discrete-time MHM which takes 
the managerial inefficiencies into account fits well and dominates other competing 
specifications by accurately predicting the timing of failures both in and out of the 
sample. 
The second chapter explores a new class of flexible cross-sectional parametric 
SFMs that impose an unobservable bound on the inefficiency term. We consider 
11 
doubly truncated normal, truncated half-normal, and truncated exponential distri-
butions to model the inefficiencies. We extend the models to the panel data setting 
and specify a time-varying inefficiency bound. We apply these models to analyze 
the performance of the U.S. commercial banking industry during 1984-2009. 
In the third chapter, we address the issue of the "wrong" skewness of the least 
squares residuals that often arises in applied studies using the traditional SFM. 
Findings of "wrong" skewness imply that the SFM is misspecified and all firms 
are fully efficient. Based on doubly truncated normal distribution that displays 
both positive and negative skewness, we prove that "wrong" skewness does not 
necessarily imply that the SFM model is misspecified. 
The fourth chapter investigates the existence of heterogeneous technologies in 
the U.S. commercial banking industry through the threshold effects estimation 
techniques, modified to allow for time-varying effects. We employ the total assets 
as a threshold variable and determine seven distinct technology-groups. 
In the fifth chapter, we describe the commercial banking data that are extracted 
from the quarterly Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income (Call Reports). 
We detail the construction of the key variables used in this thesis, which mainly 
contain output quantities, input quantities and prices, bank-specific structural and 
geographical characteristics, as well as a number of measures of risk. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Banking Crises, Early Warning Models, and Efficiency 
1.1. Introduction 
Financial crisis that started in summer of 2007 has led the U.S. and interna-
tional economies to an unprecedented meltdown, creating political instability and 
uncertainty worldwide. According to many, it also could be characterized as the 
worst economic crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930's. It appears that 
the crisis originally started in the secondary market for residential mortgages after 
the dramatic increase in delinquencies and default rates on subprime residential-
mortgage-backed securities (RMBS) as a result of the collapse of housing bubble 
during the second half of the year 2006. It very quickly spread to the banking 
industry as many banks, in particular large banks, were highly involved in this 
market until recently, fact that caused a substantial portion of these financial in-
stitutions experience widespread distress that led to closures, mergers, takeovers, 
or injection of heavy doses of government funds. More than 290 banks and thrifts 
failed or more correctly were forced into closure by regulatory agencies in three 
years from late 2007 to the middle of October of 2010. At the same time, the 
1 
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number of troubled or problem banks on the watch list of the Federal Deposit In-
surance Corporation (FDIC) has dramatically increased. The sharp increase in the 
number of failed and troubled banks since 2007 is illustrated in figure 1.1. Among 
the states that experienced the most failures are California, Georgia, Florida, and 
Illinois, accounting for more than half of all banking failures. Table 1.1 displays 
the number of failures per state within these three years, while figure 1.2 provides 
a map of banking failures per state for the referenced period. 
The distinguishing characteristic of the current banking failures from those of 
the earlier crises of the 1980's and 1990's is that the failures were not limited to 
the small financial institutions. The rapid credit expansion, as a result of over-
optimism about the economic growth, and the bad quality loans and investments 
made in good times have mainly taken their toll on large multi-billion dollar fi-
nancial institutions. Approximately one out of five failed banks had asset sizes of 
over $1 billion. As recently as 2008, 36% of failed banks were large banks, among 
them the largest bank failure in the history of U.S., that of Washington Mutual 
with $307 billion in assets. l That same year saw Lehman Brothers file for Chapter 
11 bankruptcy protection and IndyMac bank, with $32 billion in assets, was taken 
over by the FDIC.2 These large financial institution failures created large uncer-
tainties about the exposure of other financial institutions (healthy and troubled) to 
lContinental Illinois Bank and Trust Company of Chicago that failed in 1984 had one-seventh of 
Washington Mutual's assets. 
2Chapter 11 permits reorganization under the bankruptcy laws of the United States. A financial 
institution filling for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection usually proposes a plan of reorganization 
to keep its business alive and pay its creditors over time. 
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additional risks, reduced the availability of credit from investors to banks, drained 
the capital and money markets of confidence and liquidity, triggered the failure of 
smaller community banks, and raised the fears of severe instability in the financial 
system and the global economy.3 A greater attention was paid to the larger insti-
tutions at danger, commonly described as to o-big-to-fail , which received financial 
and other assistance from regulatory authorities as they thought their failure could 
impose a greater systemic risk that could substantially damage the economy and 
lead to conditions similar to, or possibly exceeding, those of the Great Depression. 
Figure 1.1. The number of failed and troubled banks for 2007.Q3-
2010.Q2 period 
r-----------------------------------------~ 
0 
C") 
" ~]1 
0 ('oj 
~ 
2007 
/ 
/ 
...... -------/ 
2008 
f 
1 
1 
quarter 
__ I 
2009 
I =-- fail~ ~-~ tro~ 
8 
00 
8 
to 
2010 
As the number of failures is still rising, one may reasonably ask when failures 
will begin to fall. On one hand, pessimistic scenarios predict the number of failures 
3Community banks are banks with assets sizes of Sl billion or less . They operation is oft ent imes 
limited to the rural communities and small cit ies . They usually engage in tradi t ional banking 
activit ies and provide more personal-based services . 
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Table 1.1. Per State distribution of failed banks 
State number of failed banks State number of failed banks 
Alabama 4 North Carolina 2 
Arkansas 1 Nebraska 2 
Arizona 7 New Jersey 3 
California 32 New NIexico 2 
Colorado 3 Nevada 10 
Florida 41 New York 4 
Georgia 44 Ohio 6 
Iowa 1 Oklahoma 2 
Idaho 1 Oregon 6 
Illinois 37 Pennsylvania 1 
Indiana 1 Puerto Rico 3 
Kansas 5 South Carolina 4 
Kentucky 1 South Dakota 1 
Louisiana 1 Texas 8 
NIassachusetts 1 Utah 5 
Maryland 5 Virginia 2 
Michigan 9 vVashington 13 
NIinnesota 14 Wisconsin 2 
Missouri 9 vVest Virginia 1 
Nlississippi 1 Wyoming 1 
in 2010 to reach 200, the most since the end of the savings and loan (S&L) crisis 
of early 1990's. They also predict that this rate of failure will continue at the 
same pace in subsequent two years.4 On the other hand, more optimistic scenarios 
expect the 2010 to be the peak year of banking distress as the worst tin1e has 
4This predict ion is due to Gerard Cass idy and his colleagues a t RBC Capital Yrarkets: who were 
among t he first ana lysts t hat predicted the r ising number of current banking failures very early. 
Gerard Cassidy is the developer of t he Texas rat io. a tool which is able to determine insolvent 
banks. 
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Source: http://portalseven,com 
Figure 1.2. Per State Distribution of failed banks 
passed and that the economy will continue to recover, with the housing market 
displaying apparent signs of stabilization. 
Regulatory authorities have always considered banking failures as a major pub-
lic policy concern due to their special role in the economic network and in imple-
mentation of an effective monetary policy. In addition, failures of certain banks 
could possibly lead to contagion or domino effects and thus negatively affect the 
safety and soundness of the banking industry and of the entire economy. Head-on 
confronting of crises usually involves taking a series of extraordinary costly actions 
and sacrificing valuable economic resources. There are typically two approaches to 
calculate the costs of a banking crisis: the narrow fiscal or quasi-fiscal costs, which 
involve large government guarantees and central bank bailouts, and the system-
wide economic costs, which include output loss, increases in unemployment rate, 
6 
missed business opportunities, and etc. It is too early to give approximate fig-
ures for the fiscal or economic costs as the consequences of the banking crisis are 
still unfolding. Nevertheless, we can make some tentative observations regarding 
the costs of banking failures to the FDIC's Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) and the 
banking industry output and employment.5 With regard to the first, it is estimated 
that the 140 failures of 2009, with combined assets of about $170 billion, cost the 
DIF $36.4 billion, while the cost of failures through mid-October 2010 involving 
banks with combined assets of more than $85 billion, is expected to exceed $20 
billion. Notably, only the failures of 2008 involving 9 out of 25 large banks cost 
the DIF $15.8 billion. The industry's assets have shrunk by 5.3% as a result of 
the banking crisis, which led to fewer loans (17.5%) and declines in the economic 
activity. Industry employment fell by 8.5% since 2007, translating into 188,000 
lost jobs. Failed banks alone left 11,210 employees without jobs.6 
In United States, FDIC and state banking regulatory authorities are responsible 
for the identification and resolution of insolvent institutions. A bank is considered 
at a risk of immediate closure if it is unable to fulfil its financial obligations the 
5The Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF), which is the result of the merger of the Bank Insurance 
Fund (BIF) and the Saving Association Insurance Fund (SAIF) in 2006, requires each FDIC 
insured institution to pay an insurance premium. The amount of the insurance premium to 
the fund is determined based on institution's balance of insured deposits and the degree of risk 
it poses to the fund. The FDIC, as the receiver of the failed institution, liquidates its assets 
and compensates its depositors up to the insurance limit (currently 8250,000). The amount not 
covered by the asset sales is provided by the DIF. 
tiSource: Wall Street Journal on-line article "Banks Keep Failing, No End in Sight" available at 
http://online.wsj.com. 
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next day or its capital reserves fall below the required regulatory rninimum.7 In 
the event of a bank failure, the FDIC either liquidates the assets of a failing bank 
and pays insurance to the depositors up to the amount of the insurance limit or 
arranges the sale of some or all of the bank's assets to another institution, which 
also may assume the part or all of the bank's liabilities.tI The latter is oftentimes 
accomplished through financial assistance provided by regulators. The FDIC is 
required to resolve outstanding issues with problem banks in a manner that im-
poses the least cost on the deposit insurance fund and ultimately on the taxpayer. 
Thus, early detection of insolvent institutions is of vital importance, especially if 
the failure of those institutions would pose a serious systemic risk on the financial 
system and the economy as a whole. The FDIC and state authorities utilize on-
site and off-site examination methods in order to determine which institutions are 
insolvent and thus should be either closed or be provided financial assistance in 
order to rescue them. The off-site examinations are typically based on statistical 
and other mathematical methods and constitute complementary tools to the on-
site visits made by supervisors to institutions considered at risk. There are three 
advantages of off-site versus on-site examinations. First, the on-site examinations 
71: nder the current regulations issued by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (Basel 
II), a bank is considered as failed if its ratio of Tier 1 (core) capital to risk-weighted assets is 
2% or lower. This ratio must exceed 4% to avoid supervisory intervention and prompt corrective 
actions as underlined in Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) of 
1992. A bank with ratio of 6% or above is considered as well-capitalized. 
tiThe coverage limit is temporary set at 8250,000 until the end of 2013 in order to protect 
the funds of depositors and prevent any potential depositor runs that could harm even the 
healthy institutions (Emergency Economic Stabilization Act, 2008). This limit will return to the 
permanent limit of 8100,000 in 2014. 
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are more costly as they require the FDIC to bear the cost of visits and to retain 
extra staff during times when economic conditions are stable. Second, the on-
site examinations are usually time-consuming and cannot be performed with high 
frequency during periods of wide-spread banking distress. Costs associated with 
on-site supervision of course increase with the number of troubled banks. Third, 
the off-site examinations can help allocate and coordinate the limited on-site ex-
amination resources in an efficient way with priority given to financial institutions 
facing the most severe challenges. The major drawback of the statistically based 
off-site tools is that they incorporate estimation errors which also affect the clas-
sification of banks as failures and nonfailures. An effective off-site examination 
tool must aim at identifying problem banks sufficiently prior to the time when 
a marked deterioration of their financial health would occur, which would force 
supervisors to undertake the necessary corrective actions needed to remedy the 
financial turmoil. Therefore, it is desirable to develop a model which would timely 
identify future failures with a high degree of accuracy and would not unnecessary 
flag healthy banks as being at risk of closure. 
Accurate statistical models that serve as early warning tools and can be alter-
natives to or complementary to the costly on-site visits made by supervisors to 
institutions considered at risk have been well documented in the banking litera-
ture. Early warning models mostly refer to models that can identify and predict 
the realization of some event with high probability well in advance. These models 
have been successfully applied to study banking and other financial institutions' 
9 
failures in the U.S. and in other countries. As the literature that deals with bank-
ruptcy prediction of financial and non-financial institutions is vast and there are 
a myriad of papers that specifically refer to the banking industry failures, we will 
discuss only few papers that are closely related to our work and are viewed as early 
warning models. 
The more widely-used statistical models for bankruptcy prediction are the 
single-period static probit/logit models and methods of discriminant analysis. 9 
These models usually estimate the probability that a firm with specific character-
istics will fail or survive within a certain time interval. The timing of the failure 
is not provided by such models. Shumway (2001), in his bankruptcy prediction 
application, demonstrates with a simple example the inconsistency and the ineffi-
ciency (in a statistical sense) of these static models, as well as the superiority of a 
model such as his dynamic hazard model that utilizes multi-period observations. 
Others in this literature have employed the Cox proportional hazard model (PHM) 
to explain banking failures and develop early warning models. 1o Typically, in this 
model the dependent variable is time to occurrence of some specific event (failure 
in case of banks) which can be equivalently expressed either through the probabil-
ity distribution function or the hazard function, the latter of which provides the 
9Por applications of the probit/logit models and the methods of discriminant analysis see Altman 
(1968), Meyer and Pifer (1970), Deakin (1972), Martin (1977), Lane et al. (1986), Cole and 
Gunther (1995, 1998), Cole and Wu (2010), among others. 
lOThe thorough discussion of the Cox proportional hazard model can be found in Cox (1972). 
Lancaster (1990), Kalbfleisch and Prentice (2002), and Klein and Moeschberger (2003). The 
application of this model to study U.S. commercial banking failures is found in Lane et al. 
(1986), Whalen (1991). and Wheelock and Wilson (1995, 2000). 
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instantaneous risk of failure at some specific time conditional on the survival up to 
this time. The Cox PHM has three advantages over the static probit/logit models: 
(i) it provides not only the measure of probability of failure (survival) but also 
the probable timing of failure (ii) it accommodates censored observations, those 
observations that survive through the end of the sample period (iii) it does not 
make strong assumptions about the distribution of time to failure. The disadvan-
tage of this model is that it requires the hazard rate to be proportional between 
any two cross-sectional observations and the inclusion of time-varying covariates 
is not as straightforward as with other models. To remedy these two shortcom-
ings researchers recently turned their attention to the discrete time hazard model 
(DTHM) Y The DTHM assumes that the failure occurs at discrete times and 
requires the covariates to be unchanged within a given time (month, quarter, or 
year). Inclusion of time-varying regressors that change over different periods allows 
for more efficient estimation and improved predictions as more recent prospective 
information is added to the retrospective information often used in less dynamic 
approaches. 
In this chapter we develop an early warning model based on the Mixture Haz-
ard Model (MHM) of Farewell (1977, 1982) with continuous and discrete time 
specifications.12 MHM effectively combines the static model, which is used to 
llSee Shumway (2001), Halling and Hayden (2006), Cole and Wu (2009), and Torna (2010) for 
applications of discrete-time hazard models. 
12 Application of the discrete-time verison of the MH:\1 are found in Gonzalez-Hermosillo et 
al.(1997), Yildirim (2008) and Topaloglu and Yildirim (2009). 
11 
identify insolvent banks, and the duration model, which provides estimates of the 
probability of failure along with the timing of closure of the troubled banks. In 
our study we view the financial crisis as a negative shock that affects banks in an 
unequal way. Well capitalized, well prepared, and prudently managed institutions 
may feel little relative distress during the financial turmoil. On the other hand, 
poorly managed banks that previously engaged in risk business practices will in-
crease their probability of being on the FDIC watch list and subsequently forced 
into closure or merger with a surviving bank by regulatory authorities. Unlike the 
standard duration model, which assumes that all banks are at the risk of failure, 
we will implicitly assume that there is a proportion of banks that will survive for 
a sufficiently long time after the end of crisis and thus are not in this absorption 
state. In other words, we assume that the probability of failure for a bank that has 
never been on the watch list is arbitrarily close to zero. The MHM is appropriate 
in dealing with this issue as it is able to distinguish between healthy and at-risk of 
failure banks. Our model also recognizes the fact that insolvency and failure are 
two different events. The realization of the first event is largely attributed to the 
actions undertaken by the bank itself, while the second usually occurs as a result 
of regulators' intervention following their insolvency. Supervisors tend not to seize 
an insolvent bank unless it has no realistic probability of survival and its closure 
does not threaten the soundness and the stability of the financial system through 
its contribution to systemic risk. 
12 
One of our (testable) assumptions concerns the fact that banks with low per-
formance, as calculated by the radial measure of realized outcome to the maximum 
potential outcome, will increase their probability of failure. Inefficiently managed 
banks could cumulatively save valuable funds by employing the best-practice tech-
nologies, which have shown to be important, especially during periods of banking 
crisis when money markets suffer from poor liquidity. Barr and Siems (1994) and 
Wheelock and Wilson (1995, 2000) were the first to consider the inefficiency as 
a potential influential factor explaining U.S. commercial banking failures during 
the earlier crisis. Barr and Siems (1994) estimate the efficiency scores with Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) techniques, which are used in a static model to 
predict banking failures. Wheelock and Wilson (1995, 2000) estimate the Cox pro-
portional hazard model with inefficiency scores included among other regressors, 
allowing inefficiency to affect the probability of failure as well as the probability 
being acquired by other bank. They employ three measures of radial technical inef-
ficiency, namely the parametric cost inefficiency measure, the nonparametric input 
distance function measure, and the inverse of the nonparametric output distance 
function measure. The first two appear to have statistically significant positive 
effects on the probability of failure, while only the first measure significantly de-
creases the acquisition probability. The estimation of these models is conducted 
in two stages. The first stage involves the parametric or nonparametric estimation 
of inefficiency scores. In the second stage these scores are used as an explana-
tory variables in addition to other variables to investigate their effect on failure 
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probability. Tsionas and Papadogonas (2006) criticize the two-step approach as it 
may entail an error-in-variables bias as well as introduce an endogenous auxiliary 
regressor. They propose a single step joint estimation procedure to overcome these 
problems. We follow a similar approach. 
Another challenge that we face in this study is the incomplete information 
associated with the troubled banks on the watch list of the FDIC. Each quarter 
the FDIC releases the number of problem banks but their names and identities are 
not disclosed. Based on our earlier assumption we can deduce that a bank that 
failed was on this list. Based on available information we make a prediction of 
which banks are on this list through an expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm 
which is designed to address this problem of missing information. Torna (2010), 
who also studies the recent U.S. commercial banking failures, identifies the number 
of troubled banks on the watch list through their tier 1 capital ranking. Banks 
are ranked according to their tier 1 capital and the number of banks with the 
lowest value are selected to match the number provided by FDIC in each quarter. 
Other ratios, such as Texas ratio, also can be utilized to deduce the problem banks. 
The Texas ratio was developed by Gerard Cassidy to predict banking failures in 
Texas and New England during recessionary periods of the 1980's and 1990's. 
It is defined as the ratio of nonperforming assets to total equity and loan-loss 
reserves. Banks with ratios close to one are identified as high risk. There are 
at least two limitations to these approaches besides their crude approximation. 
First, they ignore other variables that play a pivotal role in leading banks to a 
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distressed state. For example, the ratio of nonperforming loans is one of the major 
indicators of difficulties that bank will face in near future even if their capital 
ratio is at a normal level. Second, financial ratios that are used to classify banks 
as healthy or troubled cannot be subsequently employed as determinants due to 
possible endogeneity problem. 
Another contribution of this study is that we follow a forward stepwise proce-
dure in model building and selecting the relevant covariates that is not only based 
on the conventional measures of the goodness-of-fit and statistical tests but also 
on the contribution of these covariates to the predictive accuracy. As in Gonzalez-
Hermosillo et aL (1997), we also include state-specific macroeconomic variables to 
control for factors that differentially impact particular states. The unequal distrib-
ution of banking failures among the states is revealed in Table 1. Industry-specific 
variables that could potentially capture the sector's condition as well as contagion 
effects cannot be identified in the Cox proportional hazard model and univariate 
probit/logit models. In the first case the constant in general is not identified, while 
in the second case these variables will be mixed with the constant term and thus 
will not be identified as well. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the 
potential decision rule adopted by the regulatory authorities in determining and 
closing insolvent banks, which naturally will lead to the mixture hazard model 
(MHM). Two variants of the MHM are discussed, the continuous-time semipara-
metric proportional MHM and discrete-time MHM. In section 3 we discuss the 
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joint MHM-SFM. Section 4 deals with empirical specification issues and the data 
description. Estimation results for the model parameters and predictive accuracy 
are provided in section 5 along with a comparison of various models and specifica-
tions. Section 6 contains our main conclusions. 
1.2. The Mixture Hazard Model 
Before describing the mixture hazard model formulation in detail we establish 
a few definitions and describe the potential rules adopted by regulatory authorities 
to determine unsound banks that subsequently fail or survive. Other regulatory 
closure rules can be found in Kasa and Spiegel (2008). Let Hit define the financial 
health stock of bank i at time t and assume that there is a threshold level of it, Htt , 
such that if financial health falls bellow this level then the bank is considered at 
risk of closure by regulatory authorities. Formally, the difference between Hit and 
Hit can be represented as a function of bank-specific financial ratios, and structural 
and geographical macroeconomic variables 
(1.1) 
where eit represents the error term, which is assumed to be identically and inde-
pendently distributed across observations and over time.13 
13The iid assumption of the error term can be relaxed in the panel data context by assuming 
eit = J.1i + ~it with J.1i ~ N(O, O"~) and ~it ~ N(O,O"V independent of each other. This adds an 
additional complication to the model and it is not pursued in this paper. 
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We consider three simplified scenarios that can describe the path of financial 
health of a bank during periods of financial turmoil, which are represented in figure 
1.3. Case I describes a situation in which bank financial health sharply declines and 
falls far below its threshold level. Banks in Case I are considered as high priorities 
by the FDIC and are placed at the top of the list of at-risk of failure banks. 
Case II is the scenario under which the bank experiences some difficulties and is 
considered as "troubled" by regulatory authorities. However, this bank recovers 
either by its own means or by receiving some financial assistance from regulators. 
Finally, Case III refers to a bank that is financially sound before and during crisis. 
With some very exceptional cases, such a bank will not be considered at a risk of 
closure during the current crisis. Notice that these scenarios are very simplified 
ones. In practice, banks can enter and exit the watch list multiple times or remain 
on the watch list for mUltiple quarters. In addition, the current health stock may 
depend on the history of its past realizations, which also affect the bank's survival. 
For the purposes of our further analysis what is required is that bank is to be 
considered troubled at least once during the sample period as we will assume that 
the probability that a healthy bank fails is close to zero or equivalently, a bank 
will not be seized by the FDIC unless it is considered as problem bank. This is 
the usual practice adopted by the FDIC. 
The financial health of a particular bank is a composite and oftentimes a sub-
jective index and its lower bound is not observable. Therefore, hit is also not 
observable even to regulatory agencies that have only partial information about 
time I II III 
\ 
\ / 
/ I 
/ I 
I 
L...-_________ -.-____ -:--_____ H it 
T1'oubled H 'tt Sound 
Figure 1.3. Illustration of the bank financial health condition during 
the period of financial turmoil 
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individual banks' financial health. Instead we can define a binary variable hit such 
that 
{
I if hit> 0 
hit = 
o if hit:::; 0 
Given this, the probability that a bank will become financially unhealthy is 
given by 
P P(hit = 1) = P(hit > 0) 
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where Fe is the cumulative distribution function (cdf) of the random error e. If e 
is assumed to be standard normally distributed (probit model) then 
and 
Fe(x' 13) = exp(x~tj3) 
tt 1 + exp( X~tj3) 
if e is logistically distributed (logit model) (McFadden 1974, 1981; Train, 2003). 
However, as it is also discussed in the introductory section, information about 
a particular bank being at risk is not disclosed by regulator authorities. Therefore, 
hit is only observed for banks that actually failed and is not observed for those 
that did not. Hence, we are faced with an incomplete information type problem 
as the only information that is available to us is the total number of problem 
institutions and not their names. In next section, we show how to deal with this 
type of missing information problem by transforming the incomplete elements into 
complete data. For now we treat the data as complete and, in order to derive the 
observed likelihood function, we further define, as in the standard hazard model, a 
nonnegative random variable T which represents the duration of a bank in a state 
of operation or the time until of occurrence of some specific event, such as failure 
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in our case.14 This is characterized by the conditional probability density function 
(pdf), h and the cumulative distribution function (cdf) , FT. The survivor function 
of a particular bank given that it is characterized as a problem bank is then given 
by 
(1.2) 
SP represents the probability that problem bank will survive for a period longer 
than t and Wi is the set of individual-specific, macroeconomic, structural, and 
geographical variables that are related to a bank's survival. 
On the other hand, we let 
FP(t· w·) = Pr(T < tlh· = 1· w·) , 2 _ 1, ,1, (1.3) 
represent the probability that a problem bank will fail by time t, which is the 
complement to the survivor function. 
Likewise, we can define these probability measures for sound banks as 
(1.4) 
and 
14Bank that ceased their operation due to reasons other than failure, such as merger and voluntary 
liquidation, or remained inactive or are no longer regulated by the Federal Reserve have censored 
duration times. 
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(1.5) 
The survivor and failure functions of bank i are then expressed as 
(1.6) 
and 
(1.7) 
Let the binary variable di take on a value of 1 for observations that fail at time t 
and 0 for observations that are right censored when the bank does not fail by the 
end of the sample period or disappears during the period for reasons other than 
failure (mergers, acquisitions, incomplete data, etc). Then the likelihood function 
for bank i is given by 
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L(B;x,w) 
where B is the parameter vector, and x and ware covariates associated with the 
probability of being troubled and of having failed, respectively. 
What is generally observed for the failed U.S. commercial banks is that prior to 
their failure they experience an extensive period of financial distress. Regulatory 
authorities tend to close banks that have been characterized as troubled either by 
means of off-site or on-site examinations. Therefore, we assume that the probability 
that a healthy bank fails instantaneously is arbitrarily close to zero and thus the 
hazard rate for such banks is also arbitrarily close to zero. Hence, the above 
likelihood function reduces to 
Li(B; x, w) = [Fe(x~,B).\f(t; Wi)SP(t; wi)ldi[Fe(x~,B)SP(t; Wi) + (1 - Fe(x;,B))F-di 
(1.8) 
where 
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represents the hazard rate or probability that a troubled bank will fail during 
the period (t, t + ~t), given that it was in operation for t periods earlier. The 
hazard rate, survivor and failure functions are mathematically equivalent in the 
sense that they convey the same information about the distribution of duration 
times and specifications of any can be derived from the specification of one of these 
distributions. 
After rearranging the expression in (1.8) and taking the product over all cross-
sectional units, the sample likelihood function is given by15 
L(f); x, w, d) rr:1 Li(f); x, w, d) (1.9) 
- rr~=l Fe(x~,8)hi(l- Fe(x~,8))l-hi{/\(t;Wi)}dihi{Si(t;Wi)}hi 
where we drop the superscript from measures pertaining to problem banks in what 
follows. If hi is completely observed for each individual bank, as it is to regulators, 
then the log-likelihood can be maximized by conventional techniques of maximum 
likelihood estimation (MLE) to obtain consistent and asymptotically efficient es-
timates of the model parameters. Given that hi is partially observed to outside 
observers we need to address this incomplete information utilizing other meth-
ods and thus turn to the expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm or simulated 
maximum likelihood (SML), which are designed to handle problems of incomplete 
l°The derivation of the likelihood function is provided in the Appendix A. 
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sample information. In the next section we describe the continuous-time semipara-
metric mixture hazard model under the assumptions of proportional hazard (Cox, 
1972) and the absence of any effect of inefficiency measures on the probability 
and the timing of event, as well as the full implementation of the EM algorithm. 
These assumptions are subsequently relaxed in following sections where we con-
sider discrete-time mixture hazard model with time-varying covariates, as well as 
the performance (efficiency) of each bank as a factor explaining their difficulties 
and failures. We will refer to the continuous-time mixture hazard model as Model 
I and the discrete-time mixture hazard model as Model II. Following the standard 
nomenclature of the medical and biological sciences where the MHM was initially 
applied, we will often refer to the logistic part of the model as the incidence part 
and to the hazard part as the latency part. We will use these terms interchangeably 
throughout the chapter. 
1.2.1. Semiparametric Continuous-Time Proportional Mixture Hazard 
Model 
Following Kuk and Chen (1992) and Sy and Taylor (2000) we specify a semi-
parametric proportional mixture hazard model with the full log-likelihood function 
for ith individual bank with observed data (ti' di , Xi, wd expressed by 
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Li((J; x, w, d) - log Li((J, AO; x, w, d) = hdog(Fe(x~,B)) 
+(1 - hi) log(l - Fe(x~,B)) + dihi log(Ai(t; Wi)) + hi log(Si(t; wd) 
with 
(1.10) 
and 
(1.11) 
where Ao(t) and So(t) are unspecified conditional baseline hazard and baseline 
survivor functions, respectively. These are non-negative functions of time only and 
are assumed to be common for all individuals at risk. The censoring is assumed 
to be noninformative and statistically independent of the events of distress and 
failure. 
Given that hi is only partially observed, the SPMHM can be estimated by 
the Expectation-Maximization (EM) algorithm. The EM algorithm is an efficient 
iterative procedure for maximizing complex likelihood functions and handling in-
complete or missing data. Each iteration of the algorithm consists of two steps: 
expectation (E) and maximization (M) step. The expectation step involves the 
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projection of an appropriate functional (likelihood or log-likelihood function) con-
taining the augmented data on the space of the original, incomplete data. That 
is, the missing data are first estimated given the observed data and a current esti-
mate of the model parameters. In the maximization step the function is maximized 
while treating the incomplete data as known. Iterating between these two steps 
yields estimates that under suitable regularity conditions converge to the maxi-
mum likelihood estimates (MLE). For more discussion on the EM algorithm and 
its convergence properties see Dempster et al. (1977) and McLachlan and Krishnan 
(1996). 
To implement the EM algorithm we first need to take the expectation of the full 
log-likelihood function with the respect to hi and the data, which completes the 
E-step of the algorithm. Linearity of L (.) with respect to hi in this case facilitates 
the calculations and analysis considerably. 
The log-likelihood function of ith observation in the M-step is given by 
where hi is the probability that the ith bank will eventually belong to the group 
of problem banks conditioned on observed data and the model parameters. It 
represents the fractional allocation to the problem banks and is given by 
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(1.12) 
- { ifdi=O Fe (xi!P,I) lSi (t;wi )+(1-Fe (xij3(M»)) 
1 otherwise 
The observed full likelihood function (1.9) is then expressed by 
(1.13) 
where Ao = j't Ao(v)dv is the baseline cumulative hazard function, The nuisance 
, 0 
baseline hazard function Ao is not specified parametrically, It is estimated non-
parametrically from the profile likelihood function as 
'\o(t) = N_(t i ) 
~. hjexp(wja) ~JER(ti) 
(1.14) 
and the baseline cumulative hazard function is then calculated as 
(1.15) 
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where N(ti ) is the number of failures and R(ti ) is the set of all individuals at 
risk at time ti, respectively. Notice that in standard model where h = 1 with 
probability one (1.15) reduces to Breslow's (1972) estimator in the case when ties 
are present at time t i •16 Substituting (1.14) and (1.15) into (1.13) leads to the 
M-step log-likelihood 
£((); x, w, h) = 2::1 {hi log Fe (xU3) + (1 - hi) log(1- Fe(x~/3))} (1.16) 
+,,~ {w~a - N(ti ) log (". hjexp(wja))} ~t=l ~JER(ti) 
- L 1(/3; x, h) + L2(a; w, h) 
The second term in above expression is the Cox-type partial log-likelihood function 
for parameter a that handles the ties using the Peto (1972) and Breslow (1974) 
approximation method. 
The full implementation of the EM algorithm involves the following four steps: 
• Step 1: Provide an initial estimate for the parameter /3 and estimate the 
ordinary Cox partial likelihood model to obtain the starting values for a 
and Ao. 
16See Johansen (1983), Sy and Taylor (2000), and Klein and Moeschberger (2003) on this argu-
ment. Sy and Taylor (200) propose an alternative of the product-limit estimator to estimate the 
nuisance baseline hazard function which also can handle the zero-tail constraint in the survivor 
function for the last event time. It is empirical issue whether this constraint holds for the Breslow 
type estimate of the survivor function. 
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• Step 2 (E-step): Compute hi from (1.12) based on the current estimates 
and the observed data. 
• Step 3 (M-step): Update the estimate of parameter (3 using L1 and update 
the estimate of parameter 0: and hence ),0 using the partial log-likelihood 
£2 and equation (1.14), respectively. 
• Step 4: Iterate between steps 2 and 3 until convergence is reached. 
After the estimates of model parameters are obtained their standard errors are 
calculated from the inverse of the standard information matrix. Sy and Taylor 
(2000) provide the components of this matrix based on the complete data log-
likelihood function in their appendix. 
1.2.2. Discrete-Time Mixture Hazard Model with time-varying covari-
ates 
In order to incorporate time-varying regressors in the model we consider the 
discrete-time mixture hazard modelY However, this requires that these regressors 
remain unchanged in the time window [t, t + 1], an assumption which is tenable if 
we consider the fact that banks report their data on a quarterly basis. The hazard 
rate in the discrete-time hazard model is given by 
17See Cox and Oaks (1984), Kalbfleisch and Prentice (2002), and Bover et al. (2002) for discussion 
on discrete-time proportional hazard models. 
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P(t < T < t + liT> t, hit = 1) = 1 - exp [- exp(w~ta) .1:+1 >'(V)dV] 
1 - exp (- exp(Wt + w~ta)) = F* (Wt + w~ta) (1.17) 
j.t+l where Wt = In t >.( v )dv and F* (.) is the extreme value cumulative distribution 
function. If we assume a parametric function for the baseline hazard function, then 
Wt will also be a parametric function of time. Meyer (1990) proposes methods of 
estimating such models, both parametrically and non parametrically. 
The hazard rate in (1.17) can also be expressed in terms of the logistic distri-
bution if we note that 
where 
j.t+l In t >.(v;w)dv=ln[l+expq(t;w)] 
( ) I ( l-exp(-exp(A(t;w))) q t·w - n 
,- exp( - exp(A(t; w) 
(1.18) 
(1.19) 
which implies that q(.) is logistically distributed and can be linearly approximated 
by w~ta. Hence, 
(1.20) 
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By noting that Aij(t; w) = 1 - S~~~;~tl for j = 1,2, ... , t i , and writing the sur-
vivor function as the product of conditional survival probabilities Sij(t; w) = 
nti S(td . h S( ) h . S(t.}) WIt tiQ'= 1, we ave J=1 ',J-1 
ti ( 1 ) Sij(t;w,u) = IJ'-l 1 + (') , J- exp wija (1.21) 
which relates the survivor function to the hazard function and is a nonincreasing 
step function of time. By substituting (1.20) and (1.21) into (1.9) we obtain the 
likelihood function for the Discrete-Time Mixture Hazard Model (DTMHM). 
1.3. Stochastic Frontier Model combined with Mixture Hazard Model 
In this section we consider the performance of an individual bank as a deter-
minant of both the probability of being troubled and the timing of the event of 
failure. The efficiency performance of a firm relative to the best practice (frontier) 
technology was formally considered by Debreu ( 1951) and Farrell (1957). Aigner 
and Chu (1968) proposed a deterministic frontier model where the performance 
was measured parametrically by the deviation of the observed outcome from the 
optimal outcome. This formulation suffered from an assumption that the entire de-
viation from the ideal frontier outcome was solely attributed to inefficiency, which 
was under the control of the firm. Aigner et al. (1977), Meeusen and van den 
Broeck (1977), and Battese and Cora (1977) introduced the parametric stochastic 
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frontier model (SFM) .18 In SFM the error term is assumed to be multiplicative 
and composed of two parts; a one-sided term that captures the effects of inefficien-
cies relative to the stochastic frontier and a two-sided term that captures random 
shocks, measurement errors and other statistical noise, and allows random varia-
tion of frontiers across firms. The initial SFM was formulated in a cross-sectional 
context and was later extended to panel data models, which allow the researcher 
to consistently unconditional efficiency scores. Excellent surveys on frontier mod-
els and their applications are found in Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) and Greene 
(2007). 
The general stochastic frontier panel model for the ith firm is given by 
(1.22) 
where the dependent variable Yit could represent cost, output, profit, revenue etc, 
Zit is a vector of independent regressors, and g(.) is the frontier function, which 
can be either linear or non-linear in coefficients and covariates. Depending on 
the particular dual representation of technology specified, e = v ± u( = log Yit -
logg(zit; ,,)) represents the composed error term, with Vit representing the noise 
and Ui the inefficiency process. The noise term is assumed to be iid normally 
distributed with zero mean and constant variance. Inefficiencies are also assumed 
to be iid random variables with distribution function defined on the domain of 
18Nonparametric alternatives measuring inefficiency were introduced by Charnes et al. (1978) and 
are generically referred as data envelopment analysis (DEA). Deprins et al. (1984) generalized 
the DEA model to what is referred to as the class of free disposal hull (FDH) models. 
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positive numbers (U E R+). Both, v and u, are assumed to be independent from 
each other and from regressorsYJ We follow Pitt and Lee (1981) and assume that 
the inefficiency process is a time-invariant random effect which follows the half-
normal distribution (Ui rv N+(O, O"~) ). 
Under the above assumptions the joint distribution of the noise and the ineffi-
ciency term is given by 
After integrating Ui from this expression we obtain the marginal density of the 
composed error term, which for the production or profit frontier model is derived 
as 
(1.23) 
- I:T; 20 where 0" = J O"~ + 7i0"~ , A = 0" u/ o"v, and Ci = (1/Ti ) cit. The parameter A 
t=l 
is the signal-to-noise ratio and measures the relative allocation of total variation 
IDThe assumption of independence of the inefficiency term and the regressors is restrictive but 
is necessary for our current analysis. Its validity can be tested with Hausman-Wu specification 
test. In the panel data context this assumption can be relaxed by assuming that inefficiencies 
are fixed effects or random effects correlated with all or some of the regressors (Hausman and 
Taylor, 1981: Schmidt and Sickles, 1984; Cornwell et aL 1990). 
20The cost frontier is obtained by reversing the sign of the composed error. 
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to the inefficiency term. In practice we can use an alternative parameterization 
called the ,-parameterization which specifies 
This reparameterization is more desirable as , has compact support which fa-
cilitates the numerical procedure of maximum likelihood estimation, hypothesis 
testing, and establishing the asymptotic normality of this parameter. 
It can be also shown (see Jondrow et al., 1982) that the conditional distribution 
of the inefficiency term is given by 
(1.24) 
where fUlc(-) represents the normal distribution truncated at 0 with mean 11"; 
-Tiei(}~/(}2 = -Tien and variance (): = (}~(}~/(}2 = ,(}2(1-,Ti), and cPO and <PO 
are the pdf and cdf of the standard normal distribution, respectively. The mean 
or the mode of this conditional distribution provides an estimate of the technical 
inefficiency of each firm in the sample. Horrace and Schmidt (1996) derive the 
prediction interval for inefficiency scores based on quantiles of fUlc(-). 
In the absence of any effect of the inefficiencies on the probability and timing 
of failure, (1.23) and (1.24) can be employed to obtain the maximum likelihood 
estimates of model parameters and efficiency scores. However, consistent and effi-
cient parameter estimates cannot be based solely on the frontier model when there 
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is feedback between this measure of economic frailty, and the likelihood of failure 
and the ensuing tightening of regulatory supervision. There is a clear need for joint 
estimation of the system when the decision of firm is affected by these factors. 
Formally, we will assume as above that the censoring is noninformative and 
statistically independent of hi. Following Tsionas and Papadogonas (2006) we 
will also assume that the censoring and hi are independent of the composed error 
term, conditional on inefficiency and the data. Hence, given hi, the observed joint 
density function of the entire system, after integrating out the latent inefficiency, 
can be written as 
(1.25) 
!c( 2) !ulc( U12) 
= !c(2it) /.00 Fe(x~(3 + (hUi)hi(l - Fe(x~(3 + 61Ui))1-hi 
. 0 
The hazard rate and survival function for SPMHM are now given by 
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and 
respectively and Oi = {Xi, Wi, Zi} denotes the set of covariates, while Of is the vector 
of the structural and distributional parameters. 
This is a general model which combines the stochastic frontier model with 
logistic regression and the proportional hazard model. Either of these three models 
are special cases. If, for example, there is no association between inefficiency and 
probability of being troubled or failed (6 = (15t, 62) = (0,0)), then (1.25) consists 
of two distinct parts, the stochastic frontier and the mixture hazard. Both can be 
estimated separately using the previously outlined methods. 
The integral in the joint likelihood (1.25) has no closed form solution and thus 
the maximization of this function requires numerical techniques, such as simulated 
maximum likelihood (SML) or Gaussian quadrature.21 In SML the sample of 
draws from !ule(-) are required to approximate the integral by its numerical average 
(expectation). AB such, the simulated log-likelihood function for the ith observation 
becomes 
21Tsionas and Papadogonas (2006) employ the gaussian quadrature in estimation of the model 
wherein the technical inefficiency has potential effect on firm exit. 
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(1.26) 
1 2 ( (TieiA)) C~tcit eh 
-2" log 0- + log 1 - <II -0-- - 20-2(1 _ -yTi) + 20-2(1 - -y) 
+ log ~ L~=l {Fe (Xi,B + 81Uis)hi (1- Fe(Xi,B + 81Uis))1-hi 
X (Ai (t; Wi, Uis) )r4hi (Si( t; Wi, Uis) )hi} 
where Uis is a random draw from the truncated normal distribution fUle(') and S is 
the number of draws. We utilize the inverse cdf method to efficiently obtain draws 
from this distribution as 
(1.27) 
where U is a random draw from uniform U[O, 1] distribution or a Halton draw. 
By substituting (1.27) into (1.26) and treating the h~s as known we can max-
imize the log-likelihood function L = L. Li by employing standard optimization 
~ 
techniques and obtain the estimates of the model parameters. 
Finally, after obtaining the model parameters, the efficiency scores are obtained 
as the expected values of the conditional distribution in the spirit of Jondrow et 
al. (1982) 
; '00 G(Ui; 8)fulc(ulc) dui 
. 0 
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(1.28) 
G( lli; 8) = F(x~(3 + (h Ui)hi (1 - F(x~(3 + (h lli) )l-hi {Ai( t; Wi, lli)}dihi {S(t; Wi, lli)}hi . 
The integrals in the numerator and denominator are calculated numerically by 
SML method. It is straightforward to check that if 6 is zero then (1.28) collapses 
to the Jondrow et al. formula for production frontiers 
(1.29) 
The predicted efficiency of ith firm is given by T Ei = exp( -Ui) or it can be 
calculated as T Ei = E [exp( -lli) I ~i' hi, di] as suggested by Battese and Coeli 
(1988). The latter measure is optimal in the sense that it gives lower mean squared 
error of prediction than the latter one. 
The EM algorithm for the stochastic frontier mixture model involves the fol-
lowing steps: 
• Step 1: Provide initial estimates of the parameter vector ()'. Set the initial 
value of parameters 61 and 62 equal to zero and obtain the initial value 
of the baseline hazard function from (1.14). Consistent starting values of 
the variances of the noise and inefficiency terms are based on method of 
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moments estimates 
A2 [ fij;(_7r_)m3]2/3 au = 7r-4 
A2 A (7r-2 r2 av = m2- -- a 7r u 
where m2 and m3 are the estimated second and third sample moments 
of the OLS residuals, respectively. Estimates of a and r parameters are 
obtained through the relevant expressions provided above. 
• Step 2 (E-step): Compute hi based on the current estimates and the 
observed data from 
otherwise 
• Step 3 (lVI-step): Update the estimate of parameters by maximizing L via 
simulated maximum likelihood technique. 
• Step 4: Iterate between steps 2 and 3 until convergence. 
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1.4. Empirical Model and Data 
In this section we outline the empirical specification that we follow to estimate 
the four models. We also describe the data used in this study and the stepwise 
forward selection procedure that is employed in model building and the variable 
selection. 
1.4.1. Empirical Specification 
Following Whalen (1991) we employ a model with a two-year timeline to estimate 
the probability of distress and failure, as well as the timing of the failure of the bank 
with a certain set of characteristics. In the SPMHM the time to failure is measured 
in months (1-24) starting from December 31, 2007. The sample consists of 125 
banks that failed during 2008 and 2009 and 5,843 nonfailed banks. The covariates 
used in estimation are derived from 2007.Q4 Consolidated Reports of Condition 
and Income (Call Reports). Banks that disappear from the sample for reasons 
other than failure or did not experience the event through the end of the sample 
period have censored duration times. That is, for these banks what we observe is 
the maximum duration in the sample but there is no further information on their 
status. Nine banks voluntarily liquidated and are excluded from the sample since 
we are modeling the regulatory decision. In addition, we exclude banks that were 
chartered and started to report their data after the first quarter of 2007. These are 
typically referred as "de novo" banks and require a special treatment (DeYoung, 
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1999, 2003). The holdout sample consists of 92 banks that failed during 2010 
including the third quarter, as well as 5,674 surviving banks. This sample will be 
used to assess the modE:)l's out of sample predictive accuracy. 
For the DTMHM time to failure is measured in quarters as banks report their 
data on a quarterly basis. The sample consists of eight quarters of observations 
on banks that either failed or survived during the 2008-2009 period. The number 
of failed banks is the same as in the SPMHM. The holdout sample consists of two 
quarters of bank observations in 2010. Rather than calculating the probable time 
of failure, in this case we estimate the probability that a certain bank will fail 
during 2010. This excludes the fourth quarter of 2010 due to lack of data. 
We employ the cost frontier in the Stochastic Frontier specification. The cost 
frontier describes the minimum level of cost given a certain output level and input 
prices. It is dual to the production frontier, and it is oftentimes used to describe the 
technology employed by the firms in regulated industries (Shephard, 1953). The 
gap between the actual and minimum cost is a measure of total (cost) inefficiency 
which is composed of two parts: technical inefficiency, which arises from excess 
usage of inputs, and allocative inefficiency, which results from a non-optimal mix 
of inputs. We do not make this decomposition but rather estimate overall cost 
inefficiency. We adopt the intermediation approach of Sealey and Lindley (1977) 
according to which banks are viewed as financial intermediaries that collect de-
posits and other funds and transform them into loanable funds by using capital 
and labor. Deposits are viewed as inputs as opposed to outputs, which is assumed 
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in the production and value-added approaches (Baltensperger, 1980; Berger and 
Humphrey, 1992 ). 
As in Kaparakis et al. (1994) and Wheelock and 'Wilson (1995) we specify a 
multiple output-input short-run stochastic cost frontier with a quasi-fixed input. 
Following the standard banking literature we specify a translog functional form to 
describe the cost function22 
5 4 
ao+ L am In Ymit + L i3k In Wkit 
m=1 k=1 
1 4 4 1 
+2 L L i3kn In Wkit In Wnit + rll In Xit + 21]2 (In Xit)2 
k=1 n=1 
5 4 5 
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m=1 k=1 m=1 
4 5 4 
L A2x In Wkit In Xit + L Amt In Ymit t + L ¢kt In Wkitt + Vit + Ui 
k=1 m=1 k=1 
22Translog function provides a second-order differential approximation to an arbitrary function 
at a single point. It does not restrict the share of a particular input to be constant over time and 
across individual firms. Additional flexibility can be attained by considering the Fourier-flexible 
functional form, which includes Fourier trigonometric terms in addition to the standard translog 
terms. It requires specific truncation of the data and as it is documented in Berger and Mester 
(1997) there is no essential difference in average efficiencies and ranking of firms between this 
and the translog functional specification. 
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with symmetry and linear homogeneity in input price restrictions imposed by con-
sidering capital as the numeraire and dividing the total cost and other input prices 
by its price. Thus 
4 4 4 4 4 
Lf1k = 1, Lf1kn = Lbmk = LA2x = LcPkt = 0 
k=l k=l k=l k=l k=l 
where C is the observed short-run variable cost of an individual bank at each 
time period, Ym is the value of mth output, m = 1, .. , 5. Outputs are real estate 
loans (yreln), commercial and industrial loans (yciln), installment loans (yinln) , 
securities (ysec), and off-balance sheet items (yobs). The w's represent input prices 
for total interest-bearing deposits (dep), labor (lab), purchased funds (pur!), and 
capital (cap). The quasi-fixed input (X) consists of noninterest-bearing deposits. 
Kaparakis et al. (1994) assume that the bank takes the level of noninterest-bearing 
deposits as exogenously given and since there is no market price associated with 
this input, the quantity of it should be included in the cost function instead of its 
price. We also include the time and its interaction with outputs and input prices 
to account for non-neutral technological change. 
After the technology parameters are estimated we can estimate the scale economies 
and technological change measures along a particular output/price ray. The scale 
43 
economies are defined as the degree to which a firm's total cost of producing fi-
nancial services decreases as its output of services increase proportionally and they 
are derived as the sum of partial derivatives of the cost with respect the outputs. 
That is, 
Scaleit 
5 
- L 8lnCit 
m=18lnYmit 
(1.30) 
A value of this measure less than one indicates the presence of (short-run) 
economies of scale and would indicate that the bank is operating below its optimal 
scale level and thus can reduce its cost by expanding output. If the measure is 
greater than one then the bank experiences (short-run) diseconomies of scale and 
should reduce its output level to achieve optimal input usage. The reciprocal of 
scale economies of course is returns to scale (RTS). Technological change is derived 
from the first order derivative of the cost function with respect to time evaluated 
at output and input price levels, as well as the level of the quasi-fixed factor. 
1.4.2. Data 
The data used in this study are extracted from three main sources. The first 
source is the public-use quarterly Call Reports for all U.s. commercial banks that 
are collected and administrated by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago and the 
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FDIC. The majority of the data are from this source, which mainly consists of 
bank-specific variables. The second source is the FDIC website which provides 
information regarding failed banks and industry-level indicators. The third source 
is the website of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis (FRED), which provides 
information on regional-specific macroeconomic variables.23 
More than forty individual-specific financial ratios, state-specific macroeca-
nomic, geographical, and structural variables are constructed from variables ob-
tained form these sources as potential determinants of banking distress and failure. 
We apply the stepwise forward selection procedure (Klein and Moeschberger, 2003) 
to select the most relevant explanatory variables based on global and local tests, 
as well as the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). Although these procedures are 
very useful for deciding how many and which variables to include in the model, 
we also select variables based on their contribution to the prediction accuracy of 
the model. The purpose of doing this is to identify some variables which intra-
duce a spurious relationship to the model and hence destroy the predictive ability 
of the model. We prefer to exclude these variables from the model even though 
they are statistically significant and have the correct sign. In addition, other con-
founder variables, which are highly correlated with the significant variables, are 
excluded from the model due to high degrees of multicollinearity and attendant 
complications in obtaining the numerical solutions of our multivariate models. 
23Websites for the data sources are: (i) Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago 
(http://www.chicagofed.org). (ii) FDIC (http://www.fdic.gov)(iii) Federal Reserve Bank 
of St. Louis (http://www.stlouisfed.org). 
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The final set of variables entering both the incidence and the latency part 
includes capital adequacy, asset quality, managerial quality, earnings, liquidity, and 
sensitivity (the so-called "CAMELS"), six structural and geographical variables, 
and four state-specific variables. We use the same set of explanatory variables in 
both the incidence and latency part of our model in order to capture the different 
effects that these have on the probability that a particular bank is troubled, as 
well as the probability and timing of the resolution of the bank's troubles by the 
FDIC. Tables 1.2 and 1.3 provide our mnemonics for the variable names as well as 
their formal definitions. 
The first variable in table 1.2 is the tier 1 risk-based capital ratio. It is defined 
as the ratio of tier 1 ( core) capital to risk adjusted on and off balance sheet assets. 
Banks with a high level of this ratio are thought to have sufficient capital to absorb 
any losses occurring during the crisis and hence have a higher chance of survival. 
We expect a negative sign for this variable in both incidence and latency. Under 
current regulation, banks with a ratio above 4% are less likely to cause regulatory 
intervention. The next variable is the ratio of non performing loans to total loans, 
which consists of total loans and lease financing receivables that are nonacrual, 
past due 30-89 days and still accruing, and past due 90 days or more and still 
accruing: This variable is a primary indicator of the quality of loans made by 
banks and it is one of the influential factors explaining their distress and failure. 
The higher this ratio, the higher the probability that the bank will enter the watch 
list and subsequently fail. The next five ratios also reflect the asset quality of 
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banks. We expect the ratio of allowance for loan and lease loss to average total 
loans to have a positive effect on a bank's survival. Higher ratios may signal banks 
to anticipate difficulties in recovering losses and thus this variable may positively 
impact incidence. Similarly, charge-offs on loan and lease loss recoveries provide a 
signal of problematic assets that increase the probability of insolvency and failure. 
Provision for loan and lease losses are based upon the management's evaluation of 
loans and leases that the reporting bank has the intent to hold. Such a variable 
can expect to decrease the probability of distress and increase the probability of 
survival. 
Two of the three management quality proxies that we include are constructed 
from the balance sheet items of the reporting banks. The ratio of the full-time 
employees to average assets has an ambiguous sign in both parts. However, we 
conjecture a negative sign on this variable as the FDIC may face constraints in 
seizing large banks with a large number of employees. The intermediation ratio 
shows the ability of a bank to successfully transform deposits into loans and thus 
we expect its impact to be negative. Earnings are also expected to have a negative 
effect on both parts. From the liquid assets we expect cash and core deposits to 
have negative signs, while the direction of the effect of Jumbo CD's is uncertain. 
Banks with more rate sensitive liabilities, repricing within a year more than assets, 
ex ante should be considered as riskier. The state-specific variables that we include 
in the model are expected to have a positive impact on survival with the exception 
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of the unemployment rate, which is expected to have a negative effect on their 
viability. The structural and geographical variables have ambiguous signs. 
For the SF part of the model we use 14 quarters ( 2007.Ql-2010.Q2) of bank 
observations from the Call Reports. After deleting observations with obvious re-
porting errors and substantial outliers the final number of banks range from 6,342 
in the first quarter of 2007 to 5,642 in the second quarter of 2010. The unbalanced 
panel has a total of 83,936 observations. 
Means and standard deviations of financial ratios for the fourth quarter of 
2007 and 2009 are reported in Table 1.4. The last column of this table reports 
the p-values of the hypothesis of no difference between the means of variables of 
failed and nonfailed banks based on the two-group mean comparison test for these 
two periods. This shows the difference in financial health of nonfailed and failed 
banks.24 Table 1.5 reports the descriptive statistics of variables that enter the 
cost function for the sample of failed and nonfailed banks for the same selected 
periods. It is worth noting that, on average banks that failed had issued more real 
estate loans than their nonfailed peers prior to the crisis. This is consistent with the 
prevailing view that failed banks were highly engaged in residential mortgage loans, 
which experienced an unusually high default rates after the collapse of the housing 
bubble in 2006. Failed banks also paid higher salaries than did the nonfailed 
banks. For the DTMHM it is informative to look at the evolution of these variables 
24Notice that there are troubled banks among the nonfailed banks that fail in subsequent periods. 
Hence, the difference must be larger from that reportered in the table. 
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over time. These are given in figure 1.4 where the large discrepancy between the 
financial health of failed and non-failed banks is evident for most of the financial 
ratios. For example, the key financial variables, such as capital adequacy and 
nonperforming loans, display significant mean differences which amplify as we move 
in time.25 
1.5. Results and Predictive Accuracy 
Table 1.6 reports the results for the continuous-time semiparametric and discrete-
time MHM under the assumption that inefficiencies have no effect on the proba-
bility of incidence and latency. Both models produce qualitatively similar results. 
The influential factors that were a priori believed to have a strong effect on both 
probabilities turn out to have the correct sign and are statistically significant at 
any conventional significance level in both models. Results indicate that there is a 
large marginal effect of tier 1 capital ratio on the incidence probability. Other mea-
sures of earnings proxies and asset quality also have a large and significant effect 
on this probability. In other words, well capitalized banks with positive earnings 
and quality loans are less likely to appear on the FDIC watch list. In contrast, 
banks that are already on this list will increase their probability of failure in the 
industry if their capital ratio is insufficient, ratio of nonperforming loans is high 
and earnings are negative, and have a decreasing trend. Certificates of deposits 
25We reject the null hypothesis of no mean difference for these two variables between failed and 
nonfailed banks at any conventional significance level based on the two-group mean comparison 
test with Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom for all periods. 
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and core deposits have the expected effect though not a statistically significant one. 
On the other hand, cash has a positive and significant effect. One explanation of 
this could be, after controlling for profitability, banks that remain cash idle have 
a higher opportunity cost. It would only stand to reason for these banks to be 
costly and inefficient. Banks with a large number of full-time employees have less 
chances to fail, as it is also seen by its negative sign in both parts. Those who 
successfully transform deposits into vehicles of investment are considered poten-
tially stronger, while others with more rate sensitive liabilities appear to be less 
promising. The state-specific variables have the expected economic congruences 
which appear to be nonsignificant in the incidence part. We would expect these 
variables to significantly affect the probability of incidence of banks in states with 
higher unemployment rates, lower growth in personal income, limited construction 
permits, and falling housing prices, all of which would give cause for an on-site 
inspection. Only two of the four geographical variables have a significant effect. 
Banks that are FR members have a higher probability of failure than those that 
are not. This is associated with behavior consistent with moral hazard. Such 
banks have felt secure as members of Federal Reserve system and hence may have 
assumed higher risks than they would have had they not had FR banking. The 
positive result of the FR district code indicates that the probability of insolvency 
and failure is higher for banks in the Atlanta (6) district than for banks in the 
Boston (1) district and it is lower than for banks in the San Francisco (12) district. 
Recall that Washington, D.C. is the reference district. The size of the bank, as it 
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is measured by the natural logarithm of its gross total assets, has a negative and 
significant sign only in the incidence part of model II, which implies that larger 
banks are less likely to find themselves on the watch list and then subsequently 
fail. Older and well-established banks have lower failure probabilities than their 
younger counterparts. 
Table 1.7 contains the results for the continuous-time semiparametric and 
discrete-time MHM with the stochastic frontier specification. With few exemp-
tions, the results are qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 1.6. Ineffi-
ciency has a positive effect on incidence and failure probability. The effect is only 
significant on the latter probability and this is consistent with the view that bank 
performance is not the criterion for on-site examination but rather a factor affect-
ing a bank's longer term viability. The distributional parameters are significant 
at the 1% significant level. The descriptive statistics for the efficiency scores ob-
tained from models III and IV, as well as from the standard time-invariant random 
effects (RE) model for the sample of nonfailed and failed banks are summarized 
in Tables 1.8 and 1.9, respectively. There is a small but statistically significant 
difference between average efficiencies of failed and nonfailed banks in models III 
and IV. This difference is not statistically significant for efficiencies derived from 
the random effects model. figure 1.5 plots the distribution of inefficiencies (non-
truncated) obtained from these three models. It is interesting to note that the RE 
model reports some surviving banks as extremely inefficient while the most effi-
cient banks are banks that failed. Hence, we suspect that the two-step approach 
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would yield the opposite sign on inefficiency component from what we would ex-
pect. The difference in average efficiencies from the single step estimation can be 
mainly attributed to the fact that distressed banks that subsequently fail typically 
devote their efforts to overcome the difficulties and clean up their balance sheets. 
These impose additional costs on banks and worsen an already bad situation. 
In figure 1.6 we plot the estimated average returns to scale and the technical 
change for failed and nonfailed banks for the full sample period. Both type of 
banks display increasing returns to scale. Nonfailed banks appear to be improving 
their scale efficiencies after the second quarter of 2009. These banks also display a 
negative technological change (digress) for all periods as estimated by both speci-
fications. The failed banks had experienced a slight technological progress during 
the last periods. This points out to the fact that banks that failed in 2009 were 
relatively younger banks that employed newer technology than did older banks. 
In figures 1.7 and 1.8 we plot the survival profile of the average bank that 
failed during 2008-2009 period for all four models. The average survival profile 
based on results of the SPMHM is constructed from (1.11) and is based on the 
average characteristics of failed banks. Similarly, the average profile based on the 
DTMHM results is calculated from (1.21), which is a step function with steps 
occurring at discrete failure times. From figure 1.7 it can be seen that average 
failed banks in SPMHM are predicted to have a duration time of 22 months. After 
controlling for inefficiencies the time to failure drops to 21 months. Based on the 
DTMHM results, figure 1.8 demonstrates that a bank with the same characteristics 
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as the representative failed bank will survive up to 7 quarters after accounting for 
inefficiency. 
It is also interesting to look at the survival profile of the most and the least 
efficient banks derived from models III and IV. figure 1.9 displays the survival 
profiles obtained from SPMHM. The least efficient bank with the efficiency score 
of 0.149 is predicted to fail in 8 months. This bank was closed by FDIC in the end 
of August of 2008. On the other hand, the most efficient bank with the efficiency 
score of 0.971 has a survival probability of one throughout the sample period. This 
is also illustrated in figure 1.10, where the least efficient bank with the efficiency 
score of 0.154 is predicted to fail by the fifth quarter, using the DTMHM results. 
This bank failed in the third week of April of 2009.26 The most efficient bank with 
the efficiency score of 0.969 has an estimated survival probability that exceeds 0.95. 
We next examine our results by recasting our model estimates as early warning 
tools that can correctly classify failed and nonfailed banks within our sample used 
for estimation as well as in our hold-out sample. The tests are based on two types 
of errors, similar to those that arise in any statistical hypothesis testing. These 
are type I and type II errors (see Lane et al. 1986; Whalen, 1991; and Thompson, 
1992 among others). A type I error is defined as the error due to classifying a failed 
bank as a nonfailed bank, while a type II error arises from classifying a non-failed 
bank as a failed bank. There is a trade-off between these two type of errors and 
2°The identity of the least efficient bank is not the same in these two models. However, the 
identity of the most efficient bank is the same. 
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both are important from a public policy standpoint. Models with low type I error 
are more desirable since timely identification of failed banks allows the regulator to 
undertake any prompt corrective action to ensure the stability and the soundness 
of the financial system. On the other hand, models with high type II error will be 
unnecessary flagging some banks as failures while they are not, and hence could 
waste regulators' time and resources. However, it is oftentimes hard to interpret 
the costs of a type II error since various constraints faced by FDIC could delay the 
resolution of an insolvent bank. Thompson (1992) attributes this to information, 
administrative, legal and political constraints, among others. Whalen (1991) notes 
that some type II error predictions actually represent failures that occur in the 
near future and so should be considered as a success of the model rather than its 
failure. 
Table 1.10 reports the in-sample predictive accuracy for the four models based 
on type I, type II, and overall classification error. Overall classification error is 
a weighted sum of type I and type II errors. In what follows we set the weights 
at 0.5 for both errors. Clearly this weighting scheme is arbitrary and alternative 
weighting schemes could be based on different risk preference assumptions, implicit 
and explicit costs of regulation, etc. In our predictive accuracy analysis each bank 
is characterized as a failure if its survival probability falls bellow a probability 
cutoff point, which we base on the sample average ratio of failed to nonfailed 
banks (0.021). The DTMHM specification yields a lower type I error than does 
the SPMHM. This is to be expected since the DTMHM incorporates multiperiod 
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observations for each bank and thus is more informative on bank financial health 
than the single-period cross-sectional observations. There is a significant drop in 
type I error in both specifications when the performance of a bank is added to the 
model as an additional factor. On the other hand, type II error is increased in 
the DTMHM and it is doubled when inefficiency is included. Based on the overall 
classification error, Model IV seems to perform slightly better than Model III, but 
it largely outperforms the Models I and II. 
Table 1.11 presents the errors that judge the out-of sample classification accu-
racy of the models. The SPMHM errors are based on the survival profile of banks 
using the 2009 end-year data and can predict failures that may occur through the 
end of 2011. We consider banks that have failure times of up to nine months in 
order to compare the errors from this model with those based on the discrete-time 
alternative. The survival probabilities in the DTMHM are calculated from (1.21). 
In order to account for the third quarter failures we keep the financial ratios the 
same from the second quarter to the third quarter since the Call Reports of 2010 
have not yet been released as of the date of this analysis. We first compare these 
results with the in-sample classifications. There is a significant drop in type I error 
for all four models. This is mainly due to the fact that the data used to calculate 
the survival profiles of each banks are more informative than what was used to 
estimate the model parameters and is reasonable since the end of 2009 is consid-
ered the peek year of the banking crisis during which the financial health of some 
banks deteriorated significantly (see Table 3.9). The inter-model comparison is the 
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same as above with Model IV favored over the other models based on predictive 
accuracy. 
1.6. Conclusions 
Massive banking failures during the financial turmoil of the last three years has 
resulted in enormous financial losses and costs to the U.S. economy, not only in 
terms of the bailouts by regulatory authorities in their attempt to restore liquidity 
and stabilize the financial sector, but also in terms of the lost jobs in banking 
and other sectors of economy, failed businesses, and ultimately slow growth of 
the economy as a whole. The design of early warning models that accurately 
predict the failures and their timing is of crucial importance in order to ensure the 
safety and the soundness of the financial system. Early warning models that can 
be used as off-site examination tools are useful for at least three reasons. They 
can help direct and efficiently allocate the limited resources and time of on-site 
examination so that banks in immediate help are examined first. They are less 
costly than on-site visits made by supervisors to institutions considered at risk and 
can be performed with high frequency to examine the financial condition of the 
same bank. Finally, they can predict failures at a reasonable length of time prior 
to the marked deterioration of bank's condition and allow supervisors to undertake 
any prompt corrective action that will have the minimal cost to a taxpayer. 
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In this chapter we considered early warning models that attempt to explain 
the recent failures in the U.S. commercial banking sector. We employed a du-
ration analysis model combined with a static logit model to determine troubled 
banks which subsequently fail or survive. Both, continuous and discrete time ver-
sion of the mixed model were specified and estimated. These effectively translated 
the bank-specific characteristics, state-related macroeconomic variables, and geo-
graphical and structural variables into the risk measures. Capital adequacy and 
nonperforming loans were found to play a pivotal role in determining and closing 
insolvent institutions. State-specific variables appeared to significantly affect the 
probability of failure but not insolvency. The discrete-time model outperformed 
the continuous-time model as it is able to incorporate time-varying covariates, 
which contain more and reacher information. We also found that managerial ef-
ficiency does not significantly affect the probability of a bank being troubled but 
plays an important role in their longer term survival. Inclusion of the efficiency 
measure led to improved prediction in both models. 
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1. 7. Appendix A: Derivation of the likelihood function 
In this appendix we show the derivation of the sample likelihood function given 
in expression (1.9). For this purpose, we first note that at time t each bank can 
fall into four mutually exclusive states of nature: 
States = 
Then 
hi = 1, di = 1 with prob. pAf(t; Wi)Sf(t; Wi) 
hi = 0, di = 1 with prob. (1 - p) A:(t; Wi)St(t; Wi) 
hi = 1, di = 0 with prob. pSf(t; Wi) 
hi = 0, di = 0 with prob. (1 - p) St(t; Wi) 
L(8; x, w, d) - II~=l Li(8; x, w, d) 
x {(pSf(t; Wi))h; ((1 _ p) St(t; Wi))l-h;} I-d; 
II~=l ph; (1 - p)(l-h;) [Af(t; Wi)]<t.h 
X [A:{t; Wi)]d;(l-h;) [Sf(t; Wi)]h; [St(t; WiW-h; 
By assumption, A:(t;Wi) = 0 if and only if hi = 0 and di = 0 i.e., a bank is 
healthy and is not observed failing. Similarly St(t; Wi) = 1 if and only if hi = 0 
i.e., a bank is healthy. The final sample likelihood function is then given by 
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L((); x, w, d) = rr~=l phi (1 - p)(l-hi) [>.f(t; Wi)]dihi [Sf(t; wd]hi 
which implies that the completely healthy banks contribute to the likelihood func-
tion only through their probability being troubled. 
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1.8. Appendix B: Tables and Figures 
Table 1.2. CAMELS proxy Financial Ratios 
Capital Adequacy (C) 
Tier 1 (core) capital/risk-weighted assets 
Assset Quality (A) 
Nonperforming loans/total loans 
Allowance for loan and lease loss/average loans and leases 
Commercial real estate loans/total loans 
Charge-off on loans and leases/average loans and leases 
Recoveries on loan and lease losses/loans and leases 
Provision for loan and lease losses /loans and leases 
Managerial Quality (M) 
Number of fulltime equivalent employees/average assets 
Total loans/total deposits 
Random Effects inefficiency score 
Earnings (E) 
Total operating income/average assets 
Net income (loss)/average assets 
Net income (loss)/total equity 
Liquidity (L) 
Noninterest-bearing balances, currency, and coin/average assets 
Total tirv-e deposits of usn 100,000 or more/total assets 
Core deposits/total assets 
Sensitivity (S) 
1-Year rate sensitive assets minus liabilities/total assets 
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Table 1.3. Structural, Geographical, and State-Specific Macroeco-
nomic variables 
Structural and geographical variables 
chtype Charter type 
( lif state chartered, 0 otherwise) 
frsmb FRS membership indicator 
(1 if Federal Reserve member, 0 otherwise) 
ibf International banking facility 
(1 if bank operates an ibf, 0 otherwise) 
frsdistrcode FRS district code 
(Boston(I), New York (2), Philadelphia (3), Cleveland (4), 
Richmond (5), Atlanta (6), Chicago (7), St. Louis (8), 
Minneapolis (9), Kansas City (10), Dallas (11), 
San Francisco (12), Washington., D.C. (O-referense district)) 
19ta log of total assets 
age Age (measured in quarters) 
State-SpecIfic Macroeconoilllc variables 
ur Unemployment rate 
chpi % Change in personal income 
chphi % Change in house price index 
chnphu Change in new private housing units 
authorized by building permits 
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Table 1.4. Descriptive Statistics for CAMELS proxy financial ratios for the fourth quarter 
of 2007 and 2009 
Non-Failed Banks Failed Banks p-value 
Variable 2007.Q4 2009.Q4 2007.Q4 2009.Q4 2007. Q4/ 2009. Q4 
Mean S.D Mean S.D Mean S.D Mean S.D 
tier! 0.1072 0.0333 0.1025 0.0301 0.1011 0.0384 0.0253 0.0219 0.049/0.000 
alll 0.0129 0.0065 0.0169 0.0094 0.0161 0.0100 0.0450 0.0221 0.000/0.000 
reIn 0.4583 0.1703 0.4590 0.1652 0.6254 0.1440 0.6070 0.1372 0.000/0.000 
rnpl 0.0260 0.0231 0.0435 0.0395 0.0539 0.0528 0.2114 0.1043 0.000/0.000 
roa 0.0097 0.0076 0.0023 0.0158 0.0030 0.0137 -0.0636 0.0296 0.000/0.000 
roe 0.0957 0.0771 0.0064 0.3224 0.0178 0.1980 -1.5493 55.774 0.000/0.801 
cd 0.1563 00749 0.1644 0.0757 0.2082 0.1010 0.2302 0.1092 0.000/0.000 
coredep 0.8228 0.0741 0.8334 0.0659 0.8068 0.0798 0.9054 0.0665 0.013/0.000 
coifs 0.2493 0.3995 0.5687 0.6542 0.2902 0.3376 1.5778 1.1923 0.135/0.000 
lrec 0.0008 0.0033 0.0008 0.0021 0.0004 0.0012 0.0014 0.0017 0.001/0.011 
IIp 0.0027 0.0067 0.0120 0.0169 0.0092 0.0119 0.0724 0.0370 0.000/0.000 
fte 0.3169 0.1290 0.2838 0.1174 0.2737 0.1999 0.2134 0.0796 0.007/0.000 
1mr 0.8126 0.2053 0.7792 0.1873 0.9647 0.1526 0.8149 0.1271 0.000/0.014 
sens -0.1433 0.1490 -0.1348 0.1270 -0.0505 0.1748 -0.2095 0.1440 0.000/0.022 
cash 0.0323 0.0182 0.0310 0.0269 0.0209 0.0135 0.0230 0.0307 0.000/0.000 
01 0.0718 0.0121 0.0581 0.0115 0.0786 0.0178 0.0511 0.0111 0.000/0.000 
N 5843 5674 125 92 
The calculation of the mean and standard deviation for 2007.Q4 sample of failed banks is based on banks that failed 
between 2007.Q4-2009.Q4. Figures for 2009.Q4 are based on failures of 201O.Ql-2010.Q3 
Pvalues under the null hypothesis of no difference between the means of variables of failed and nonfailed banks based on the 
twogroup mean comparison test with Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom. 
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Table 1.5. Descriptive Statistics for variables that enter the cost function for the fourth 
quarter of 2007 and 2009 
Non-Failed Banks Failed Banks p-value 
Variable 2007.Q4 2009.Q4 2007.Q4 2009.Q4 2007.Q4/2009.Q4 
Mean S.D Mean S.D Mean S.D Mean S.D 
Cost 53395 955229 46259 780129 42967 105935 24717 31302 0.488/0.049 
yreln 485820 7426706 625015 9671132 532470 1432030 329015 436220 0.745/0.003 
yciln 165465 3061182 179833 3128254 67053 181888 44812 65765 0.021/0.001 
yinln 78985 1587319 110304 2343919 15900 68652 6952 17501 0.003/0.001 
ysec 195045 3420833 335307 6913427 118358 379112 56332 108157 0.155/0.003 
yobs 136245 2736033 212630 3947440 74323 290364 104491 215157 0.146/0.060 
X 163124 3369938 250018 5307998 58179 124646 58179 65623 0.694/0.718 
wdep 0.0297 0.0066 0.0165 0.0052 0.0367 0.0065 0.0248 0.0054 0.001/0.000 
wlab 55.078 14.016 58.598 14.645 66.127 16.279 69.801 17.747 0.000/0.000 
wcap 0.2875 0.2119 0.2900 0.2131 03041 0.2507 0.3551 0.2949 0.409/0.050 
wpurf 0.0447 0.0083 0.0267 0.0076 0.0458 0.0091 0.0311 0.0096 0.132/0.000 
N 5843 5674 125 92 
The calculation of the mean and standard deviation for 2007.Q4 sample of failed banks is based on banks that failed 
between 2007.Q4-2009.Q4. 
Figures for 2009.Q4 are based on failures of 2010.Ql-201O.Q3. The price of labor is measured in thousands of US dollars. 
Pvalues under the null hypothesis of no difference between the means of variables of failed and nonfailed banks based on the 
twogroup mean comparison test with Satterthwaite's degrees of freedom. 
O".l 
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63 
Table 1.6. Estimates from the Continuous-Time Semiparametric 
Proportional Mixture Hazard Model (Model I) and Discrete-Time 
Mixture Hazard Model (Model II) 
Model I Model II 
Variable Latency Incidence Latency Incidence 
Intercept -2.5989 4.9130 
19ta 0.0797 0.0607 0.0531 -0.3320*** 
age -0.0004* 0.0004 -0.0003 0.0001 
tier 1 -48.417*** -86.791 *** -47.060*** -88.728*** 
alll -9.5829** 16.473** -8.8615* 8.8671 
reIn 4.4321 *** 2.0116 3.7811 *** 3.9762*** 
rnpl 7.2555*** 6.3838*** 6.1802*** 9.6447*** 
roa -6.1672 -11.248** -7.2727 -8.8145 
roe 0.0003 0.0002 0.0003 0.0003 
cd 1.0098 1.6651 1.2499 0.8245 
coredep -2.7654 -1.2140 -2.5466 -3.1272 
coffs 0.2351 *** 0.3168*** 0.2319*** 0.2703** 
lrec 38.162** 14.463 35.681 * 37.945 
IIp -10.427** -15.501 ** -11.688** -13.155** 
fte -0.8228 -3.0004** -0.8329 -3.1287** 
Imr -4.2141 *** -1.7238 -3.7792*** -4.4020*** 
sens 2.3255*** 2.5869** 2.0025** 5.6444*** 
cash 6.7983*** 6.7497** 6.9211 *** 4.5465 
oi -3.9670 -6.1756 -3.1670 -4.9651 
ur 0.1198*** 0.0196 0.0655* 0.0548 
chpi -15.091 * -10.555 -20.313** -10.645 
chhpi -8.1375* -3.1678 -9.8817** -5.4824 
chnphu -0.6570*** 0.0006 -0.5246** 0.0047 
chtype -0.2151 0.4441 0.0223 -0.7143 
frsmb 0.4707*** 0.4018* 0.4617*** 0.3466 
ibf 1.1171 1.4405 1.2816* -2.5959*** 
frsdistrcode 0.2465*** 0.2615*** 0.2295*** 0.2457*** 
LogL -1763.87 -1714.92 
N 5968 38571 
p*<O.l, p**<O.05, p***<O.Ol 
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Table 1.7. Estimates from the Stochastic Frontier Continuous-Time 
Semiparametric Proportional Mixture Hazard Model (Model III) and 
Stochastic Frontier Discrete-Time Mixture Hazard Model (Model 
IV) 
Model III Model IV 
Variable Latency Incidence Latency Incidence 
Intercept -2.6934 4.7694* 
19ta -0.0408 -0.0087 -0.0742 -0.3466*** 
age -0.0004* 0.0004 -0.0004* 0.0001 
tier 1 -48.647*** -86.280*** -48.452*** -88.684*** 
alll -8.5073* 17.003** -8.8587* 8.8881 
reIn 4.6588*** 2.1044* 4.4871 *** 3.9288*** 
rnpl 6.9014*** 6.0653*** 6.7347*** 9.5835*** 
roa -6.1672 -11.451 *** -6.4175 -8.8129 
roe 0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 
cd 0.8641 1.5840 0.7565 0.7329 
coredep -2.3913 -1.0244 -1.5432 -2.9196 
coffs 0.2447*** 0.3232*** 0.2516*** 0.2720** 
lrec 37.309** 14.661 37.219** 38.569 
IIp -11.175** -15.784** -11.654** -13.211 ** 
fte -2.1781** -3.8780** -2.8670*** -3.3559** 
Imr -3.7660*** -1.4553 -3.2640*** -4.2466*** 
sens 2.2143*** 2.5264** 2.0894** 5.6036*** 
cash 7.4166*** 7.1461 ** 7.6605*** 4.6012 
oi -3.9483 -6.4722 -4.1980 -5.0126 
ur 0.1210*** 0.0234 0.1208*** 0.0555 
chpi -15.567** -9.7061 -15.551 * -10.639 
chhpi -8.1886* -3.2387 -8.1802** -5.4864 
chnphu -0.6300*** -0.0001 -0.6171 *** 0.0046 
chtype -0.1496 0.4875 -0.1293 -0.7224 
frsmb 0.4960** 0.3994* 0.4977*** 0.3487 
ibf 1.1325 1.4718* 1.1295* -2.5923*** 
frsdistrcode 0.2612*** 0.2725*** 0.2663*** 0.2469*** 
p*<O.l, p**<O.05, p***<O.Ol 
-=-* 
table 1.7 Cont'd 
Model III Model IV 
Variable Latency Incidence Latency Incidence 
SFM 
(h 0.2062 0.0343 
62 0.3058*** 0.4137*** 
a 0.0552*** 0.0548*** 
I 0.5173*** 0.5278*** 
LogL -67701 -66360 
N 5968 38571 
p*<O.l, p**<O.05, p***<O.Ol 
Table 1.8. Cost efficiencies results for the sample of Nonfailed Banks 
Model III 
Model IV 
Random Effects 
Mean 
0.6817 
0.7295 
0.6466 
Standard Deviation 
0.0691 
0.1630 
0.0662 
The top and bottom 5% of inefficiencies scores are trimmed 
Minimum 
0.3167 
0.1992 
0.4636 
Maximum 
0.9705 
0.9688 
0.9650 
Table 1.9. Cost efficiencies results for the sample of Failed Banks 
Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Model III 
Model IV 
Random Effects 
0.6721 
0.6804 
0.6408 
0.1022 
0.0824 
0.0798 
The top and bottom 5% of inefficiencies scores are trimmed 
0.1499 
0.1539 
0.3845 
Table 1.10. In-sample classification error decomposition 
Type I error 
Type II error 
Overall classification error 
I 
0.3840 
0.0047 
0.1937 
II 
0.2882 
0.0051 
0.1465 
III 
0.1123 
0.0231 
0.0581 
Overall classification error is a simple average of type I and type II errors 
0.8722 
0.8488 
0.8626 
IV 
0.0644 
0.0476 
0.0573 
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Table 1.11. Out-of-sample classification error decomposition 
Type I error 
Type II error 
Overall classification error 
I 
0.2283 
0.0049 
0.1157 
II 
0.1630 
0.0062 
0.0840 
III 
0.0543 
0.0244 
0.0394 
Overall classification error is a simple average of type I and type II errors 
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Figure 1.4. Financial ratios over the 2007.Q4-2010.Q2 period. Solid 
line is for non-failed banks and dashed line is for failed banks. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Bounded Stochastic Frontiers with an Application to the 
US Banking Industry: 1984-20091 
2.1. Introduction 
The parametric approach to estimate stochastic production frontiers was in-
troduced by Aigner, Lovell, and Schmidt (1977), Meeusen and van den Broeck 
(1977), and Battese and Corra (1977). These approaches specified a parametric 
production function and a two-component error term. One component, reflecting 
the influence of many unaccountable factors on production as well as measurement 
error, is considered "noise" and is usually assumed to be normal. The other com-
ponent describes inefficiency and is assumed to have a one-sided distribution, of 
which the conventional candidates include the half normal (Aigner, et aI., 1977), 
truncated normal (Stevenson, 1980), exponential (Meeusen and van den Broeck, 
1977) and gamma (Greene 1980a,b, Stevenson, 1980). This stochastic frontier pro-
duction function has become an iconic modeling paradigm in econometric research, 
1This is a version of my work with professors Junhui Qian (Shanghai Jiao Tong University) and 
Robin Sickles. 
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rate making decisions in regulated industries across the world, in evaluating out-
comes of market reforms in transition economies, and in establishing performance 
benchmarks for local, state, and federal governmental activities. 
In this chapter we propose a new class of parametric stochastic frontier mod-
els with a more flexible specification of the inefficiency term, which we view as 
improvement on the basic iconic stochastic frontier production model. Instead of 
allowing unbounded support for the distribution of productive (cost) inefficiency 
term in the right (left) tail, we introduce an unobservable upper bound to ineffi-
ciencies or a lower bound to the efficiencies, which we call the inefficiency bound. 
The introduction of the inefficiency bound makes the parametric stochastic fron-
tier model more appealing for empirical studies in at least two aspects. First, it is 
plausible to allow only bounded support in many applications of stochastic frontier 
models wherein the extremely inefficient firms in a competitive industry or market 
are eliminated by competition. Bounded inefficiency makes sense in this setting 
since the extremely inefficient stores will be forced to close and thus individual 
production units constitute a truncated sample.2 This is consistent with the ar-
guments of Alchian (1950) and Stigler (1958) wherein firms are at any point in 
time not in a static long run equilibrium, but rather are tending to that situation 
as they are buffeted by demand and cost shocks. As a consequence, even if we 
correctly specify a family of distributions for the inefficiency term, the stochastic 
2In addition, the frequent use of balanced panels in empirical studies would in effect eliminate 
those failing firms from the sample and thus would provide more merit to the bounded inefficiency 
model. 
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frontier model may still be misspecified. This particular setting is one in which the 
inefficiency bound is informative as an indicator of competitive pressures and! or 
the extent of supervisory oversight by direct management or by corporate boards. 
In settings in which firms can successfully differentiate their product, which is the 
typical market structure and not the exception, or where there are market concen-
trations that may reflect collusive behavior or conditions for a natural monopoly 
and regulatory oversight, incentives to fully exploit market power or to instead 
make satisficing decision are both possible outcomes. Much more likely is that it 
is not one or the other but some middle ground between the two extremes that 
would be found empirically. 3 
A second justification for our introduction of the inefficiency bound into the 
classical stochastic production frontier model is that our model points to an ex-
planation for the finding of ''wrong "skewness in many applied studies using the 
traditional stochastic frontier, and thus to the potential of our bounded inefficiency 
model to solve the "incorrect" skewness problem. Researchers have often found 
positive instead of negative skewness in many samples examined in applied work, 
which may point to the stochastic frontier being incorrectly specified. However, 
3 "The quiet life hypothesis" (QLH) by Hicks (1935) argues that, due to management's subjective 
cost of reaching the optimal profits, firms use their market power to allow inefficient allocation 
of resources. Increasing competitive pressure is likely to force management to work harder to 
reach optimal profits. Another hypothesis that relates market power and efficiency is "the efficient 
structure hypothesis" (ESH) by Demsetz (1973). ESH argues that firms with superior efficiencies 
or technologies have lower costs and therefore higher profits. These firms are assumed to gain 
larger market shares which lead to higher concentration. Recently Kutlu and Sickles (2010) 
have constructed a model in which the dynamic game is played out and have tested for the 
alternative outcomes, finding support for the QLH in certain airlines city-pair markets and the 
ESH in others. 
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we conjecture that the distribution of the inefficiency term may itself be negatively 
skewed, which may happen if there is an additional truncation on the right tail 
of the distribution. One such specification in which this is a natural consequence 
is when the distribution of the inefficiency term is doubly truncated normal, that 
is, a normal distribution truncated at a point on the right tail as well as at zero. 
As normal distributions are symmetric, the doubly truncated normal distribution 
may exhibit negative skewness if the truncation on the right is closer to the mode 
than that on the left. We also consider the truncated half normal distribution, 
which is a special case of the former, and the truncated exponential distribution. 
Although these two distributions are always positively skewed, the fact that there 
is a truncation on the right tail makes the skewness very hard to identify empiri-
cally. That is to say, when the true distribution of the one-sided inefficiency error is 
bounded (truncated), the extent to which skewness is present in any finite sample 
may be substantially reduced, often to the extent that negative sample skewness 
for the composite error is not statistically significant. Thus the finding of positive 
skewness may speak to the weak identifiability of skewness properties in a bounded 
frontier model. 
In addition to proposing new parametric forms for the classical stochastic pro-
duction frontier model, we also show that our models are identifiable, and in which 
cases the identification is local or global. Initial consistent estimates are based on 
method of moments estimates, based on explicit analytic expressions which we 
derive, and which either can be used in a two-step method of scoring or as starting 
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values in solving the normal equations for the relevant sample likelihood, based 
on the parametric density functions whose expressions we also provide. As the 
regularity conditions for the maximum likelihood estimation are satisfied, we em-
ploy it in order to obtain consistent and asymptotically efficient estimates of the 
model parameters, including this of the inefficiency bound. We conduct Monte 
Carlo experiments to study the finite sample behavior of our estimators. We also 
extend the model to the panel data setting and allow for a time-varying inefficiency 
bound. By allowing the inefficiency bound to be time-varying, we contribute an-
other time-varying technical efficiency model to the efficiency literature. Our model 
differs from those most commonly used in the literature, e.g., Cornwell, Schmidt, 
and Sickles (1990), Kumbhakar (1990), Battese and Coelli (1992), and Lee and 
Schmidt (1993) in that, while previous time-varying efficiency models are time-
varying in the mean or intercept of individual effects, our model is time-varying in. 
the lower support of the distribution of individual effects. This explicitly allows 
for the level of competitive pressures on firms and other factors that may force 
the firms to exit the industry to change over time as demand and cost conditions 
change. 
The outline of this chapter is as follows. In Section 2 we present the new models 
and derive analytic formula for density functions and expressions that allow us to 
evaluate inefficiencies. Section 3 deals with the "wrong" skewness issue inherent 
in the traditional stochastic frontier model. Section 4 discusses the identification 
of the new models and the methods of estimation. Section 5 presents Monte Carlo 
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results on the finite sample performance of the bounded inefficiency model vis-a-vis 
classical stochastic frontier estimators. The extension of the new models to panel 
data settings and specification of the time-varying bound is presented in section 6. 
In Section 7 we give an illustrative study of the efficiency of U.S. banking industry 
in 1984-2009. Section 8 concludes. 
2.2. The Model 
We consider the following Cobb-Douglas production model, 
where 
K 
Yi = aD + L akXi,k + ei 
k=l 
(2.1) 
(2.2) 
For every production unit i, Yi is the log output, Xik the k-th log input, Vi the 
noise component, and Ui the (nonnegative) inefficiency component. We maintain 
the usual assumption that Vi is iid N(O, (j~), Ui is iid, and Vi and Ui are independent 
from each other and from regressors. Clearly we can consider other more flexible 
functional forms for production (or cost) that are linear or linear in logarithms, 
such as the generalized Leontief or the transcendental logarithmic, or ones that are 
nonlinear. The only necessary assumption is that the error process ei is additively 
separable from the functional forms we employ in the stochastic production (cost) 
frontier. 
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As described in the introduction, our model differs from the traditional sto-
chastic frontier model in that Ui is of bounded support. Additional to the lower 
bound, which is zero and which is the frontier, we specify an upper bound to the 
distribution of Ui (lower bound in the case of the cost frontier Ci = Vi + Ui). In par-
ticular, we assume that Ui is distributed as doubly truncated normal, the density 
of which is given by 
where <1>(.) and ¢(.) are the cdf and pdf of the standard normal distribution, re-
spectively, and l[o,B] is an indicator function. It is a distribution obtained by 
truncating N(f.L,O";) at zero and B > O. The parameter B is the upper bound of 
the distribution of Ui and we may call it the inefficiency bound. The inefficiency 
bound may be a useful index of competitiveness of a market or an industry.4 In 
the banking industry, which we examine in section 7, the inefficiency bound may 
also represent factors that influence the financial health of the industry. It may 
be natural to extend this specification and treat the bound as a function of indi-
vidual specific covariates Zi, such as exp(J'zi), which would allow identification of 
bank-specific measures of financial health. 
4The inefficiency bound has a natural role in gauging the tolerance for or ruthlessness against 
inefficient firms. It is also worth mentioning that, using this bound as the "inefficient frontier," 
we may define "inverted" efficiency scores in the same spirit of "Inverted DEA" described in 
Entani, Maeda, and Tanaka (2002). 
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Using the usual nomenclature of stochastic frontier models, we may call the 
model described above the normal/doubly truncated normal model, or simply, the 
doubly truncated normal model. The doubly truncated normal model is rather 
flexible. It nests the truncated normal (B = 00), half normal (p, = 0 and B = 00), 
and truncated half normal models (p, = 0). One desirable feature of our model 
is that the doubly truncated normal distribution may be positively or negatively 
skewed, depending on the truncation parameter B. This feature provides us with 
an alternative explanation for the ''wrong skewness" problem prevalent in empirical 
stochastic frontier studies. This will be made more clear later in this section and 
in the following chapter. Another desirable feature of our model is that, like the 
truncated normal model, it can describe the scenario that only a few firms in the 
sector are efficient, a phenomenon that is described in the business press as "few 
stars, most dogs", while in the truncated half normal model and the truncated 
exponential model (in which the distribution of Ui is truncated exponential), most 
firms are implicitly assumed to be relatively efficient. 
In Table 2.1 we provide detailed properties of our model. In particular, we 
present the density functions for the error term Ci, which is necessary for maximum 
likelihood estimation, and the analytic form for E[Uilci], which is the best predictor 
of the inefficiency term Ui under our assumptions, and the conditional distribution 
of Ui given Ci, which is useful for making inferences on Ui. The results for the 
truncated half normal model, a special case of the doubly truncated normal model 
(p, = 0), are also presented. Finally, we also provide results for the truncated 
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exponential model, in which the inefficiency term Ui is distributed according to the 
following density function, 
(2.3) 
The truncated exponential distribution can be further generalized to the truncated 
gamma distribution, which shares the nice property with the doubly truncated 
normal distribution that it may be positively or negatively skewed. 
For the doubly truncated normal model and the truncated half normal model, 
the analytic forms of our results use the so-called ,-parameterization, which spec-
ifies 
(2.4) 
By definition, E [0,1], a compact support, which is desirable for the numeri-
cal procedure of the maximum likelihood estimation. Another parameterization, 
initially employed by Aigner et al. (1977), is the A-parameterization 
(2.5) 
We may check that when B ----+ 00, the density function for Ci in the doubly 
truncated normal model reduces to that of the truncated normal model introduced 
by Stevenson (1980). Furthermore, if J-l = 0, it reduces to the likelihood function for 
the half normal model introduced by Aigner et al. (1977). Similarly, the truncated 
Table 2.1. Key Results 
f(s) is the density of 10 = v - u, lE(uls) is the conditional mean ofu given 10, and f(uls) is the conditional density of u given 
s. ¢;(-) and <1>(.) are the pdf and cdf of the standard normal distribution, respectively. And 1[0,B](') is an indicator function. 
Model f(s) 
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exponential model reduces to the exponential model introduced by Meeusen and 
van den Broeck (1977). 
2.3. The Skewness Issue 
A common and important methodological problem encountered when dealing 
with empirical implementation of the stochastic frontier model is that the residuals 
may be skewed in the wrong direction. In particular, the ordinary least squares 
(OLS) residuals may show positive skewness even though the composed error term 
v - u should display negative skewness, in keeping with u's positive skewness. This 
problem has important consequences for the interpretation of the skewness of the 
error term as a measure of technical inefficiency. It may imply that a nonrepresen-
tative random sample had been drawn from an inefficiency distribution possessing 
the correct population skewness (see Carree, 2002; Greene, 2007; Almanidis and 
Sickles, 2009; Simar and Wilson, 2010). This is considered a finite sample "ar-
tifact" and the usual suggestion in the literature and by programs implementing 
stochastic frontier models is to treat all firms in the sample as fully efficient and 
proceed with straightforward OLS based on the results of Olson et al. (1980) and 
Waldman (1982). As this would suggest setting the variance of the inefficiency 
term to zero, it would have problematic impacts on estimation and on inference. 
Simar and Wilson (2010) suggest a bagging method to overcome the inferential 
problems when a half-normal distribution for inefficiencies is specified. However, 
a finding of positive skewness in a sample may also indicate that inefficiencies are 
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in fact drawn from a distribution which has positive skewness. Carree (2002) con-
siders one-sided distribution for inefficiencies that can have negative or positive 
skewness. He employes the binomial distribution, wherein continuous inefficiencies 
fall into discrete "inefficiency categories". Besides being discrete, the binomial dis-
tribution implicitly assumes that only a very small fraction of the firms attain a 
level of productivity close to the frontier, especially when Ui is negatively skewed. 
Our model addresses the "wrong skewness" problem in the spirit of Carree 
(2002), but with a more appealing distributional specification on the efficiency 
term. For the doubly truncated normal model, let e1 = =..I!:. , e2 = B-1-', and 
Uti. O'u 
- et<l>(el)-e~<I>(e2) k - 0 1 4 N h t . th· M·II' . d ·t 
"1k = 4>(e2)-4>(el) ' - , , ... ,. ote t a "10 IS e Inverse 1 s ratIO an 1 
is equal to V2J1i in the half normal model, and that e1 and ~2 are the lower and 
upper truncation points of the standard normal density, respectively. The skewness 
of the doubly truncated normal distribution is then given by 
s - 2"13 - "10(3"11 + 1) + "12 
u - (1 2 + )3/2 
- "10 "11 
(2.6) 
It can be checked that when B > 211, Su is positive. And when B < 211, Su is 
negative. Since B > 0 by definition, it is obvious that only when 11 > 0 is it 
possible for Ui to be negatively skewed. And the larger 11 is, the larger range of 
values B may take such that Ui is negatively skewed. Consider the limiting case 
where a normal distribution with 11 -4 00 is truncated at zero and B > O. An 
infinitely large 11 means that there is effectively no truncation on the left at all and 
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that any finite truncation on the right gives rise to a negative skewness. Finally, 
for both the truncated half normal model (f-l = 0) and the truncated exponential 
model, the skewness of Ui is always positive. 
Consequently, the doubly truncated normal model has a residual that has an 
ambiguous sign of the skewness, which depends on an unobservable relationship 
between the truncation parameter Band f-l. We argue that this ambiguity theo-
retically could explain the prevalence of the "wrong" skewness problem in applied 
stochastic frontier research. Here, the term wrong is set in quotes to point out that 
the conventional wisdom that positive skewness is inconsistent with the standard 
stochastic frontier production model errors skewness is not necessarily the correct 
wisdom. When the underlying data generating process for Ui is based on the doubly 
truncated normal distribution, increasing sample size does not solve the "wrong" 
skewness problem. The skewness of the OLS residual c may be positively skewed 
even when sample size goes to infinity. Hence the "wrong" skewness problem also 
may be a large sample problem. 
In finite samples, we may use simulations to show that our model is capable of 
generating residuals with "wrong" skewness with higher frequency than do tradi-
tional stochastic frontier models (Simar and Wilson, 2010). We generate samples 
of the residuals c = v - U with U being doubly truncated normal. We then calcu-
late the proportion of samples with positively skewed residuals in 1000 repeated 
experiments. We set the parameter f-l to 1 and examine the proportions of positive 
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Table 2.2. Proportion of Positive Skewness for Simulated Residuals 
in the Doubly Truncated Normal Model. 
n B = 1 B=2 B=5 
50 0.519 0.505 0.480 
100 0.481 0.501 0.516 
200 0.495 0.473 0.514 
A = 0.1 500 0.487 0.503 0.539 
103 0.520 0.516 0.510 
104 0.504 0.483 0.512 
105 0.532 0.492 0.437 
50 0.517 0.485 0.503 
100 0.545 0.491 0.459 
200 0.551 0.490 0.486 
A = 0.5 500 0.520 0.488 0.431 
103 0.564 0.514 0.453 
104 0.684 0.491 0.397 
105 0.759 0.496 0.107 
50 0.565 0.536 0.367 
100 0.524 0.513 0.317 
200 0.529 0.512 0.224 
A=l 500 0.567 0.514 0.155 
103 0.576 0.524 0.063 
104 0.709 0.501 0 
105 0.943 0.503 0 
skewness when B is 1,2,5, and 10. We also experiment with different values of A 
and sample sizes from 50 to 105 . The results are reported in Table 2.2. 
The first column (B = 1) shows that the proportion of the samples with the 
positive ("wrong") skewness increases as the sample size gets larger. It appears to 
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converge to one as the sample size increases, especially when the signal-noise-ratio 
,\ is large. The second column corresponds to the case where B = 2fL. In this case 
there is about a 50 - 50 chance that we generate a sample with positive skewness. 
In other words, the positive skewness appears to be statistically insignificant in 
most of the cases. The third column (B = 5) corresponds to the case where the 
distribution of inefficiencies is positively skewed. The results in this column are 
similar with those reported in Simar and Wilson (2010) for traditional stochastic 
frontier models. 
Our simulation results confirm that the skewness issue is also a large sample 
issue, since for B < 2fL the proportion of the samples with positive skewness 
converges to one. This would mean that if the true data generating process is 
based on inefficiencies that are drawn from a doubly truncated normal distribution, 
and if a researcher fails to recognize this and finds a skewness statistic with the 
wrong sign, then she may erroneously reject her model. Moreover, if there is the 
potential for increasing the sample size and the researcher keeps increasing it and 
finds continuously positive signs of skewness, then she may erroneously conclude 
that all firms in her sample are super efficient. The bounded inefficiency model, 
the doubly truncated normal model in particular, avoids this problem. 
As a conclusion of this section, the doubly truncated normal model generalizes 
the stochastic frontier model in a way that allows for negative as well as positive 
skewness for the residual. In addition, although the truncated half normal and the 
truncated exponential models have correct (negative) skewness in the limit, the 
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existence of the inefficiency bound reduces the identifiability of negative skewness 
in finite samples, often to the extent that "wrong" skewness appears. This implies 
that finding a "wrong" skewness does not necessarily mean that the stochastic 
frontier model is inapplicable. It may only be that we are studying a market or an 
industry in which firms do not fall below some minimal level of efficiency in order 
to remain in the market or industry. Hence the traditional unbounded support 
for the inefficiency term would be misspecified and should be substituted with the 
model of bounded inefficiency. 
2.4. Estimation 
2.4.1. Identification 
Identification of our model may be done in two parts. The first part is concerned 
with the parameters describing the technology, and the second part identifies the 
distributional parameters using the information contained in the distribution of 
the residual. For models without an intercept term the identification conditions 
for the first part are well known and are satisfied in most of the cases. The 
structural parameters can be consistently obtained by applying straightforward 
OLS. However, for models containing an intercept term there is a need to bias 
correction it using the distributional parameters since E[e] = -E[u] i= 0 (see 
Afriat, 1972 and Richmond, 1974). Therefore, the identification of the second part, 
which is based on method of moments requires a closer examination. Table 2.3 lists 
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Table 2.3. Central Moments of c 
Moment Doubly-truncated-normal 
'ljJ1 -f.l-CYuTJo 
'ljJ2 CY; (1 - TJ5 + TJl) + CY~ 
'ljJ3 -CY~ (2TJ8 - 3TJl''lO - TJo + TJ2) 
'ljJ4 CY; (3 + 3TJl + TJ3 - 2TJ5 - 4TJOTJ2 + 6TJ5TJl - 3TJ~) 
+6CY;CY~ (1 - TJ5 + TJl) + 3CY; 
'ljJ5 -10CY;CY~ (2TJ8 - 3TJl TJo - TJo + TJ2) 
-CY~ (TJ4 + 4TJ2 - 5TJoTJ3 + lOTJ5TJ2 - lOTJ8TJl + 10TJ8 - 15TJoTJl + 4TJg - 7TJo) 
See the text for the definitions of T/k' k = 0, ... ,4. 
the population (central) moments of (Ci) for the doubly truncated normal model 
and the truncated exponential model. The moments of the truncated half normal 
model can be obtained by setting f.l = 0 in the doubly truncated normal model. 
These results are essential for the discussion of identification and the method of 
moments estimation. 
To examine the identification of the second part we note that under the as-
sumption of independence of the noise and inefficiency term the following equality 
holds 
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This is a measure of excess kurtosis and for the truncated half-normal model 
is derived as 
where TJo = (211");;;~~i<PW. Notice that for the normal distribution TJo = 0 and thus 
the excess kurtosis is also zero. 
After multiplying (2.7) by 'l/J;4/3 we eliminate (J' u and the resulting function, 
which we denote by 9 has only one argument ~ 
~3- 3(:- 4(:2-2 4-2 3(:2-2 12~-3 g{~) = -.." 1]0 + ..,,1]0 - .." 1]0 - 1]0 - .." 1]0 - ..,,1]0 
(2 -3 3(:-2 - (:2 - ) -4/3 1]0 - ..,,1]0 -1]0 +.." 1]0 (2.8) 
The weak law of large numbers implies that 
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where mk denotes the kth central sample moment of the least squares residuals e. 
By employing the Slutsky theorem we can specify the following function G: 
g(~) m4 - 3m~ -
m 4/ 3 
==? 
G(~) g(~) - m4 - 3m~ -
m 4/ 3 
Similarly, we can derive the function G for the normal/truncated exponential 
model with function 9 expressed by 
(2.9) 
Both the truncated half normal model and the truncated exponential model are 
globally identified. To see this, we can examine the monotonicity of the function 
G with respect to the parameter ~ which will allow us to express this parameter 
(implicitly) as a function of sample moments and data. This condition provides the 
necessary and sufficient condition for global identification ala Rothenberg (1971). 
For the truncated half normal model, G is monotonically decreasing and for the 
truncated exponential model, G is monotonically increasing. Hence, in both cases, 
G is invertible and ~ can be identified. The identification of other parameters then 
follows from the third order moment of least squares residuals. Note, however, 
that for large values of ~ (e.g., ~ > 5 for the normal/truncated half-normal model 
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and ~ > 20 for the normal/truncated exponential model), the curve 9(0 is nearly 
flat and gives poor identification. ~ can be large for two reasons: either (J' u goes to 
zero or the bound parameter is relatively large. In the first case the distribution 
of the inefficiency process approaches the Dirac-delta distribution which makes it 
very hard for the distributional parameters to be identified. This limiting case is 
discussed in Wang and Schmidt (2008). In the second case the distribution of the 
inefficiency term becomes unbounded as in the standard stochastic frontier models, 
where it is straightforward to show the global identification (Aigner et al., 1977 
and Olson et al., 1980). 
It is not clear, however, that the doubly truncated normal model is glob-
ally identifiable. However, local identification can be verified. We may examine 
7/J34/3(7/J4 - 37/J~) and 7/J35/3(7/J5 -107/J27/J3)' both of which are functions of ~1 and ~2 
only and we denote them as 91(~1' ~2) and 92(~1' ~2)' respectively. Let gl and g2 
be the sample versions of 91 and 92, respectively, we have the following system of 
identification equations, 
Gl(~l' ~2) == 91(~1' ~2) - gl 0 
G2(~1' ~2) == 92(~1' ~2) - g2 - 0 
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By the implicit function theorem, the identification of ~1 and ~2 depends on the 
matrix 
H = (~~~ ~~~) 
092 092 
a~l a~2 
If H is of full rank, then ~1 and ~2 can be written as functions of 91 and 92; the 
identification of the model then follows. The analytic form of H is very compli-
cated, but we may examine the invertibility of H by numerically evaluating g1 
and g2 and inferring the sign of each element in H. It can be verified that the 
determinant of H is nonzero in neighborhoods within It, 12 , and 14 , the definitions 
of which are given as follows, 
(i) 11== {(J.t,B)IJ.t::; O,B > O} 
(ii) h == {(/1, B)IJ.t > 0, B E (0, 2ft)} 
(iii) h == {(J.t, B)IB = 2J.t > O} 
(iv) 14 == {(J.t,B)IJ.t > O,B > 2J.t}. 
The line 13 == {(J.t,B)IB = 2J.t > O} corresponds to the case where 'l/J3 = O. 
Hence, the functions gl and g2 are not continuous and the implicit function theorem 
is not applicable. Nonetheless, simulation results in the next section show that 
when the true values of Band J.t satisfy B = 2J.t, both Band J.t are consistently 
estimated. This may indicate that the restricted (B = 2J.t) model may be nested 
in the unrestricted model and the model is locally identifiable on h U 13 U h 
We may treat the doubly truncated normal model as a collection of differ-
ent sub-models corresponding to the different domains of parameters. Treated 
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separately, each of the sub-models is globally identified. In maximum likelihood 
estimation, the separate treatment is easily achieved by constrained optimization 
on each parameter subset. For example, on the line of {(J.L, B)IJ.L = 0, B > o} c h, 
the doubly truncated normal model reduces to the truncated half normal model. 
As another useful example, the line 12 corresponds to a sub-model that has positive 
skewness even asymptotically. 
2.4.2. Method of Moment Estimation 
The method of moments (Olson et al., 1980) may be employed to estimate our 
model or to obtain initial values for maximum likelihood estimation. In the first 
step of this approach, OLS is used to obtain consistent estimates of the parameters 
describing the technology, apart from the intercept. In the second step, using the 
distributional assumptions on the residual, equations of moment conditions are 
solved to obtain estimates of the parameters describing the distribution of the 
residual. 
More specifically, we may rewrite the production frontier model in (2.1) and 
(2.2) as 
K 
Yi = (ao - ]ffiUi) + L akxi,k + c: 
k=l 
where c; = Ci + (]ffiUi) has zero mean and constant variance a;. Hence OLS yields 
consistent estimates for ci and ak, k = 1, ... , K. Equating the sample moments of 
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estimated residuals (en to the population moments, one can solve for the parame-
ters associated with the distribution of (cn. 
2.4.3. Maximum Likelihood Estimation 
For more efficient estimation, we may use maximum likelihood estimation (MLE). 
Note that with the presence of a noise term Vi, the range of residual is unbounded 
and does not depend on the parameter. No other standard regularity conditions 
might be questioned. In the remainder of this section we provide the log-likelihood 
functions for the bounded inefficiency model for the three parametric distributions 
we have considered. 
The log-likelihood function for the doubly truncated normal model with 'Y-
parameterization is given by 
_cp(i";'Y/(1- 'Y) - /1";(1- 'Y)/'Yn 
(J' 
(2.10) 
(2.11) 
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This can be expressed in terms of the A-parameterization as in Aigner et al. 
(1977) by substituting I in (2.10) with 
(2.12) 
In addition to the ,,-parameterization discussed earlier, we re-parametrize the 
bound parameter with another parameter B = exp( -B). Unlike the bound, B 
takes values in compact unit interval which facilitates the numerical procedure of 
maximum likelihood estimation as well as establishing the asymptotic normality 
of this parameter. When B lies in the interior of the parameter space, the MLE 
estimator is asymptotically normal (see Rao, 1973 and Davidson and MacKinnon, 
1993 among others). 
The log-likelihood function for the truncated half normal model is 
InL (2.13) 
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Finally, the log-likelihood function for the truncated exponential model is given 
by 
InL 
n lnB,,-1/2 n 1 - "( 
--In''( - nIna - nln(l- e u ) + --- (2.14) 
2 2 "( 
-1/2 n n (I B- )( )-1/2 ~ +~ ~Ci+ ~ln[<p( - n +c~ 1-"( +V~) 
_<p(ci(l- "()-1/2 + Jl -"()] 
a "( 
Note that in practice we may also need the gradients of the log likelihood 
function. The gradients are complicated in form but straightforward to derive. 
These are provided in the appendix. 
After estimating the model, we can estimate the composed error term Ci: 
(2.15) 
From this we can estimate the inefficiency term Ui using the formula for E ( Ui I Ci) 
provided in Table 2.1. 
One reasonable question is whether or not one can test for the absence or the 
presence of the bound (Ho : B = 0 vs. HI : B > 0), which one may wish to test 
since this would suggest that the proper specification would be the standard SF 
model which assumes no bound as a special case of our more general bounded 
SF model. The test procedure is slightly complicated but still feasible. The first 
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complication arises from the fact that B lies on the boundary of the parameter 
space under the null. Second, it is obvious from the log-likelihood functions pro-
vided above that the bound is not identified in this case and it can be shown 
that any finite order derivative of the log-likelihood function with respect to B 
is zero. Thus the conventional Wald and Lagrange Multiplier (LM) statistics are 
not defined and the Likelihood Ratio (LR) statistic has a nonstandard asymptotic 
distribution that strictly would dominate the Xfl) distribution. Lee (1993) derives 
the asymptotic distribution of such an estimate as a mixture of X2 distributions 
under the null that its value is zero, focusing in particular on the SF model under 
the assumption of half-normally distributed inefficiencies. Here .\ is globally iden-
tified, which can also be seen using the method of moments estimator provided 
in Aigner et al. (1977). Lee (1993) provides useful one-to-one reparameterization 
which transform the singular information matrix into a nonsingular one. However, 
since the bound in our model case is not identified in this situation, there is no 
such re-parameterization and hence this procedure cannot be used. An alternative 
is to apply the bootstrap procedure proposed by Hansen (1996, 1999) to construct 
asymptotically equivalent p - values to make an inference. To implement the 
test we treat the Ei (i = 1, ... , n) as a sample from which the bootstrap samples 
E~m) (i = 1, ... , n; m = 1, ... , M) are drawn with replacement. Using the bootstrap 
sample we estimate the model under the null and the alternative of bounded ineffi-
ciency and construct the corresponding LR statistic. We repeat this procedure M 
times and calculate the percentage of times the bootstrap LR exceeds the actual 
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one. This provides us with the bootstrap estimate of the asymptotic p - value of 
LR under the null. 
2.5. Panel Data 
In the same spirit as in Schmidt and Sickles (1984) and Cornwell et al. (1990), 
we may specify a panel data model of bounded inefficiencies: 
where 
K 
Yit = ao + L akXit,k + Cit 
k=l 
(2.16) 
(2.17) 
We assume that the inefficiency components (Uit) are positive, independent 
from the regressors, and are independently drawn from a time-varying distribution 
with upper bound Bt . We may set B t to be time-invariant. However, it is certainly 
more plausible to assume otherwise, as the market or industry may well become 
more or less forgiving as time goes by, especially in settings in which market reforms 
are being introduced or firms are adjusting to a phased transition from regulation 
to deregulation. 
Note that since Uit is time-varying, the above panel data model is in effect 
a time-varying technical efficiency model. Our model differs from the existing 
literature in that, while previous time-varying efficiency models, notably Cornwell 
et al. (1990), Kumbhakar (1990), Battese and Coelli (1992), and Lee and Schmidt 
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(1993), are time-varying in the mean or intercept of individual effects, our model 
is time-varying in the upper support of the distribution of inefficiency term 1.l i. 
The assumption that Uit is independent over time simplifies estimation and 
analysis considerably. In particular, the covariance matrix of Ci == (ci!, ... , ciT)' is 
diagonal. This enables us to treat the panel model as a collection of cross-section 
models in the chronological order. We may certainly impose more structure on the 
sample path of the upper bound of Uit, without incurring heavy costs in terms of 
analytic difficulty. For example, we may impose smoothness conditions on Bt • This 
is empirically plausible, indeed, since changes in the market competitive conditions 
may come gradually. And it is also technically desirable, since imposing smoothness 
conditions gives us more degree of freedom in estimation, hence better estimators 
of model parameters. A natural way of doing this is to let Bt be a sum of weighted 
polynomials, 
K 
Bt = L bi(t/T)i, t = 1, ... , T, 
i=O 
(2.18) 
where (bi ) are constants. We may also use trigonometric series, splines, among 
others, in the modeling of B t . 
2.6. Simulations 
To examine the finite sample performance of the three MLE estimators we run 
a series of Monte Carlo experiments for the standard cross-sectional stochastic 
frontier model. The data generating process is (2.1) and (2.2) with aD = 0 and 
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K 2 (two regressors and no constant termr; Throughout we set C¥l = 0.6, 
C¥2 0.5. We set rYu = 0.3 in all three submodels. To examine how the noise 
level (rYv) affects the quality of estimation, we vary rYv from 0.1,0.2, to 0.5. In 
the other dimension, we change the inefficiency bound from 0.8,1.0, to 1.2, to 
examine its impact on estimation. For both normal/truncated half normal and 
normal/doubly truncated normal models we use the 'Y-parameterization, and thus 
the parameters to be estimated are rY and 'Y as well as the production parameters. 
For the normal/truncated exponential model we report the estimates of parameters 
rY u and rY v themselves. 
Tables 2.7 and 2.8 report results from the normal/truncated half normal model 
with a sample size of 200 and 1000, respectively. The results from these two tables 
differ only quantitatively. The first important conclusion that can be drawn is 
that the MLE estimators for technology parameters, C¥l and C¥2, are accurately 
estimated. As the noise level increases, the mean squared error (MSE) of these 
estimates increases only marginally. The second important observation is that the 
estimates of the inefficiency bound have relatively smaller MSE's when the noise 
level is mild. When noise level is high, as when rYv = 0.5, B becomes inaccurate. In 
table 2.7 distribution parameters, fJ and l' display a significantly upward bias and 
large MSE as the signal-to-noise ratio decreases.u Wang and Schmidt (2008) show 
5 The results does not change very much if we include the constant term. We ommit it to save 
space. The results with constant term are available upon the request. 
6lt can be shown that in this case the Hessian is close to singular, which makes the estiamates 
of the model paramers less accurate. To our best knoweldge this pathology is shared by all 
likelihood based stochastic frontier models in this setting. 
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that the distribution of u degenerates to a point mass at E[u] as A tends to zero. 
This is also the case for our model. When the noise level is high relative to the 
variance of inefficiencies the distributional parameters are very hard identified. On 
the other hand, as A -- 00 the variance of the noise is not identified (Deterministic 
Frontier). Table 2.8 shows that the problem is alleviated somewhat when the 
sample size increases. 
We now look at the doubly truncated normal model. Table 2.9 and 2.10 reports 
Monte Carlo results with a sample size of 200 and 1000, respectively. For both 
sample sizes, the technology parameter estimates al and a2 are quite accurate. In 
order to identify the distribution parameters we employ the restrictions that arise 
form the identification discussion of section 4. Now, the estimates of distribution 
parameters, (J and 'Y, are upward biased, especially when A and N are relatively 
small. Their MSE is low for low levels of noise. In addition, the parameter J..l 
is accurately estimated, especially then the sample size is large. The inefficiency 
bound is significantly distorted when the signal-to-noise ratio decreases. Finally, 
the case of B = 0.8 corresponds to the case of the "wrong" skewness. Clearly 
there is no problem of estimation and identification of the model parameters for 
this particular case. 
Tables 2.11 and 2.12 provide results for the truncated exponential model with 
a sample size of 200 and 1000, respectively. As with the previous models, the 
technology parameter estimates al and a2 are accurately estimated. Parameters 
of the one-sided error term have relatively low MSE's when the noise level is mild. 
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It can be seen from these tables how sensitive the parameter estimates 0-u and B 
are to the level of stochastic noise. The estimated values of these parameters are 
highly contaminated by the noise when this dominates the inefficiency term. As 
expected, the finite sample problems with 0-u and B are lessened when we consider 
the larger sample size of 1000. 
2.7. Efficiency Analysis of Banking Industry 
2.7.1. Empirical Model and Data 
We now apply the bounded inefficiency (BIE) model to an analysis of the U.S. 
banking industry, which underwent a series of deregulatory reforms in the early 
1980's and 1990's, and experienced an adverse economic environment in the last few 
turbulent years of the last decade.7 Our analysis covers a lengthy period between 
1984 and 2009. What is generally observed during this period is that the number of 
commercial banks substantially decreased through either mergers or failures. The 
current number of banks is less than half of the number in 1984. It is characteristic 
of the fact that the number of failed banks in 2009 was about 2.75 times more than 
that of the period 2001-2008 due to banking crisis that was fired up in summer 
of 2007. As of the present time, the number of mergers and new charters has 
decreased, while the proportion of problematic banks has dramatically increased. 
However, the biggest failures occurred during the financial crisis of early 1990's 
7 These deregulations gradually allowed banks in certain states to merge with other banks across 
the state borders. Reigle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act that was passed 
by the Congress in 1994 also allowed the branching across the state lines. 
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where almost 400 banks failed within three years. All these facts have triggered 
the interest of researchers to analyze the U.S. commercial banking industry more 
closely and especially the performance of its institutions and their market behavior. 
The primary aim of our model is to capture the efficiency trends of the U.S. banking 
sector during all of these years until the present time, as well as to identify the 
toughness of the market against very inefficient firms. . 
Here we extend our model to the panel setting and following Adams et al. 
(1999) and Kneip et al. (2011), we specify a multiple output/input Cobb-Douglas 
stochastic output distance frontier model as follows8 
(2.19) 
where }it is the log of real estate loans; Xit is the negative of log of inputs, which 
include demand deposit (dd), time and savings deposit (dep), labor (lab), capital 
(cap), and purchased funds (purf).9 Yi; includes the log of commercial and indus-
trial loans/real estate loans (ciln) and installment loans/real estate loans (inln). 
In order to account for the riskiness and heterogeneity of the banks we include the 
log of the ratio of equity to total assets (eqrt) which usually measures the risk of 
insolvency of the banks in the banking literature. lO The lower the ratio the more 
8 For more discussion on stochastic distance frontiers see Lovell et al. (1994). 
9Purchased funds consist of wholesale CDs, federal funds purchased and all securities sold under 
agreements to resell, other borrowed money and notes issued to the U.S. Treasury, brokered 
deposits, and subordinated notes and debentures. 
lOWe exclude from the sample banks with eqrt less that 0.02. Typically, these banks are close 
to failure and estimation of their efficiency scores require special treatments. (see Wheelock and 
Wilson, 2000 and Almanidis, 2010 for more discussion). 
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riskier a bank is considered. We assume the Vit are iid across i and t, and for each 
t, Uit has a upper bound B t • Then we can treat this model as a generic panel data 
bounded inefficiency model as discussed in Section 2.5. Once the individual effects 
Uit are estimated, technical efficiency for a particular firm at time t is calculated 
We use U.S. commercial banking data from 1984.Q1 through 2009.Q3. The 
data is a balanced panel of 4, 193 commercial banks extracted from the Call Reports 
and the FDIC Summary of Deposits. The data set includes 431,879 observations for 
103 quarterly periods. This is a fairly long panel and thus the assumption of time-
invariant inefficiencies does not seem to be tenable. For this reason we compare 
the estimates from BIE model to the estimates from other time-varying models 
such as CSSW (Cornwell et al., 1990) and BC (Battese and Coelli, 1992) models, 
along with the baseline fixed effect estimator (FIX) of Schmidt and Sickles (1984). 
Descriptive statistics for the bank-level variables are given in table 2.6, where all 
nominal values are converted to reflect 2000 year values. 
2.7.2. Results 
Table 2.4 compares the parameter estimates of the bounded inefficiency (BIE) 
model with that of FIX, CSSW, and BC.ll The structural parameters are statis-
tically significant at 1 % significance level and have the expected sign for all four 
llvVe estimate the normal/doubly truncated normal model in order to be able to compare it with 
the Be model which specifies the inefficiencies to follow the truncated normal distribution. 
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models. The technology parameters from BIE model are somewhat different from 
those obtained from other models. The negative value of the coefficient of the eqrt 
implies that riskier firms tend to produce more loans, and especially real estate 
loans that are considered of high risk. The positive sign of the estimate of the time 
trend shows technological progress on average. There is a slight difference between 
the distributional parameters of BIE and Be model which are also statistically 
significant at any conventional significance level. We also tested (not reported 
here) other distributional specifications for BIE discussed above. The distribu-
tional parameters obtained from the normal/truncated half-normal model did not 
differ very much from that reported in the table, but those obtained from the nor-
mal/truncated exponential model did. However, this is not a specific to bounded 
inefficiency models. Similar differences have been documented in unbounded SF 
models as well. 
We test for the extent by which the distribution of inefficiencies displays positive 
skewness by testing the asymmetry of the distribution of observable least squares 
residuals. We do so by utilizing the adjusted for skewness test statistic proposed 
by Bera and Premaratne (2001), which is suitable for testing for a symmetry of 
distributions with non-zero excess kurtosis. The test statistic is given by 
(2.20) 
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where 'l/Ji is the ith population central moment of the least squares residuals and 
n is the number of observations in the sample. This statistic is asymptotically 
normally distributed and its value in our case is calculated to be 990.26, leading to 
rejection of the null hypothesis of symmetry at any conventional significance level. 
The asymmetry of the least squares residuals is also verified by quantile-quantile 
plot representation in figure 2.1. 
We estimate the time-varying inefficiency bound using two approaches. First 
we estimate the bound for the panel data model without imposing any restriction 
on its sample path. In the second approach we specify the bound as a sum of 
weighted time polynomials. We choose to fit a fifth degree polynomial the co-
efficients of which are estimated by MLE along with the rest parameters of the 
model. 12 Both approaches are illustrated in figure 2.3 with their respective 95% 
confidence intervals. It can be seen that the inefficiency bound has had a decreas-
ing trend up to year 2005, when the financial crisis (informally) began, and then 
it is increasing for the remaining periods through 2009.Q3. One interpretation of 
this trend can be that the deregulations of 1980's and 1990's increased competitive 
pressures and forced many inefficient banks to exit the industry, reducing thus the 
12The choice of degrees of the time polynomial was based on the simple likelihood-ratio (LR) 
test for degrees of the polynomial ranging from 1 to lD. The maximum likelihood estimates of 
coefficients for this polynomial are given by 
bo = -3.9477e - 007, b1 = 0.0039509**, b2 = -15.816***, b3 = 31656**, b4 = -3.168e + 
007*, b5 = 1.2682e + OlD 
-------
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upper limit of inefficiency that banks could sustain and still remain in their par-
ticular niche market in the larger banking industry. The new upward trend can be 
attributed to the adverse economic environment and an increase in the proportion 
of banks that are characterized as "too big to fail." 
Of course, for time-varying efficiency models such as CSSW, BC, and BIE, 
average efficiencies change over time.13 These are illustrated in figure 2.2 along 
with their 95% confidence bounds. The BIE averaged efficiencies (panel 4) are 
significantly higher than those obtained from the fixed effect time-invariant model. 
However, the differences are small compared to BC and CSSW models. These 
small differences are not unexpected, however, since the existence of the ineffi-
ciency bound implies that the mean conditional distribution of inefficiencies is also 
bounded from above, resulting in higher average efficiencies. Failing to take the 
bound into account could possibly yield underestimated mean and individual effi-
ciency scores (see table 2.1). We smooth the BIE averaged efficiencies by fitting 
ninth degree polynomial of time in order to capture their trend and also to be able 
to compare them with other two time-varying averaged efficiency estimates. These 
are represented by a curve labeled BIEsmooth. It can be seen that the efficiency 
trend for the BIE model is in close agreement with the CSSW model and better 
reflects the deregulatory reforms and consolidation of the U.S. commercial banking 
industry. It is increasing initially and then falls soon after the saving and loans 
(S&L) crisis of early 90's began. It has the decrea.'ling pace and reaches its minium 
13We trimmed the top and bottom 5% of inefficiencies to remove the effects of outliers. 
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in 1993 a year before Congress passed the Reigle-Neal Act which allowed commer-
cial banks to merge with and acquire banks across the state lines. This spurred a 
new era of interstate banking and branching, which along with the Gramm-Leach-
Billey Act that granted broad-based securities and insurance power to commercial 
banks, substantially decreased the number of banks operated in the U.S. from 
10,453 in 1994 to 8,315 by the end of the millennium. After 1994 the banking 
industry witnessed a rapid increase in averaged efficiencies of its institutions due 
in part to the disappearance of inefficient banks previously sheltered from compet-
itive pressure and due to the expansion of large banks that both financially and 
geographically diversified their products. The increasing trend continues until the 
new recessionary period of 2001 and then steadily falls thereafter until the rapid 
decline illustrating the effects of the 2007-2009 crisis. The CSSW model is able 
to show the weakness of the banking industry as early as 2005. This weakness is 
illustrated by the estimated inefficiency bound from the BIE model. 
On the other hand, the BC model shows a slight, statistically non-significant, 
upward efficiency trend for all these periods (fJ = 0.0066). We also can look at 
the efficiency ranking of firms from these four estimators. Table 2.5 tabulates 
the Spearman rank correlations among different models, which shows that BIE 
efficiency ranking is in agreement with other estimators, especially with CSSW. 
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Table 2.4. Comparisons of Various Estimators. Estimates and standard 
errors (in parentheses) for each model parameters from competing models ( FIX, 
CSSW, BC, BIE) 
FIX CSSW BC BIE 
ciln 0.2407 0.2971 0.2284 0.2838 
(0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0013) (0.0012) 
inln 0.2206 0.1715 0.2043 0.2609 
(0.0013) (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0013) 
dd -0.0940 -0.0935 -0.1197 -0.0996 
(0.0024) (0.0020) (0.0024) (0.0020) 
dep -0.3999 -0.4037 -0.4368 -0.4053 
(0.0048) (0.0051) (0.0048) (0.0034) 
lab -0.3104 -0.2219 -0.1610 -0.1892 
(0.0046) (0.0042) (0.0044) (0.0020) 
cap -0.0460 -0.0464 -0.0510 -0.0965 
(0.0016) (0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0015) 
purf -0.1507 -0.1658 -0.1627 -0.1665 
(0.0034) (0.0029) (0.0034) (0.0031) 
time 0.0057 0.0020 0.0021 
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
eqrt -0.1369 -0.1189 -0.0975 -0.1088 
(0.0045) (0.0041) (0.0044) (0.0039) 
0.7980 0.7690 
(0.0115) (0.0058) 
0.2210 0.2070 0.2733 0.2712 
(0.0034) (0.0020) (0.0045) (0.0022) 
0.3240 0.3518 
(0.0139) (0.0630) 
B 1.5186 
ATE 0.5853 0.6470 0.6410 0.6998 
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Table 2.5. Spearman Rank Correlations of Efficiencies 
FIX CSSW BC BIE 
FIX 1 
CSSW 0.8556 1 
BC 0.9662 0.8231 1 
BIE 0.6919 0.7942 0.7168 1 
In sum, figures 2.2 and 2.3 display an interesting findings: on one hand, an 
upward trend is observed for the average efficiency of the industry, presumably 
benefiting from the deregulations in the 1980's and 1990's; on the other hand, the 
industry appears to be more "tolerant" of less efficient banks in the last decade. 
Possibly, these banks have a characteristic that we have not properly controlled 
for and we are currently examining this issue. Given the recent experiences in 
the credit markets due in part to the poor oversight lending authorities gave in 
their mortgage and other lending activities, our results also may be indicative of 
a backsliding in the toleration of inefficiency that could have contributed to the 
problems the financial services industry faces today. 
2.8. Conclusions 
In this chapter we have introduced a series of parametric stochastic frontier 
models that have upper (lower) bounds on the inefficiency (efficiency). The model 
parameters can be estimated by maximum likelihood, including the inefficiency 
bound. In the panel data setting, we set the inefficiency bound to be varying over 
time, hence contributing another time-varying efficiency model to the literature. 
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We have examined the finite sample performance of the maximum likelihood esti-
mator in the cross-sectional setting. We also have showed how the "wrong "skew-
ness problem inherent in traditional stochastic frontier model can be avoided when 
the bound is taken into account. An empirical analysis of U.S. commercial banking 
industry using the new model revealed interesting trends in efficiency scores. 
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2.9. Appendix: First-order derivatives of the log-likelihood function 
The first-order derivatives of the normal/doubly truncated normal model are 
calculated based on log-likelihood function (2.10) and are given by 
81nL n [(ZI¢(ZI) - Z2¢(Z2)] - 1 .------
8)" -"1 4>(ZI) - 4>(Z2) + (In(B) + /L) ,2 v,/(l - ,,))¢(Z3i) 
1 n 1 _ 1 
+;;: ~ 4>(z3d - 4>(Z4i) {(( -In(B) + ci) (1 _ ,)2 J(1- ,)h 
1 1 
-(ci (1 _ ,)2 J(1 - ,) I, - /L).. ,2 J, 1(1 - ,) )¢(Z4i)} 
81n(L) n ¢(ZI) - ¢(Z2) _ t (ci + /L) +V(l - ,)h t ¢(Z4i) - <P(Z3i) 
8/L 0' v0 <I>(ZI) - <I>(Z2) i=1 0'2 0' i=1 <I>(Z3i) - 4>(Z4i) 
81n(L) n ¢(zd 1 ~ ¢(Z3i) 
8iJ [30' v0 4>(ZI) - 4>(Z2) - iJO'v(1- ,h -8 4>(Z3i) - 4>(Z3i) 
where Z = - (In(B)+JL) Z = ~ z. = _ (In(B)-ei)~+(ln(B)+JL)~ . -
I u V'Y ' 2 u V'Y ' 3, u ' Z4,-
eiv''''''""-y/-:-(I--'Y-:"")-JLV(I-'Y)/'Y d ... . 
u ,an ci = Yi -XiQ.. The first-order denvatives oflog-hkehhood 
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function of normal/truncated half-normal model are obtained after substituting 
I-" = 0 in the above expressions. 
The scores for normal/truncated exponential model are derived from (2.14) as 
OlnL 
0(7 = 
OlnL 
0(7 
n 
(7 
n In E,,(-1/2 InB'Y-
1/ 2 
e " 
----~ 
InB'Y-1/2 
1- e " 
InB'Y- 1/ 2 
n nInE e " n 1 n 
= - 2'V - 2"y3/2 In B'Y- 1/ 2 - 22 - 2 3/2 L Ci 
I 1 _ e " "( "( i=l 
1 ~ ¢(Z2i) - ¢(Zli) (Ci 1~) 
-2 f;;t {<ll(Zli) - <ll(Z2i) (7(1 - ,,()3/2 - "(2 V 1 -~ "( 
In E ¢( Zli) 
(7(1 - ,,()3/2 <ll(Zli) - <ll(Z2i) 
where Z . = (-lnB+ei)(I-I')-1/2 + IG. and Z . = ei(I-I')-1/2 + IG. 
It r:T V -:y It r:T V -:yo 
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Table 2.6. Descpriptive statistics for bank-specific variables 
Variable Name TVIean TVIedian SD 
Real Estate loans 212968 17549 4341501 
Commercial and Industrial loans 103272 4908 2143974 
Installment loans 58869 4360 1417908 
Demand Deposits 54913 7282 912761 
Time and Savings Deposits 449003 46954 1.00E+07 
Labor 186 29 2960 
Capital 8196 913 129778 
Purchased Funds 163785 13698 3322838 
Ratio of Equity to Total Assets 0.1007 0.0936 0.0312 
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~.5 
Figure 2.1. Quantile-Quantile plot 
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Table 2.7. Monte Carlo results for Truncated Half Normal model. 
The number of repetitions M = 1000. Sample size N = 200 
B=0.8 B = 1.0 B = 1.2 
True AVE MSE AVE MSE AVE MSE 
a- 0.3 0.3308 0.0022 0.3288 0.0013 0.3282 0.0011 
i' 0.9 0.9079 0.0026 0.9101 0.0025 0.9107 0.0021 
(Jv = 0.1 B 0.7987 0.0148 0.9223 0.0309 0.9600 0.0923 
&1 0.6 0.6004 0.0009 0.6008 0.0009 0.6003 0.0009 
&2 0.5 0.5016 0.0008 0.5022 0.0007 0.5021 0.0007 
a- 0.4 0.4967 0.1325 0.4464 0.0656 0.4466 0.0723 
i' 0.7 0.7440 0.0451 0.7432 0.0354 0.7344 0.0412 
(Jv = 0.2 B 0.8429 0.0860 0.9585 0.0990 0.9790 0.1604 
&1 0.6 0.6045 0.0023 0.6024 0.0021 0.6030 0.002 
&2 0.5 0.5029 0.0021 0.5061 0.0020 0.5039 0.0021 
a- 0.6 0.8399 0.3356 0.8538 0.3604 0.8662 0.3905 
'Y 0.3 0.4570 0.1525 0.4621 0.1636 0.4538 0.1616 
(Jv = 0.5 B 1.0780 0.6185 1.1966 0.6121 1.2083 0.5521 
a1 0.6 0.6114 0.0100 0.6169 0.0108 0.6117 0.0112 
&2 0.5 0.5202 0.0116 0.5176 0.0125 0.5210 0.0127 
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Table 2.8. Monte Carlo results for Truncated Half Normal model. 
The number of repetitions M = 1000. Sample size N = 1000 
B=0.8 B = 1.0 B = 1.2 
True AVE MSE AVE MSE AVE MSE 
fJ 0.3 0.3191 0.0002 0.3188 0.0002 0.3191 0.0001 
'Y 0.9 0.9020 0.0005 0.9019 0.0004 0.9027 0.0004 
(Iv = 0.1 B 0.8045 0.0049 0.9889 0.0170 1.0918 0.0502 
&1 0.6 0.6005 0.0002 0.5993 0.0002 0.6001 0.0002 
&2 0.5 0.5001 0.0002 0.5013 0.0002 0.5004 0.0002 
ff 0.4 0.3806 0.0042 0.3735 0.0010 0.3724 0.0009 
i 0.7 0.7111 0.0094 0.7156 0.0056 0.7125 0.0050 
(Iv = 0.2 B 0.8692 0.0589 1.0351 0.0808 1.1169 0.1044 
0:1 0.6 0.6010 0.0005 0.6027 0.0005 0.6020 0.000 
&2 0.5 0.5023 0.0004 0.5021 0.0004 0.5021 0.0004 
fJ 0.6 0.6597 0.0407 0.6568 0.0355 0.6573 0.0373 
i 0.3 0.3580 0.0609 0.3568 0.0597 0.3565 0.0589 
(Iv = 0.5 B 0.9995 0.4273 1.1713 0.5255 1.2536 0.5442 
&1 0.6 0.6020 0.0031 0.6028 0.0031 0.6042 0.0028 
0:2 0.5 0.5056 0.0028 0.5059 0.0029 0.5052 0.0026 
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Table 2.9. Monte Carlo results for Doubly Truncated Normal model. 
The number of repetitions M = 1000. Sample size N = 200 
B=0.8 B = 1.0 B = 1.2 
True AVE MSE AVE MSE AVE MSE 
(y 0.3 0.4141 0.0628 0.4227 0.0753 0.3899 0.0424 
'Y 0.9 0.9463 0.0072 0.9511 0.0085 0.9442 0.0091 
(jv = 0.1 P, 0.5 0.5894 0.0329 0.5367 0.0427 0.4758 0.0377 
B 0.8452 0.0239 1.0207 0.0278 1.1797 0.0411 
a1 0.6 0.6046 0.0020 0.6035 0.0024 0.5990 0.0028 
&2 0.5 0.5084 0.0020 0.5032 0.0023 0.5006 0.0027 
(y 0.4 0.4627 0.0658 0.5182 0.1026 0.4853 0.0759 
'Y 0.7 0.7937 0.0524 0.8300 0.0564 0.8173 0.0603 
(jv = 0.2 P, 0.5 0.6057 0.0627 0.5875 0.0923 0.5306 0.0958 
B 0.9296 0.1035 1.0963 0.1205 1.2538 0.1421 
&1 0.6 0.6122 0.0040 0.6123 0.0046 0.6093 0.005 
&2 0.5 0.5189 0.0045 0.5079 0.0050 0.5076 0.0058 
(y 0.6 0.7444 0.1064 0.7397 0.0973 0.7756 0.1238 
'Y 0.3 0.5174 0.1381 0.5338 0.1486 0.5542 0.1734 
(jv = 0.5 P, 0.5 0.4491 0.1187 0.5125 0.1635 0.5647 0.2265 
B 1.1524 0.6325 1.3944 0.8184 1.5888 0.9906 
&1 0.6 0.6155 0.0133 0.6179 0.0150 0.6205 0.0173 
&2 0.5 0.5193 0.0156 0.5172 0.0157 0.5287 0.0189 
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Table 2.10. Monte Carlo results for Doubly Truncated Normal 
model. The number of repetitions M = 1000. Sample size N = 1000 
B=0.8 B = 1.0 B = 1.2 
True AVE MSE AVE MSE AVE MSE 
a- 0.3 0.3487 0.0108 0.3336 0.0058 0.3229 0.0010 
'Y 0.9 0.9155 0.0013 0.9142 0.0015 0.9125 0.0019 
av = 0.1 P, 0.5 0.5419 0.0088 0.5053 0.0035 0.4997 0.0044 
B 0.8100 0.0056 1.0067 0.0094 1.2116 0.0157 
al 0.6 0.6025 0.0004 0.5995 0.0005 0.6014 0.0006 
a2 0.5 0.5008 0.0004 0.5024 0.0005 0.5006 0.0006 
a- 0.4 0.4305 0.0285 0.4128 0.0236 0.3874 0.0079 
'Y 0.7 0.7348 0.0208 0.7346 0.0181 0.7260 0.0139 
av = 0.2 P, 0.5 0.5735 0.0257 0.5298 0.0163 0.4977 0.0137 
B 0.8268 0.0240 1.0441 0.0455 1.2619 0.1089 
al 0.6 0.6020 0.0008 0.6034 0.0010 0.6011 0.001 
a2 0.5 0.5029 0.0008 0.5020 0.0010 0.5015 0.0012 
a- 0.6 0.6780 0.0400 0.7115 0.0555 0.7100 0.0527 
'Y 0.3 0.4227 0.0721 0.4601 0.0872 0.4527 0.0884 
av = 0.5 P, 0.5 0.4771 0.0630 0.5361 0.0827 0.5253 0.0973 
B 1.1325 0.7649 1.2912 0.6360 1.2649 0.6243 
al 0.6 0.6076 0.0032 0.6075 0.0032 0.6038 0.0033 
a2 0.5 0.5076 0.0032 0.5086 0.0033 0.5069 0.0036 
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Table 2.11. Monte Carlo results for Truncated Exponential model. 
The number of repetitions M = 1000. Sample size N = 200 
B=0.8 B = 1.0 B = 1.2 
True AVE MSE AVE MSE AVE MSE 
o-u 0.3 0.3062 0.0017 0.3084 0.0011 0.3006 0.0006 
(Jv 0.1 0.0986 0.0001 0.0992 0.0001 0.0985 0.0001 
(Jv = 0.1 iJ 0.7991 0.0018 0.9876 0.0027 1.1934 0.0053 
a1 0.6 0.6005 0.0004 0.6038 0.0005 0.5968 0.0005 
a2 0.5 0.4999 0.0003 0.4966 0.0003 0.5022 0.0004 
o-u 0.3 0.3334 0.0117 0.3147 0.0048 0.3133 0.0020 
o-v 0.2 0.1940 0.0004 0.1962 0.0003 0.1955 0.0003 
(Jv = 0.2 B 0.8191 0.0066 1.0150 0.0091 1.2008 0.0113 
a1 0.6 0.6020 0.0014 0.6001 0.0008 0.6032 0.001 
a2 0.5 0.5026 0.0009 0.5016 0.0007 0.5004 0.0008 
o-u 0.3 1.0081 7.0210 0.9838 4.8403 0.7934 1.5996 
o-v 0.5 0.5009 0.0210 0.4869 0.0037 0.4824 0.0033 
(Jv = 0.5 B 1.0335 0.3644 1.1115 0.3053 1.2878 0.3050 
a1 0.6 0.5942 0.0108 0.6034 0.0058 0.6088 0.0060 
a2 0.5 0.5166 0.0082 0.5025 0.0045 0.5266 0.0053 
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Table 2.12. Monte Carlo results for Truncated Exponential model. 
The number of repetitions M = 1000. Sample size N = 1000 
B = 0.8 B = 1.0 B = 1.2 
True AVE MSE AVE MSE AVE MSE 
fru 0.3 0.3019 0.0008 0.3014 0.0004 0.3021 0.0003 
frv 0.1 0.0992 0.0001 0.0990 0.0001 0.0988 0.0001 
av = 0.1 iJ 0.7992 0.0009 0.9972 0.0015 1.1975 0.0024 
&1 0.6 0.5995 0.0002 0.6001 0.0002 0.6001 0.0003 
a2 0.5 0.5005 0.0002 0.5003 0.0002 0.5004 0.0002 
fru 0.3 0.3186 0.0069 0.3112 0.0022 0.3074 0.0011 
frv 0.2 0.1983 0.0002 0.1984 0.0002 0.1981 0.0001 
av = 0.2 iJ 0.8091 0.0047 1.0038 0.0060 1.1988 0.0088 
a1 0.6 0.6002 0.0005 0.6014 0.0005 0.6001 0.001 
0!2 0.5 0.5010 0.0004 0.5004 0.0004 0.5014 0.0004 
fru 0.3 0.6274 1.2594 0.5654 0.7008 0.4593 0.3063 
frv 0.5 0.5044 0.0099 0.4963 0.0034 0.5005 0.0144 
av = 0.5 B 0.9446 0.4032 1.1498 0.3430 1.2166 0.3058 
a1 0.6 0.5934 0.0055 0.6028 0.0043 0.6000 0.0041 
a2 0.5 0.4996 0.0048 0.5032 0.0035 0.5047 0.0038 
CHAPTER 3 
Skewness Issue in Stochastic Frontier Models: 1 Fact or 
Fiction? 
3.1. Introduction 
As we mentioned in the previous chapter, obtaining residuals that are skewed 
in the "wrong" direction constitutes one of the common and major drawbacks of 
the traditional stochastic frontier models (SFM). While the theory would predict 
a negative (positive) skewness in production (cost) frontiers in the population, 
researchers often discover that the sample residuals are positively (negatively) 
skewed. Of course, in finite samples nothing prevents the skewness statistic to 
have the opposite sign from that the theory would predict. Indeed this is more 
frequent in cases of low dominance of the inefficiency process over the two-sided 
noise (Carree, 2002). Simar and Wilson (2010) refer to this phenomenon as a finite 
sample artifact. While it may be recognized that this could arise from the models 
based on errors with correct skewness, researchers still consider the "wrong" skew-
ness statistic as the indication of misspecification of the stochastic frontier model. 
Therefore, whenever they find the residuals skewed in the "wrong" direction they 
tend to believe that the model is misspecified or the data are inconsistent with 
lThis is a version of my work with professor Robin Sickles. 
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the SFM paradigm. Two course of actions are oftentimes undertaken: respecify 
the model and/or obtain a new sample which hopefully results in the desired sign 
of skewness. However, instead of respecifying the model, applied researchers also 
often respecify their interpretation of the results by assuming away inefficiencies 
and utilizing straightforward least squares regression approaches.2 This weak point 
of the stochastic frontier models is emphasized in a series of papers, some of which 
try to justify that this phenomenon might arise in finite samples even for models 
that are correctly specified (Greene, 2007; Simar and Wilson, 2010). 
The above discussion refers directly to the question raised in the title: is the 
"wrong" skewness just a finite sample fiction or it could be also a fact? If it is 
a fiction, then the bagging method, a solution proposed by Simar and Wilson 
(2010), should be employed to make an inference in SFMs. This method could 
also be generalized to the cases where efficiencies are bounded which we discussed 
in the previous chapter, since the normal/half-normal model is a special case of 
the normal/doubly truncated normal model. As we show via simulations later 
in this chapter, the former can be recovered from the latter without imposing 
any a priori restrictions on model parameters. Attributing the appearance of the 
"wrong" skewness exclusively to the finite sample fiction is just a one side of the 
same coin. We also should be concerned for the cases where this phenomenon is 
not a finite sample artifact but a fact. 
2This is in particular due to the results that Olson et al. (1980) and Waldman (1982) obtain for 
stochastic frontier models when half-normal distribution for inefficiencies is specified. 
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More specifically, this chapter intends to illustrate how the bounded ineffi-
ciency formulation, discussed in the previous chapter, might overcome the issue of 
the "wrong" skewness in the stochastic frontier model. We first show that the im-
position of an upper bound to inefficiency (lower bound to efficiency) enables the 
distribution of the one-sided inefficiency process to display positive and negative 
signs of skewness. This is in particular true for the truncated normal distribution 
with strictly positive mean. Imposing a bound on the truncated normal density 
function apart from the zero yields both positive or negative skewness depend-
ing on the position of the bound in the support of inefficiency distribution, thus 
justifying the occurrence of the so-called "wrong" skewness. We show that the 
normal/ doubly truncated normal model is capable of handling and estimating the 
SFM with "wrong" skewness and we show that it is also quite reasonable to ob-
tain such a pattern of residuals in large samples. Our analysis can be extended to 
include the gamma and the Wei bull distributions as well. We perform a limited 
set of Monte Carlo experiments on a stochastic frontier production function with 
bounded inefficiency and show that when we have a positively skewed distribution 
of errors we can still get very reasonable maximum likelihood estimates of the 
disturbance and inefficiency variances, as well as other parameters of the model. 
An interpretation of our results is that, although a potential misspecification may 
occur if the stochastic frontier model is used and skewness is found to be "wrong", 
this can be avoided if the stochastic frontier model with bounded inefficiency is 
specified instead. 
124 
This chapter is structured in the following way. In section 2 the general problem 
of the "wrong" skewness in stochastic frontier models and its implications are 
discussed, as well as solutions proposed in the literature to solve it. In section 3 
we show the potential of the bounded inefficiency model to address the "wrong" 
skewness problem and generalize Waldman's proof to formally support the use 
of stochastic frontier models under these circumstances. Monte Carlo simulation 
results and further discussion are provided in section 4. Section 5 concludes. 
3.2. Skewness issue in Stochastic Frontier Analysis 
3.2.1. "Wrong" skewness and its implications in frontier models 
We consider here the cross-sectional classical stochastic frontier model, where the 
functional specification of production technology or cost is assumed to be linear in 
parameters. In this classical setting, the stochastic specification is ci = Vi - Ui for 
production frontiers, or Ci = Vi + Ui for the case of cost frontiers. The stochastic 
term Vi represents the statistical noise and is usually assumed to be iid N(O, (j~) 
and Ui ~ 0 represents the inefficiency process, which also is assumed to be an 
iid random variable that follows some one-sided distribution. The error terms Vi 
and Ui are usually assumed to be statistically independent of each other and from 
the regressors. Under these assumptions, the distribution of the composed error 
term is asymmetric and non-normal implying that simple least squares applied 
to a linear stochastic frontier model will be inefficient and will not provide us 
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with an estimate of the degree of technical or cost inefficiency. However, least 
squares does provide consistent estimates of all parameters except the intercept 
since E(ci) = -E(Ui) ::; O. Moreover, 
which implies that the negative of the third moment of OLS residuals is a consistent 
estimator of the skewness of the one-sided error. 
The common distributions for inefficiencies that appear in the literature are 
positively skewed, reflecting the fact that a large portion of the firms are expected 
to operate relatively close to the frontier. For production frontiers whenever we 
subtract the positively skewed inefficiency component from the symmetric error 
the composite error should display negative skewness.3 Thus researchers find sto-
chastic frontier models inappropriate to model inefficiencies if they obtain residuals 
skewed in the "wrong" direction. The typical conclusion is that, either the model 
is misspecified or the data is not compatible with the model. However, there can 
be a third interpretation as well based on the fact that inefficiencies might nave 
been drawn from a distribution which displays negative skewness. This simply 
says that if the "wrong" skewness is not a finite sample artifact but a fact, then 
any stochastic frontier model based on inefficiencies that are drawn form positively 
skewed distributions will be misspecified. 
3We will focus on the production function but clearly all that we say about it can be said about 
the cost function with a sign change on the one-sided error in the composed error term. 
126 
The first formal discussion on skewness problem is found in Olson et al. (1980) 
in their derivation of modified ordinary least squares (MOLS) estimates as a con-
venient alternative to maximum likelihood estimates. They explicitly assume half-
normal distribution for technical inefficiencies in their formulation. MOLS method 
estimates the slope parameters by OLS. These are unbiased and consistent under 
standard assumptions about the regressors and the error terms. OLS estimate of 
the constant term, however, is biased and inconsistent. The bias-corrected estima-
tor of the constant term is obtained by adding ./2/ 1f(J' u term, which is the expected 
value of the composed error term. Of course we do not know (J'u. Estimates of (J'; 
and (J'~ are derived from the method of moments using the second and third mo-
ments of OLS residuals. These are consistent, but not asymptotically efficient, and 
are given by 
(3.2) 
and 
(3.3) 
where jJ,2 and jJ,3 are the estimated second and third moments of the OLS residuals, 
respectively. 
It is obvious from (3.2) that a serious flaw in this method occurs whenever jJ,3 
is positive, since the estimated variance of inefficiencies becomes negative. This 
is referred as a "Type I" failure of MOLS estimators by Olson et al. (1980). 
Waldman (1982) proved that MLE estimate of (J'; in this case is zero and that the 
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model parameters can be efficiently estimated by OL8. vVe will outline the main 
steps and results of Waldman's proof which are necessary benchmarks and links 
to our further analysis. A "Type II" failure, on the other hand, arises whenever 
The log-likelihood function of normal/half-normal model is given by 
where Ci = Yi -xil3, A = au, (j2 = (j~ +(j~, and <1>(.) denotes the cdf of the standard 
au 
normal distribution. Waldman notes that there are two stationary points that 
potentially can characterize this log-likelihood function. Defining the parameter 
vector by () = ((3', (j2, A), the first stationary point would be the one for which the 
first derivatives of the log-liklihood function are zero while the second is the OL8 
solution for () wherein the parameter A is set to zero. The superiority of these two 
stationary points is then compared in cases of the wrong skewness. One way to do 
this is to examine the second-order derivative matrix of the log-likelihood function 
evaluated at these two points. The Hessian matrix evaluated at OL8 solution, 
()* = (b' , 3 2 , 0), is 
-2l:n I 
-3 i=l XiXi V2/ 7rs - 1 l:~=l Xi 0 
H(()*) = /2FiS-ll:~=l Xi -2n/7r 0 (3.5) 
0 0 -n/234 
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~ 1::7=1 ~;, and ~i is the least squares 
residual. 
This matrix is singular with k + 1 negative characteristic roots and one zero 
root. This essentially would require the log-likelihood function to be examined in 
the direction determined by the characteristic vector associated with this zero root 
which is given by the vector z = (sJ2/7f, 1,0). Departing from the point of OLS 
solution, the term of interest is then the sign of 
.6..logL logL(B* + oz) -logL(B*) (3.6) 
where 0 > 0 is an arbitrary small number. If we expand .6..logL using a Taylor 
series expansion, we would obtain (see Waldman, 1982) 
n 
.6..logL = (03 /6s 3 ) J2/7f[(7f - 4)/7f] L ~1 + 0(04 ). (3.7) 
i=l 
Thus, if the term 1::7=1 ~1 > 0 then the maximum of the log-likelihood function is 
located at the OLS solution, which is superior to MLE. This result suggests two 
strategies for practitioners: apply OLS whenever the least squares residuals display 
positive skewness or increase the sample size, since 
(3.8) 
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which implies that asymptotically the sample third moment of least squares resid-
uals converges to its population counterpart by the law of large numbers and thus 
the problem of the "wrong" skewness goes away. 
Undoubtedly, this is true if the inefficiencies are indeed drawn from the half-
normal distribution which is positively skewed. What if they are not? ·What if 
they are drawn from the distribution which displays negative skewness as well? 
We will attempt to give answers to these questions in the following sections. 
The problem of the "wrong" skewness is also made apparent and emphasized 
by the two widely-used computer packages used to estimate stochastic frontiers. 
The first package LIMDEP 9.0, which is developed by Greene (2007), calculates 
and checks the skewness of the OLS residuals just before maximum likelihood 
estimation begins. In case the sign of the skewness statistic is positive, significantly 
or not, the message appears that warns the user about the misspecification of the 
model and suggests using OLS instead of MLE. The second software FRONTIER 
4.1, produced by Coelli (1996), also first obtains the OLS estimates as a starting 
2 
values for the grid search of a starting value of the r (= ~+ 2) parameter. If the 
O"u U v 
skewness is positive, the final maximum likelihood value of this parameter is very 
close to zero, indicating no inefficiencies. More detailed description and comparison 
of FRONTIER 4.1 and the earlier version 7.0 of LIMDEP can be found in Sena 
(1999). 
Related to these results, several parametric and non-parametric test statistics 
have been developed to check the skewness of least squares residuals in stochastic 
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frontier models. Schmidt and Lin (1984) proposed the test statistic 
(3.9) 
where m2 and m3 represent the second and the third moment of the empirical 
distribution of the least squares residuals. The distribution of Vb; is not standard 
and the application of this test requires special tables provided by D' Agostino and 
Pearson (1973). Coelli (1995) proposed an alternative statistic for testing whether 
the third moment of residuals is greater than or equal to zero 
(3.10) 
where N denotes the number of observations in the sample. Under the null hy-
pothesis of zero skewness, the third moment of OLS residuals is asymptotically 
distributed as a normal random variable with zero mean and variance 6mV N. 
This implies that Jbf is asymptotically distributed as a standard normal variable 
and one can consult the corresponding statistical tables for making an inference. 
These two tests, although easily computed and implemented, have unknown finite 
sample properties. Coelli (1995) conducts Monte Carlo experiments and shows 
that Jbf has correct size and good power in small samples, which makes it more 
attractive for testing for the skewness of the least squares residuals in SFM. 
131 
3.2.2. Solutions to the "wrong" skewness 
Nonetheless, the standard solutions considered in the case of "wrong" skewness 
essentially constitute no solutions with regard to the stochastic frontier model. 
Setting the variance of the inefficiency process to zero based on the skewness of 
OLS residuals is not a very comforting solution. This solution to the problem 
simply would imply that all firms in the industry are fully efficient. Moreover, 
the estimated standard errors will not be correct if straightforward OLS is applied 
to the data, while data-mining techniques will introduce inferential problems and 
possibly biases in parameters and their standard errors (Leamer, 1978). Carree 
(2002), Greene (2007), and Simar and Wilson (2010) note that in finite samples, 
even the correctly specified stochastic frontier model is capable of producing least 
squares residuals with the "wrong" skewness sign with relatively high frequency. 
Thus another suggested solution is to get more data. Of course the availability of 
the data in economics is often rather limited and this alternative may not possible 
in many empirical settings. Another solution is to argue that the inefficiencies are 
drawn from an efficiency distribution with negative skewness. A major problem 
with this assumption is that it implies that there is only a very small fraction of 
the firms that attain a level of productivity close to the frontier. For example, 
Carree (2002) considers a distribution for inefficiencies that allows for both, nega-
tive and positive skewness.4 He proposes a binomial distribution b(n,p) which for 
4Carree (2002) also argues that distributions with bounded range can be negatively skewed but 
further development of these is not pursued by the author. 
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a range of values of the parameter p is negatively skewed.5 This is a discrete distri-
but ion wherein continuous inefficiencies fall into discrete "inefficiency categories". 
He employs the method of moments estimators as in Olson et al. (1980) and 
Greene (1990) and provides an explanation for how theoretically and empirically 
the "wrong" skewness issue may arise in stochastic frontier model.6 Empirically, 
the use of the binomial distribution can be justified by a model in which the cycle 
of innovations and imitations occurs. This would suggest that the occurrence of 
positively skewed residuals would correspond to the cases where very few firms in 
the industry innovate while the large proportion of firms experience large inefficien-
cies. In contrast, as it was shown in the previous chapter, the stochastic frontier 
model with doubly truncated normal inefficiencies does not imply such a pattern 
in firms' inefficiencies, but instead it precludes the probability of occurrence of 
extreme inefficiencies. 
GOther authors also considered distributions with negative skew (see Johnson et a1. 1992, 1994). 
6The shortcoming of this approach is that method-of-moments estimators may not be defined for 
some empirical values of the higher sample moments of the least squares residuals 
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3.3. Skewness statistic under the bounded inefficiencies 
3.3.1. Derivation of skewness and MOLS estimates with doubly trun-
cated normal inefficiencies 
The skewness statistic is derived in chapter 2 as 
s - 21]~ - 1]0(31]1 + 1) + 1]2 
u - ( 2 )3/2 1 - 1]0 + 1]1 
(3.11) 
with 
(3.12) 
~1 = =H. and ~2 = B-1-' are the lower and upper truncation points of the standard 
(ju, O'u 
normal density function ¢('), respectively. <P(-) is the cumulative distribution 
function of the standard normal distribution. 1]0 represents the inverse Mill's ratio 
and it is equal to J2/1f in the normal/half-normal model. 
The skewness parameter typically describes the shape of the distribution inde-
pendent of location and scale. Although many non-symmetric distributions have 
either positive or negative sign of skewness, for the doubly truncated normal distri-
bution the sign of skewness is ambiguous. It is either positive, whenever B > 2fL, 
or negative when B < 2fL (for fL > 0). This follows from the fact that the bound B 
is strictly positive by assumption.7 The consequences of both positive and negative 
7It should be noted that parameter /-L is not restricted to be strictly positive in estimation pro-
cedure. It can take non-positive values as well. 
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skewness of the doubly truncated normal distribution in the SFM are not clear. 
The residuals can be skewed in both directions while the variance of inefficiency 
term is nonzero. Moreover, in finite samples the sampling variability of the skew-
ness statistic itself could give rise to a positive or negative skewness statistic even 
if the population skewness parameter was negative or positive. 
The second and third population central moments of the SFM residuals based 
on OLS are given by 
from which we can obtain the method of moments estimators of ()~ and (); 
(3.13) 
and 
(3.14) 
Compared to (3.2), in (3.13) the positive value of fi,3 does not necessarily yield 
a negative variance. Here, the denominator also plays a role. Since the negative 
of the third moment of the OLS residuals is an unbiased and consistent estimator 
of the skewness of inefficiencies, one can see that the estimate of the (); can have 
positive sign even in the case of positively skewed residuals. Most importantly, 
the "type I" failure goes away asymptotically since a positive fi,3 would imply that 
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the denominator of (3.13) is negative, which occurs whenever B < 2J.l. Thus o-~ 
cannot take on negative values. In cases where we have B = 2J.l the ratio in 
(3.13) is unidentified. By applying L'Hospital rule and evaluating the limits it 
is straightforward to show that the variance of the inefficiency term is a strictly 
positive number. Only in the case when B = 0 is the variance of the inefficiency 
term zero. 
We can test the extent to which the distribution of unobservable inefficiencies 
can display negative or positive skewness using the observable residuals based on 
the expression in (3.1). For this purpose we can utilize the adjusted for skewness 
test statistic proposed by Bera and Premaratne (2001), since the excess kurtosis 
is not zero. By using the standard test for skewness we will have either over-
rejection or under-rejection of the null hypothesis of non-negative skewness and 
this will depend primarily on the sign of the excess kurtosis. In addition, since 
there are two points at which the doubly truncated normal distribution has zero 
skewness, the standard tests are not appropriate. Since the standard tests do 
not distinguish these two cases, application of these tests may lead researchers to 
accept the null hypothesis of zero variance when it is false at levels larger than 
nominal test size would suggest. 
3.3.2. Generalization of Waldman's proof 
We now examine the consistency and identifiability of the parameters of the nor-
mal/ doubly truncated normal bounded inefficiency stochastic frontier model by 
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utilizing the same approach as in Waldman (1982). To compare and contrast the 
problem of the "wrong" skewness with the benchmark case of the normal/half-
normal model of Aigner et al. (1977), we fix the values of the deep parameters B 
and J.1 and consider the scores of parameter vector () = ( (3', (}2, ,\) as a function of 
these fixed parameters. Note that, the normal/half-normal model fixes these val-
ues at 00 and 0, respectively. We begin by examining the second-order derivative 
matrix evaluated at the OLS solution point, ()* = (b', 8 2 ,0): 
_J.. ~n (e- - II)X- 0 
84 L .. n=l 2 r 2 
(3.15) 
o o o 
1 ~n ,2 d'· hIt ; L.."i=l Ci' an Ci 1S t e eas squares 
residual. 
Obviously, H(()*) is singular with k + 1 negative characteristic roots and one 
zero root. The eigenvector associated with this zero root is given by z = (0',0,1). 
We then need to search the sign of 6.logL = logL(()* +5z) -logL(()*) in the positive 
direction ( c5 > 0 ), since ,\ is constrained to be non-negative. By expanding the 
6.logL, the first term in the series drops since OLS is a stationary point. The 
second term also vanishes since IH(()*)I = o. Thus, the only relevant point that 
remains to be considered is the third derivative of the log-likelihood function with 
137 
respect to parameter A evaluated at the OLS solution 
~83 83log( 0*) 
6 8A3 
(3.16) 
Substituting for the third derivative and ignoring higher order terms, we obtain 
(3.17) 
where 'Wk = w~q,(wd-W~q,(W2) k = a 1 2 with WI = -I! and W2 = B-ft. 
cI>(W2)-cI>(wd' " s s 
The simple inspection of (3.17) reveals that the third order moment of the 
least squares residuals need not always have the opposite sign of tllogL. This will 
mainly depend on the relationship between the imposed bound B and the mean of 
the normal distribution p. For B < 2p, 'Wo is negative and the term in the curly 
brackets becomes positive. Thus, positive skewness would imply the existence of 
inefficient firms in the sample. The implication of this is that whenever a researcher 
finds positively skewed residuals it may be the case that the inefficiencies have been 
drawn from a distribution that has negative skew. For B = 2p, tllogL = a and 
in this case MLE should be employed since it will be more efficient than OLS 
and will provide us with technical inefficiency estimates. Asymptotically the third 
order term of OLS residuals and the expression in curly brackets have the same 
sign since, 
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which implies that we can observe the "wrong" skewness even in large samples. 
Thus we can argue that the problem of the "wrong" skewness is not a just finite 
sample issue. Positive or negative skewness of least squares residuals will always 
imply a positive variance of the inefficiency process in large samples. In finite 
samples, anything can happen. We can obtain negatively skewed residuals even if 
we sample from a negatively skewed distribution of inefficiencies. 
3.4. Further Discussion 
An important question for applied researchers is, what happens in the case 
if the true model is the normal/half-normal but we estimate the normal/doubly 
truncated normal model instead and vise-versa? To answer the first part of the 
question, we conduct a Monte Carlo experiment to assess the validity of the nor-
mal/ doubly truncated normal model whenever the underlying true data generating 
process is the one proposed in Aigner et al. (1997). For this purpose, we specify a 
simple cross-sectional Cobb-Douglas production frontier with two inputs as: 
where Vi ",iid N(O, 0";) and Ui ",iid N+(O, O"~). Vi and Ui, as previously, are assumed 
to be independent of each over and from regressors. 
Throughout, we set 0:0 = 0.9, 0:1 = 0.6, and 0:2 = 0.5. InXjilj=I,2 are drawn 
from N(/-Lxj) O";j) with /-LxI = 1.5, /-Lx2 = 1.8, and 0";1 = 0";2 = 0.3. These draws are 
fixed across Monte Carlo replications. We keep O"u = 0.3 and vary the O"v in a way 
-------------
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that )..2 takes on values of 1, 10, and 100, while at the same time we vary the sample 
size by 100, 200, and 1000, respectively. To facilitate the numerical optimization 
procedure we consider the 'Y-parameterization instead of the )..-parameterization 
in the maximum likelihood estimation. We set the number Monte Carlo replica-
tions to 1000 and examine the performance of the normal/ doubly truncated normal 
model without imposing any restrictions on model parameters. Table 3.1 reports 
the averaged values (AVE) of the estimates over the replications and their mean 
squared errors (MSE). The first case reported in the first column is where n = 100 
and )..2 = 1. In this case about 1/3 of the samples will have least squares residuals 
positively skewed according to Simar and Wilson (2010). The distributional para-
meters obtained from the normal/doubly truncated normal model have relatively 
large mean squared errors. We presume that this is due to the fictitious "wrong" 
skewness that yields large variances of the estimates because the determinant of 
Fisher's information matrix is close to zero. The normal/ doubly truncated normal 
model cannot provide a remedy in this case and the bagging technique proposed by 
Simar and Wilson (2010) could be employed to make an inference. As either the 
sample size or signal-t<>-noise ratio ()..) increases, the fictitious "wrong" skewness 
goes away, MSE decreases and the normal/half-normal model is recovered from 
the normalj doubly truncated normal model. It would appear from our intuition 
and from our simulations that in finite samples the large estimated standard er-
rors of the distributional parameters can serve as an indicator of the presence of 
"fictitious" wrong skewness in the model. 
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Table 3.1. Monte Carlo results for for Half-Normal model. The num-
ber of repetitions M = 1000. 
n = 100 n = 200 n = 1000 
True AVE MSE AVE MSE AVE MSE 
(J 0.42 0.4307 0.0099 0.4359 0.0079 0.4250 0.0041 
"( 0.5 0.5634 0.1332 0.5605 0.0025 0.5565 0.0382 
J-L 0.0 -0.0071 0.3069 -0.0351 0.2801 0.0082 0.2003 
),? = 1 CYo 0.9 0.9799 0.1197 0.9728 0.0728 0.9757 0.0450 
CY1 0.6 0.5814 0.0160 0.5997 0.0034 0.6021 0.0012 
&2 0.5 0.5105 0.0139 0.5043 0.0021 0.4958 0.0013 
0" 0.31 0.3264 0.0076 0.3256 0.0021 0.3148 0.0011 
:y 0.91 0.9404 0.0068 0.9161 0.0006 0.9107 0.0004 
J-L 0.0 -0.0398 0.1277 -0.0566 0.0439 -0.0115 0.0175 
).2 = 10 CYo 0.9 0.9144 0.0247 0.8982 0.0043 0.9001 0.0026 
&1 0.6 0.6079 0.0043 0.6033 0.0006 0.6012 0.0003 
CY2 0.5 0.5015 0.0036 0.4973 0.0007 0.5005 0.0004 
0" 0.30 0.3064 0.0049 0.3050 0.0013 0.3030 0.0006 
:y 0.99 0.9958 0.0001 0.9912 0.0001 0.9905 0.0001 
J-l 0.0 -0.0252 0.0559 -0.0092 0.0104 -0.005 0.0050 
).2 = 100 &0 0.9 0.9102 0.0098 0.8986 0.0014 0.8951 0.0006 
&1 0.6 0.5995 0.0016 0.5993 0.0108 0.6003 0.0001 
CY2 0.5 0.4978 0.0012 0.5016 0.0125 0.5002 0.0001 
To answer the second part of the question we consider the conditional mean 
inefficiencies conditional on the composed error in the same spirit as in Jondrow 
et al. (1982). For the normal/doubly truncated normal model these are given by 
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where fL* = JlO"~;2eO"~ and (I * = O"y.:v. Ignoring the bound will yield incorrect esti-
mates of the inefficiencies scores. 
3.5. Conclusions 
Most of the distributions for inefficiencies considered in the stochastic frontier 
models literature are positively skewed. The doubly truncated normal inefficiency 
distribution generalizes the SFM in a way that allows for negative skewness as 
well. This implies that finding incorrect skewness does not necessarily indicate 
that the model is misspecified. A misspecification would arise, however, were 
the researcher to consider an incorrect distribution for the inefficiency process, 
which has a skewness that is not properly identified by the least squares residuals. 
The "wrong" skewness can be a finite sample artifact or a fact. Our study has 
considered the latter case and has shown that the normalf doubly truncated normal 
composed error SFM can still be valid with the "wrong" sign of the skewness 
statistic using a generalization of Waldman's (1982) proof. Moreover, "wrong" 
skewness in finite samples does not necessarily preclude its appearance in large 
samples under our specification. Our study thus provides a rationale for applied 
researchers to adopt an additional strategy in cases when this perceived empirical 
anomaly is found. 
CHAPTER 4 
Accounting for Heterogeneous Technologies in the Banking 
Industry: A time-varying Stochastic Frontier Model with 
Threshold Effects 
4.1. Introduction 
The U.S. commercial banking industry is characterized by its large number of 
heterogeneous institutions. Although the number of commercial banks currently 
operating in the banking sector has dropped to 6839 from the 14382 it was in 
1984, the differences among banks are more profound. These differences could be 
largely attributed to the effects of deregulation and financial crises of the early 
1980s and 1990s. Two acts have played an especially crucial role in forming the 
current landscape of the commercial banking industry: the Reigle-Neal Interstate 
Banking and Branching Efficiency Act, that was passed by Congress in 1994 and 
fully implemented in 1997, which allowed the interstate banking and branching; 
and the Financial Services Modernization Acts of 1999 that granted broad-based 
securities and insurance power to commercial banks. The first act allowed banks 
to geographically expand through acquisitions of other financial institutions and 
through opening new offices or branches within and outside of a particular state. 
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AB a result, more than 6000 mergers occurred within less than two decades which 
created large national banks (mega banks) for the first time in the history of U.S. 
commercial banking. Certain banks had grown enormously in size and are char-
acterized now as too-big-to fail by regulators as their failure would likely cause 
significant damage to the financial system and cause serious disruptions to the 
broader economy. Currently the asset sizes of the six largest mega banks corre-
spond to 63% of the GDP, up from 17% in 1995. The second act had similar 
effects in leading commercial banks to grow in size by allowing them not only to 
enter insurance and securities companies' areas, but also directly to acquire these 
companies. In addition, technological innovations, such as the automated teller 
machine (ATM) , credit card network and scoring, electronic payments, internet 
banking, and emergence of new financial instruments, such as mutual funds and 
derivatives led large banks to grow larger through various channels and increase 
the gap between these and smaller depository institutions. Figure 4.1 plots the 
size distributions (in natural logarithm scale) of commercial banks for four differ-
ent quarters, which appear to be extremely skewed to the right with the skewness 
statistic increasing over time. 
Heterogeneity could arise from different business opportunities that each fi-
nancial institution faces, lending strategies, accessibility to the short-term money 
markets, risk exposures, expenditures on technology related innovations, and sev-
eral other factors that are primarily associated with the size of these institutions. 
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Size of banks, which is typically measured by their total assets or deposits, is tra-
ditionally considered to affect the type of activities and the performance of banks. 
It is a standard practice adopted by regulators to analyze banks by splitting them 
into several size-categories. For example, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation 
(FDIC) divides these financial institutions into four groups based on the market 
value of their total assets. The first group consists of banks with asset size under 
$100 million and the second group includes banks with asset size between $100 mil-
lion and $1 billion. Banks from these two groups, which are usually characterized 
as small or community banks, mostly base their activities on retail and consumer 
banking and specialize in residential mortgages and individual loans. They have 
limited or no access to capital markets, such as federal funds market, and usually 
finance their activities with core deposits and/or equity. Their contribution is very 
important to the U.S. economy because of the personalized services they offer and 
their understanding of the communities they serve. The third group's assets range 
from $1 billion to $10 billion and the fourth group consists of very large banks with 
asset size that exceeds $10 billion.1 Banks in groups three and four are consid-
ered large banks and typically engage in nontraditional banking and extend their 
activities both superregionally and nationally. Large banks have relatively easy 
access to purchased funds and the capital markets compared to the small banks, 
hold fewer core deposits, and are highly leveraged. Furthermore, these banks tend 
lOften the fourth group is further divided to distinguish between top 10-25 banks and the rest 
banks in the group. 
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to hire expert personnel and pay higher salaries, as well as extensively engage in 
mergers and in investment in buildings and premises. The last two groups of banks 
are increasing both in number and importance, while the number of community 
banks and their assets as a percentage of the total industry assets are shrinking 
over time. 
Based on our discussion so far it would not be appropriate to pool a highly 
heterogenous sample of banks into a single group. It also would be misleading 
to assign the banks to different groups based on arbitrary and ad hoc criteria 
when using statistical estimation and inference. Nevertheless, the majority of the 
received studies in the banking literature that estimate either the production or 
cost frontiers assume that banks are relatively homogeneous and have an access to 
the same best-practice technology and hence share the common frontier. When this 
assumption fails to hold it is more plausible to assume that the different types of 
banks employ different types of technology in their intermediation process. Mester 
(1994) and Wheelock and Wilson (2001) offer examples that divide the banks into 
classes based on the value of their asset size and treat the threshold values as 
known when estimating the technology parameters. 
Asset size, while a common threshold variable in the banking literature to 
designate banks to certain groups, by no means exhausts the list of the variables 
that may be used to distinguish different types of banks. There are other criteria, 
such as riskiness, that can be used separately or along with bank's asset size to 
further segment the banking industry. These are typically employed in a cluster 
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analysis framework. Amel and Rhoades (1988, 1992), Brown and Glennon (2000), 
Tortosa-Ausina (2002), and Wang and Kumbhakar ( 2009 ) among others, use 
cluster analysis techniques to segment banks into distinct strategic groups in terms 
of their product mix and allocation of inputs. If asset size is considered as the only 
threshold variable, two questions still remain unanswered: how do we determine 
the appropriate cutoffs to split the banks in the sample? What does it mean for 
bank to be large or small? If the answer to these questions is not obvious then 
one needs to resort to data-driven methods, such as threshold effects, to deal with 
these particular issues. 
These issues appear to be even more challenging and interesting in stochas-
tic frontier literature, where recently researchers attempted to separate the firm-
specific effects (differences) from the firm-specific efficiencies. Orea and K umb-
hakar (2004), Greene (2005), EI-Gamal and Inanoglu (2005) among others, em-
ployed the latent class specification to suggest heterogeneity in technology para-
meters and inefficiencies. Tsionas (2002), O'Donnel and Griffiths(2004), Tsionas 
and Kumbhakar (2004), and Huang (2004) employed the hierarchical Bayesian 
methods to address the same issue of heterogenous technologies in stochastic fron-
tier models. Their findings pointed to the existence of considerable differences in 
technologies employed by firms and their efficiencies scores. 
If bank differences are primary due to the heterogeneous technologies, then 
accounting for these while simultaneously estimating the bank-level efficiencies 
would be an appropriate solution to this problem. More specifically, our solution 
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to this problem involves applying the nondynamic panel threshold effects model of 
Hansen (1999, 2000a) to the sample of U.S. commercial banks modified to estimate 
time-varying inefficiencies in the spirit of Cornwell et al. (1990). In addition to 
the estimates of individual and group efficiency scores, we provide the estimates 
of returns to scale and measures of technological change. We show that pooling 
banks into a single class is clearly not justified by standard statistical techniques 
and produce estimates that have considerably different efficiency ranking than 
estimates based on the technology-specific effects model. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. In section 2 the hetero-
geneity issue in stochastic frontier models and its importance is discussed. Section 
3 outlines Hansen's (1999, 2000a) nondynamic panel model with threshold effects 
which is modified to account for time-varying individual effects. Section 3 lays 
out the baseline empirical model that describes the technology of U.S. commercial 
banking industry. Section 4 summarizes the estimation results from the threshold 
effects model for the panel data sample of banks for the period 1984-2009 and 
compares these to the full sample estimation results. Finally, section 5 concludes. 
4.2. Heterogeneity in Stochastic Frontier Models 
Parametric Stochastic Frontier Model (SFM) was first introduced by Aigner 
et al. (1977), Meeusen and van de Broek (1977), and Battese and Cora (1977) 
as a model that provides measures of the performance of individuals or firms. 
The technology in SFM is demonstrated through parametric functions, such as 
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Cobb-Douglas or translog functions, as opposed to the nonparametric alternative 
approaches of data envelopment analysis (DEA) proposed by Charnes et al. (1978) 
and the free disposal hull (FDH) of Deprins et al. (1984). The error term in SFM 
is assumed to be multiplicative and composed of two parts, a one-sided error term 
that captures the effects of inefficiencies relative to the stochastic frontier and a 
two-sided error term that captures random shocks, measurement error and other 
statistical noise, as well as allows for random variation of frontiers across firms. 
The original model was developed in cross-sectional context and explicitly as-
sumed that inefficiencies are independent from the regressors. This is a very strong 
assumption, the violation of which leads to inconsistent estimates of the model's pa-
rameters. Schmidt and Sickles (1984) introduced panel data model that provides 
consistent estimates by considering the inefficiencies as permanent fixed effects. 
That is, departing from the pure production frontier the model can be represented 
as: 
Yit = a + X:d3 + Vit - Ui 
ai + X:t;3 + Vit 
where Yit is the output, Xit is a vector of inputs. Vit is the noise component which 
is iid N(O, a;), while Ui > 0 is the time invariant firm effect representing technical 
inefficiency and which mayor may not be correlated with the regressors. 
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The time-invariance assumption of inefficiency term is also very restrictive and 
unreasonable for relatively long panels. Cornwell, Schmidt, and Sickles (1990) 
(CSS) instead formulated the individual effects as a time polynomial of degree 
two. That is 
where ()f S are firm-specific parameters. This quadratic specification allows techni-
cal efficiency to vary over time and across individual firms. If ()i2 = ()i3 = 0 , then 
CSS model collapses to the fixed effects model of Schmidt and Sickles (1984). If 
we assume that the coefficients of time and the squared time are constant across 
firms then the model reduces to the fixed effects model with the linear and qua-
dratic time term common to all producers, ()2t +()3t2. One interpretation of this 
restricted version of the model is that technical efficiency is producer-specific and 
varies through time in the same manner for all producers. An alternative interpre-
tation is that technical efficiency is producer-specific and time-invariant, with the 
quadratic time term capturing the effects of technical change. It is not possible to 
distinguish between these two scenarios.2 CSS describes several estimation strate-
gies including the fixed-effects (within), random-effects (GLS), and the Hausman 
and Taylor (1981) efficient instrumental variable ( IV) approach for their model. 
The fixed effects estimator does not assume independence of inefficiencies and the 
regressors. However, it does not allow for time-invariant regressors and requires 
T --+ 00 for consistent estimation of the effects. On the other hand, the random 
2See Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) for more discussion. 
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effects estimator is consistent as N goes to infinity provided that the effects are 
uncorrelated with the regressors, which is a testable assumption (Hausman-Wu 
test). For fixed T it is more efficient than the fixed effects estimator. The efficient 
IV provides the solution in case some regressors are correlated with the efficien-
cies. Inefficiencies in panel data model can also be treated as random effects drawn 
from some known distribution. They can be time-invariant (Pitt and Lee, 1981) or 
time-varying (Kumbhakar, 1990; Battese and Coeli, 1992).3 Unfortunately, these 
random effects models do not allow for endogenous regressors. 
The common characteristic of all these models is that they do not account for 
the heterogeneity that might exist among individuals or firms. They assume com-
mon technology and/or inefficiency distribution parameters for all individuals and 
any unobserved differences are mixed with the inefficiency term. Greene (2007) 
defines two types of heterogeneity: the observable and the unobservable hetero-
geneity. The first type is controlled by considering some exogenous variables, such 
as ownership type, country of origin, etc., that can detect any differences among 
firms associated with these variables. These can be included in the kernel produc-
tion or cost frontier and/or can enter the performance equation. The second type, 
however, cannot be easily detected and as such requires data-driven methods to 
3Kumbhakar (1990) proposed Uit = w( t)Ui specification for time-varying efficiency model, where 
wet) = 1/[1 + expbt + Jt2)] and Ui ~iid N+ (0, <T~) and estimated "( and 6, along with the rest 
model parameters, by the maximum likelihood techniques. Whereas, Battese and Coeli (1992), 
on the other hand, define wet) = exp(17(T - t)) in their model. The latter model is more popular 
and widely employed in panel data SFYIs due to the provision of the free software from the 
authors (Frontier 4.1 version). 
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account for it. In standard panel data models (with fully efficient units) u po-
tentially represents these unobservable individual specific effects. These, however, 
cannot be incorporated and identified in a straightforward fashion in stochastic 
frontier models. 
While estimating the efficiencies in SFM, why it is so important to account 
for heterogeneity/differences across firms? According to Tsionas (2002), a firm 
shouldn't be labeled as inefficient if it employs different technology (possibly old 
and inferior) than other firms in the industry do. It would stand to reason that 
it is not profitable for this firm to adopt a new technology, which of course does 
not come at no cost, and employing the old technology is the optimal for the 
time being. Hence, using a common frontier will pronounce this firm as inefficient 
although it may fully utilize its current technology. Ignoring the possibility of 
heterogenous technologies can also lead to erroneous efficiency ranking of firms 
and wrong conclusions about the measure of returns to scale at the individual 
and industry level. Consider an illustrated example (on the below graph) of two 
firms (or group of firms) A and B with cost frontiers labeled with the respective 
letters. The observed total costs of two firms are given by the point A' and B' , 
respectively. If we assume common frontier (C) for these two firms, then the cost 
efficiency of firm A is given by the ratio of the minimum cost to the observed cost, 
CE~oled = gf, and this of firm B by CE~oled = g~,. Under this assumption, we 
conclude that firm B is less efficient than firm A. However, if we consider each 
firm operating on its own frontier, then CETd = ~1: and CE~ = ~EJ;:, where 
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ind stands for individual frontier. It is obvious that efficiency ranking of these two 
firms reverses since in this case firm A is pronounced to be less efficient than firm 
cost 
B 
C 
~-~c 
~~~~----~--------------~Q 
o 
Appropriately defining outputs and inputs is still an elusive topic in the banking 
literature. The intermediation approach of Sealey and Lindley (1977), which is the 
standard in banking related research, considers the dollar volume of the banks' 
outputs and inputs instead of their physical units, which is obviously far from 
the ideal. Numbers and specific characteristic of loans are generally not available 
for the public use. As a result, as Berger and Mester (2002) also note, outputs 
produced by the larger banks can be substantially different from outputs produced 
by the smaller banks, requiring different monitoring and screening techniques. A 
4Similar example can be found in El-Gamal and Inanoglu (2005). 
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large amount of the loan produced by a large bank and issued to a single borrower, 
for example, could have a significantly differential effect on its cost than if the same 
amount was lent in parts to smaller borrowers. Moreover, there is a significant 
gap in costs among banks with similar scale and product mix, which could be 
attributed to many factors (Berger and Humphrey, 1992). Two such factors are 
size and inefficiency. Ignoring the size effect, the full gap would be attributed solely 
to inefficiency and other uncontrollable factors. Thus, appropriately distinguishing 
between large and small banks could in part account for this difference by capturing 
the shifts in their production technologies. 
How do we then account for both heterogeneity and inefficiencies in SFM? One 
way to do this is by introducing an individual specific intercept to the standard 
model. 
Notice that this requires that the inefficiency component is strictly time-varying 
in order to identify the individual effects. Recall also that in CSS model (};it = 
BOi + Blit + B2it2, thus (};i cannot be separately identified from the BOi , unless we 
consider a specification for the inefficiency term without the intercept. 
Greene (2005) considers the (};i to be either fixed parameter or random effects 
drawn from some known distribution. In the first case, he specifies what he calls the 
"true" fixed effects model and estimates it by the "brute force" techniques. The 
drawback of this model is that it induces the "incidental parameters" problem 
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and it also assumes that inefficiencies are uncorrelated with the regressors. In the 
second case, the "true" random effects model is specified which is estimated via 
simulated maximum likelihood (SML) method or quadrature. Both the effects and 
the inefficiencies are assumed to be uncorrelated with the regressors in this model. 
Another way to model the individual heterogeneity in SFM is through the ran-
dom parameters model in the spirit of Swamy and Tavlas (1995). This model 
assumes that both, the intercept term and the slope parameters are random in 
frontier function and can be estimated either by SML method (Greene, 2005) or 
Bayesian techniques (Tsionas, 2002; Huang, 2004). Orea and Kumbhakar (2004) 
and Greene (2005) instead estimate a latent class SFM, which assumes the exis-
tence of Q classes with each firm's membership in the specific class determined by 
its contribution to the log-likelihood function. Prior membership probabilities for 
each individual firm are specified, which may also be considered as functions of 
observed individual characteristics. El-Gamal and Inanoglu (2005) proposed a sim-
ilar model which employes the estimation-classification method of El-Gamal and 
Grether (1995). By fixing the number of classes, the conventional likelihood ratio 
(LR) test is performed to investigate the parameter heterogeneity across classes in 
their model. 
All the models described above assume that structural/technological parame-
ters do not change over time. Firms are assigned to a particular class or adopt 
a specific technology that is not changed throughout the given sample. However, 
after observing the real world it can be seen that firms change their strategies and 
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production techniques in order to survive in a constantly changing and challeng-
ing environment. This at least suggests that firms need not to share the same 
technology parameters over time and need to be allowed to switch groups. This 
can be accomplished through the clustering analysis (Brown and Glennon, 2000; 
Tortosa-Ausina, 2002; Wang and Kumbhakar, 2009) which segments the industry 
based on certain strategic variables, such as output mix, etc. However, there is no 
consensus on the nature and the number of the strategic variables. We consider 
overcoming this limitation by employing structural break/threshold effects model. 
4.3. The Threshold Effects Stochastic Frontier Model 
Following Hansen (1999, 2000a), the CSS production frontier model with single 
threshold effects can be represented as 
(4.1) 
where J(.) denotes the indicator function, qit is a continuous time-varying scalar 
representing the threshold variable, and r is the threshold value that splits the 
sample into two technology-groups. The assumptions about the effect and noise 
term are maintained from previous section. The effects are assumed to be random 
which allows for identification of the intercept and time trend parameter (s) in the 
kernel regression function. 
We can rewrite (4.1) in a more compact representation as 
with 
X it (,) = (XitI(qit ~ I)) 
XitI(qit > ,) 
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(4.2) 
(4.3) 
where X· ('V) = (Xit I(qitS,l')) is the NT x (K + 1) design matrix of regressors and tt I Xit I (qit>l') 
(3 = [(31 : (32] is a (K + 1) x 1 vector of structural parameters. 
The above representation makes it clear that the model is capable of dividing 
the observations into two discrete class-regimes based on the threshold variable 
value. If we consider qit as a proxy for firm size, then two regimes can represent 
two different technologies that each bank in the sample employs depending on 
its size. In other words, the main purpose of the threshold effects model is to 
investigate whether the independent variables have different impacts on different 
subgroups of the population. If the answer to the previous question is positive, 
then the estimates based on the full sample will be biased and will have little or 
no economic meaning. 
Using the conventional stacking of the panel data models, the threshold effects 
stochastic frontier model (TSFM), can be rewritten in matrix notation as: 
y = X (r) (3 + Qu + v ( 4.4) 
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where QNTx3N = diag(Wi ), Wi = [1 t t 2], and u is 3N x 1 iid random vector with 
zero mean and covariance matrix ~. 
Let MQ = 1- Q(Q'Q)-lQ' be the projection onto the null space of Q and 
n-1/ 2 = ~MQ + F where 
(4.5) 
Then, while treating the value of the parameter '"Y as known,the generalized least 
squares (GLS) estimator of !3 is given by 
(4.6) 
The estimation of '"Y parameters is performed by minimizing the concentrated 
sum of squared residuals using a grid search algorithm.5 That is, 
l' = arg min S( '"Y) (4.7) 
I 
iJThe values of the threshold variable are sorted and the algorithm searches over all distinct values 
or certain quantiles of q. The value of q that minimizes the concentrated sum of squared errors 
is the solution of the optimization algorithm. 
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where 
S("() = e'('Y)e("() = (Y - X("()~("())'(y - X("()~("()) 
= (Y - X("() [X' ("() X ("()t 1 X' ("()Y)'(Y - X ("()[X' ("() X ("()t 1 X'("()Y) 
= Y'{I - X("()[X'('Y)X("()]-lX'("()}Y (4.8) 
After the threshold parameter is estimated we can obtain the structural coef-
ficients and the variance of within residuals from 
By regressing the residuals 
on Q, we can obtain the estimated individual effects Uit = UOi + Ulit + U2it2. The 
group-specific efficiencies then are estimated asO 
which is consistent for large N. This specification implies that in each period at 
least one producer produces on frontier and is 100% technically efficient. 
6EFFit = exp(minj Ujt - Uit) for the cost frontier models. 
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The estimate of'Y and consequently of j3(-y) are consistent. Chan (1993) and 
Hansen (1999) note that the estimate of the threshold can be treated as fixed in 
deriving the asymptotic distribution of j3(-y) in order to facilitate the inference. 
However, the distribution of'Y is nonstandard which can complicate the inference. 
In particular, testing for the presence of the threshold becomes problematic, since 
'Y is not identified under the null hypothesis of no threshold and conventional 
tests would have distributions that are also nonstandard (Davies' Problem, 1977). 
Hansen (1996, 1999) proposes a bootstrap method to simulate the asymptotic 
distribution of the classical LR test, which can be used in hypothesis testing. We 
use the same test to investigate the existence of heterogeneous technologies in our 
commercial banking application. 
A model with a single threshold can be extended in a straightforward fashion 
to accommodate multiple thresholds. If we assume the presence of L thresholds 
then the model is represented as 
Yit = j3~xitI(qit ~ 'Y1) + j3~xitI(-y1 < qit ~ 'Y2) + ... 
+j3;XitI (-YI_1 < qit ~ 'YI) + j3;+1xitI(-Y1 < qit) - Uit + Vit 
with the restriction that 'Y1 < 'Y2 < .... < 'Y1-1 < 'YI for l = 1,2, ... , L. 
Similarly to the single threshold model, the threshold parameters are estimated 
via a grid search algorithm on the threshold variable values and the rest model 
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parameters and their standard errors are consequently estimated. A slight com-
plication, however, arises in estimating the threshold parameters in the multiple-
threshold model. Joint estimation of the threshold parameters would require a grid 
search over an enormous number of points (even if we consider few quantiles of the 
q) which drastically increase with the number of break points. This calls for the 
sequential estimation of the threshold parameters which is consistent and is more 
than necessary especially when the sample size is large. However, this method 
yields asymptotically efficient estimates only of the last threshold parameter in 
the process. The previous estimates are contaminated by the presence of the ne-
glected thresholds. Bai (1997) suggested a refinement estimation of the threshold 
parameters which amounts to re-estimating the threshold parameters backwards, 
each time holding the estimates of the previous thresholds fixed. The refinement 
estimator is shown to be asymptotically efficient. 
4.4. Empirical Model and Data 
The technology in the banking industry can be either demonstrated directly 
by the production frontier or indirectly by its dual cost function (Shephard, 1953). 
The cost frontier typically describes the minimum level of cost given a certain 
output level and input prices. The intermediation approach of Sealey and Lindley 
(1977) is the standard approach adopted in the banking literature according to 
which banks are viewed as intermediary multi-stage production units that collect 
loanable funds from depositors and investors to transform them into earning assets, 
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such as loans and securities (see for example Kaparakis et al., 1994, Berger and 
Mester,1997, 2002; Adams et al., 1999; Wheelock and Wilson, 2000, 2001; Kneip et 
al., 2011, among others). We adopt this approach in our empirical application. We 
abstain from including the cost share equations in the analysis due to the issues 
related to the allocative inefficiency ("Greene Problem"). Thus, the estimated 
overall efficiency represents the cost or economic inefficiency which can be due to 
technical or allocative inefficiency, or both. 
Following Greene (2005), we specify five-output five-input stochastic cost fron-
tier with flexible transcendental (translog) functional form 7 
I Cit n-
Wlit 
5 4 
+ L L 6m k In Ymit (r) In :kit (r) + 7) In reqit (r) + On rmnp1it (r) 
m=1 k=1 lzt 
1# 
1 2 1 2 1 2 
+2((1n reqit) + 2 'l,b (In rmnp1it) + 8It + 282t 
5 4 
~ ~ Wkit 
+ D Amt In Ymit( ,)t + D cPkt In -(r)t + Vit + Uit 
m=1 k=1 Wlit 
1# 
7Translog function provides the second-order Taylor series approximation to any arbitrary func-
tion at a single point. In addition, the returns to scale measures and factor demand elasticities 
are not required to be constant as in the Cobb-Douglas case. 
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where Cit = Lk WkitXkit represents the observed total cost of the intermediation 
process for the individual bank in each time period t and Ym is the value of mth 
output, m = 1, ",5. Outputs are the real estate loans (Yl), commercial and in-
dust rial loans (Y2), loans to individuals (Y3), securities (Y4), and off-balance sheet 
items (Y5). w's represent the inputs prices, which are interest-bearing deposits in 
total transaction accounts (xt}, interest-bearing deposits in total non-transaction 
accounts (X2), labor (X3), purchased funds (X4), and capital (X5). In addition, 
two variables are included to control for observable heterogeneity. The first vari-
able is the ratio of the total equity to total assets (req) which typically measures 
the risk of insolvency of the bank. It reflects the ability of the bank to absorb 
the unexpected losses from their on- and off-balance sheet activities. Banks with 
lower values of this ratio are highly leveraged and thus should be considered riskier 
than banks with higher values, ceteris paribus. The second variable is the ratio 
of non-performing loans to total loans (rmnpl) which reflects the quality of loans 
made by the bank.s Quadratic time trend and time interaction with outputs and 
input prices are also included to account for non-neutral technological shifts of 
the cost frontier. The linear homogeneity in input prices restriction is imposed by 
normalizing the cost and the input prices by the price of capital. The symmetry 
restrictions (amj = ajm and f3kn = f3nk ) are also imposed. 
SNonperfoming loans include the total loans and lease finance receivables that are nonacrual, 
past due 30-89 days and still accruing, and past due 90 days and still accruing. 
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Deposits can be determined as either inputs or outputs through the empirical 
test outlined in Huges and Mester (1993). That is, when quantity instead of the 
price of the deposits is included in the cost function and the increased quantity 
leads to the lower cost (In C / In x < 0), then the particular type of deposits is 
considered as an input. Should the deposits be considered as an output, then the 
opposite should hold. Increasing the output requires additional usage of inputs 
(none if the bank operates inefficiently), which subsequently should increase the 
cost. In the intermediation approach deposits are viewed as inputs, as opposed 
to the production and value-added approaches (Baltensperger, 1980; Berger and 
Humphrey, 1992 ) which treat the deposits as the bank output services. In the 
current application both types of deposits are determined as inputs by the above 
simple empirical test. 
After the structural parameters are obtained we can estimate the class-specific 
scale economies and measures of technological change. The scale economies are 
defined as the degree to which a bank's total cost of producing financial services 
decreases as its output services increase proportionally and it is derived as the sum 
of the partial derivatives of the cost with respect to the outputs. That is, 
Scaleit(-y) (4.9) 
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If this measure is less than one then there is a presence of economies of scale 
indicating that the bank is operating below the optimal scale level and can reduce 
the cost by expanding its output. On the other hand, if it is greater than one then 
the bank is experiencing diseconomies of scale and should reduce its output level 
to achieve optimal input combination. It is worthwhile to note that in the case 
of the Cobb-Douglas cost frontier specification the economies of scale is equal to 
L::~=1 am and is common for all banks in the sample. In this special case threshold 
effects estimation can provide measures that are common for banks within the 
technology-group, but different across groups. 
The data are extracted from quarterly Consolidated Reports of Condition and 
Income (Call Reports) for all U.S. commercial banks that are collected and admin-
istrated by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago and Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation (FDIC). The observed sample period is from 1984 to 2009 (third 
quarter). The initial unbalanced sample is comprised of 5,253 (2009.Q3) to 12,781 
(1984.Q1) banks observed in each quarter with total of 861,420 observations, af-
ter dropping banks with zero costs, zero output and input levels, as well as those 
with obvious measurement errors and other data inconsistencies. This eliminated 
approximately 18.5% of observations of the entire population of all insured com-
mercial banks. Finally, we randomly sample 2,500 banks with a total of 257,500 
observations from this non-homogeneous pool of banks, which also constitutes the 
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estimation sampleY Summary statistics of this sample are reported in table 4.2 
for four selected quarters. IO 
4.5. Empirical Results 
The application of the threshold stochastic frontier model (TSFM) to the sam-
pIe of commercial banks revealed the existence of six thresholds/cutoffs, which is 
translated into seven distinct technology-groups.ll There was not enough evidence 
in the sample to suggest against the null hypothesis of six thresholds over the al-
ternative hypothesis of seven thresholds based on bootstrap probability value. The 
estimated threshold parameters along with the group-specific average estimates of 
the cost efficiency (CE), returns to scale (RTS) , and technical change (TC) are 
reported in table 4.1. Figures 4.3-4.5 plot the these estimates over time for each 
group, as well as for the full sample. The same table summarizes the accounting ra-
tios, such as return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), profit margin (PM), 
and asset utilization (AU), separately for each group.12 These ratios are typically 
9The reason for utilizing a balanced sample is to capture a stable technological behavior of the 
banks as they grow in size throughout the entire sample period and to film their switching the 
size-categories over time. This eliminates very small banks (those that failed or were acquired by 
other surviving banks) and the de novo banks (state member banks that have been in operation for 
five years or less), which could introduce a serious technological disruptions and bias the results. 
Another reason is that the threshold effects estimation method is computationally intensive, as 
it takes very long time even for computers with superior computing power which utilize multiple 
nodes. 
l01984.Q1 (beginning of the sample), 1993. Q1 (prior to the introduction of the Reigle-Neal Act 
in 1994), 2000.Q1 (reference period), and 2009.Q3 (end of the sample). 
llTo determine the number of thresholds, a grid search was performed over 250 quantiles of the 
threshold variable in each of the 29 sequential estimation steps. 
I2ROA is defined as the ratio of the net income to the total assets and measures the profit earned 
relative to the bank's assets. ROE is defined as the ratio of the net income to total equity capital 
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Table 4.1. Estimation Results: Threshold Values, Cost Efficiency, 
Returns to Scale, Technical Change, Return on Assets, Return on 
Equity, Profit Margin, and Asset Utilization. 
group CE RTS TC ROA ROE PM AU 
group 1 0.7683 1.486 4.5% 0.31% 2.6% -2.7% 5.0% 
(0 < q ~ 19,876) 
group 2 0.7680 1.516 3.6% 0.53% 4.9% 9.4% 5.0% 
(19,876 < q ~ 39,876) 
group 3 0.7641 1.338 3.0% 0.61% 7.1% 12.4% 5.1% 
(39,876 < q ~ 110,178) 
group 4 0.7960 1.211 3.6% 0.64% 5.1% 13.1% 5.1% 
(110,178 < q ~ 197,430) 
group 5 0.8065 1.128 0.8% 0.63% 7.1% 13.0% 5.2% 
(197,430 < q ~ 361,946) 
group 6 0.8184 1.120 6.2% 0.62% 5.1% 12.4% 5.2% 
(361,946 < q ~ 1,300,592) 
group 7 0.7792 1.038 3.9% 0.58% 15.4% 11.5% 5.2% 
(q> 1,300,592) 
full sample 0.7673 1.182 1.3% 0.57% 6.2% 11.1% 5.1% 
used to evaluate the performance and profitability of financial institutions by man-
agers, investors, and regulators. Parameter estimates from the translog stochastic 
cost frontier for each group are reported in table 4.3. 
and measures the overall profitability of the bank per dollar of equity. PM is defined as the 
ratio of the net income to the total operating income and measures the bank's ability to pay 
expenses and generate net income from interest and non-interest income. AU is defined as the 
ratio of the total operating income to the total assets and measures the amount of the interest 
and non-interest income generated per dollar of the total assets. 
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In particular, we find that banks in groups 1,2, and 3, which are very small 
banks, appear to be less efficient compared to the banks in the other four groups. 
The difference is small, but statistically significant. On average, banks in these 
three groups are considerably scale inefficient for all sample periods and group 1 
displays an upward efficiency trend for the most of the quarters. The number of 
the small banks is falling over time according to figure 4.2. On the other hand, 
group 6 is the most cost efficient group on average. However, the performance 
of this group is rapidly declining since 2000. Banks in this group have enough 
room to exploit their scale efficiencies. It is worthwhile to note, that pooling 
banks into a single class underestimates the efficiencies of banks in this group and 
reports them as less efficient than those in group 7. One possible explanation of 
the higher cost efficiencies of group 6 is that its member banks are able to adopt 
new technologies very quickly due to their manageable size. This also could be one 
of the reasons the regulatory authorities seek to place specific upper bounds on 
the size of very large banks ("too-big-to-fail" banks) to make them smaller, safer, 
and more manageable. Even a slight difference in the efficiencies of these large 
institutions could be translated in billions of dollars losses. 
Figure 4.4 shows that the large banks in group 7 have already exhausted their 
potential scale economies. The hypothesis of constant returns to scale cannot 
be rejected for these banks after 1996. Previous studies in banking literature 
have shown that U.S. commercial banks operate at constant returns to scale at 
much lower output levels (McAllister and McManus, 1993; Wheelock and Wilson, 
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2001). In their recent study of the U.S. commercial banking industry, Wang and 
Kumbhakar (2009) found that a large proportion of very small banks, with asset 
sizes less than 25 millions, face decreasing returns to scale. Results of the current 
work fail to support this finding. 
Overall the efficiency trends for all groups are consistent with those found in 
Almanidis et al. (2010). The efficiencies are increasing after the deregulation 
of the 1980s. Except for group 6, the efficiency levels are relatively stable for 
the period 1990-2005 and fall thereafter, possibly revealing the weaknesses of the 
banking industry and the seeds of the current financial distress. Similar patterns 
occur, although not to that extent, during previous recessionary periods of 1990 
and 2001. In sum, we could informally conclude that the declining efficiencies of 
the U.s. commercial banking industry could serve as a predictor and indicator of 
a financial crisis. 
Technological innovation has always been and still is the concern of all financial 
institutions. However, acquiring and adopting new technologies is not the same 
for banks of different sizes. Our results indicate that the small banks display 
technological progress which is decreasing over time. The cost frontier of the large 
banks in groups 6 and 7, on the other hand, is expanding at an increasing rate 
due to the high technology that these banks can afford. It is widely believed that 
small banks adopt new technologies with considerable lags, but at a lower cost. 
The technical change measure is constant at around 2% if the estimation is done 
without considering the possibility of the threshold effects. 
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Finally, according to the accounting ratios, on average larger banks appear to 
perform better than smaller banks. Simply looking at ROA suggests that, banks 
in group 7 are less profitable than banks in groups 3 and 4. However, they produce 
two to six times more profit per dollar of equity than banks in any other group. 
This is because they tend to hold less equity than other banks do, as they have 
relatively easy access to money and capital markets. Moreover, their profit margin, 
i.e., the ability to generate net income from interest and noninterest income, is low 
compared to this for banks in groups 3 to 6. The ability to generate noninterest 
income, however, is twice as high for these large banks (1.1 % of total assets) 
compared to smaller banks (0.56% of total assets), because the former banks tend 
to engage in off-balance sheet activities more than their smaller peers are able to 
do. 
4.6. Conclusions 
In this chapter we investigated the existence of heterogeneous technologies in 
the U.S. commercial banking industry. we applied the threshold effects estimation 
technique with an exogenous threshold variable (total asset size) and determined 
seven distinct technology-groups. Pooling banks into a single class was clearly not 
justified by the result of the bootstrap test and produced distorted estimates and 
different efficiency ranking than estimates based on the technology-specific effects 
model. In addition, we provided estimates of individual and group efficiency scores, 
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as well as of those of returns to scale and measures of technological change. The 
average efficiencies were found to be time-varying whose level and slopes differed 
across groups. All groups displayed a consistent sharp decline in their average effi-
ciencies during the financial crisis that was fired up in August of 2007. Results also 
have shown that the very large banks have already exploited their scale efficiencies 
and display technological progress which improves over time. 
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Table 4.2. Summary statistics for selected periods 
variables 1984.Q1 1993.Q1 2000.Q1 2009.Q3 
YI 27.4 (251.6) 84.2 (720.5) 473.6 (6500) 695.2 (10000) 
Y2 38.8 (642.7) 49.4 (630.8) 165.2 (2399) 221. 7 (3466) 
Y3 19.5 (149.8) 31.9 (366.5) 103.7 (1715) 134.9 (2099) 
Y4 40.3 (178.6) 87.7 (779.2) 258.6 (4274) 377.4 (6850) 
Y5 20.7 (318.6) 61.7 (996.1) 316.3 (6633) 2337 (71900) 
WI 0.011 (0.18) 0.006 (0.07) 0.006 (0.06) 0.003 (0.005) 
W2 0.018 (0.03) 0.009 (0.02) 0.002 (0.001) 0.007 (0.003) 
W3 8.80 (4.380) 9.25 (1.939) 10.7 (2.3010) 33.0 (7.1095) 
W4 0.023 (0.09) 0.012 (0.01) 0.033 (0.025) 0.075 (0.038) 
W5 0.090 (0.07) 0.091 (0.07) 0.080 (0.059) 0.215 (0.141) 
req 0.091 (0.03) 0.102 (0.03) 0.104 (0.032) 0.108 (0.031) 
rmnpl 0.026 (0.03) 0.011 (0.01) 0.024 (0.021) 0.038 (0.030) 
Standard deviation in parenteses. Outputs and the price of the labor are expressed in 
thousands of lJ.S. dollars 
Yi =real estate loans 
Y2=commercial and industrial loans 
Y3 =loans to individuals 
Y4=securities 
Y5=off-balance sheet items 
Wi = average price of interest-bearing deposits in total transaction accounts 
w2=average price of interest-bearing deposits in total non-transaction accounts 
W3= average price of labor 
w4=average price of purchased funds 
w5=average price of capital 
req= the ratio of the equity to total assets 
rnmpl=the ratio of non-performing loans to total loans 
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Table 4.3. Technology-Group Estimation Results 
gl g2 g3 g4 g5 g6 g7 
YI -0.104** -0.114*** 0.063* 0.256*** 0.335*** 0.570*** 0.496*** 
Y2 -0.088*** 0.128*** 0.232*** 0.282*** 0.517*** 0.387*** -0.028 
Y3 -0.008 -0.179*** -0.028 0.130*** 0.115*** -0.220** 0.071 ** 
Y4 -0.327*** -0.449*** -0.262*** 0.203*** 0.292*** 0.781 *** 0.313*** 
Ys -0.089*** -0.131*** -0.044* -0.057** -0.143*** -0.207*** 0.076** 
WI 0.171 *** 0.116*** 0.223*** 0.316*** 0.436*** 0.336*** 0.138*** 
W2 0.618*** 0.870*** 0.873*** 0.830*** 0.471*** 0.715*** 0.646*** 
W3 0.181 * -0.058 -0.052 0.123* -0.094* -1.407* 0.141 * 
W4 -0.098*** 0.037* -0.006 -0.040* 0.131*** 0.453** 0.130*** 
Ws 0.129* 0.035 -0.038 -0.228** 0.056 0.902 -0.056 
WIWI 0.053*** 0.052*** 0.053*** 0.044*** 0.016*** 0.018** 0.002 
WIW2 -0.047*** -0.048*** -0.028*** -0.012*** 0.006** 0.006 -0.006* 
WIW3 -0.019*** -0.031*** -0.045*** -0.059*** -0.034*** -0.061** -0.021 *** 
WIW4 0.020*** 0.031*** 0.028*** 0.035*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.016*** 
WIWS -0.006* -0.004* -0.007* -0.008** -0.010* 0.014 0.009 
W2W2 0.153*** 0.162*** 0.119*** 0.117*** 0.093*** 0.103*** 0.088*** 
W2 W3 -0.049*** -0.055*** -0.043*** -0.047*** -0.070*** -0.153*** -0.072*** 
W2 W4 -0.046*** -0.053*** -0.040*** -0.048*** -0.022*** -0.002 0.005 
W2W S -0.106*** -0.114*** -0.073*** -0.081*** -0.088*** -0.071* -0.077*** 
W3W3 0.056*** 0.084*** 0.061 *** 0.066*** 0.070*** 0.407** 0.053*** 
W3W4 0.006* -0.001 0.007*** 0.013*** 0.015*** -0.034 0.022*** 
W3W S -0.103*** -0.108*** -0.058*** -0.047*** -0.012* 0.088 -0.011 
W4W4 0.013*** 0.0190*** 0.004** 0.001 -0.018*** -0.020*** -0.052*** 
W4 WS -0.077*** -0.086*** -0.063*** -0.058*** -0.024*** 0.029 -0.037*** 
WSWs -0.113*** -0.139*** -0.096*** -0.088*** -0.071*** -0.355* -0.074** 
WIYI -0.008*** -0.004*** -0.005*** -0.004*** 0.006*** 0.004 -0.031 *** 
WIY2 -0.002** 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.003** 0.003* 0.015*** 0.036*** 
WIY3 0.018*** 0.016*** 0.013*** 0.004*** -0.006*** -0.015*** 0.009*** 
WIY4 0.004** 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.015*** -0.002 0.020*** 0.013*** 
p*<O.L p**<O.05, p***<O.Ol 
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Table 3: Cont'd 
gl g2 g3 g4 g5 g6 g7 
WIYS -0.001* -0.002*** -0.001** 0.001 -0.004*** -0.010*** -0.014*** 
W2Yl 0.036*** 0.011*** 0.003 -0.001 0.007** -0.016* 0.045*** 
W2Y2 -0.011*** -0.010*** -0.014*** -0.005* -0.009*** -0.003 -0.038*** 
W2Y3 -0.012** -0.024*** -0.016*** -0.015*** 0.008*** -0.005 -0.004* 
W2Y4 0.023*** 0.024*** 0.015*** 0.011*** 0.026*** 0.037*** 0.010** 
W2YS -0.016*** -0.012*** -0.007*** -0.010*** -0.009*** 0.011* -0.011 *** 
W3Yl -0.020*** -0.001 0.012*** 0.007* -0.005 0.088*** -0.031 *** 
W3Y2 0.013*** -0.004* 0.008*** -0.003 -0.006* -0.073*** -0.014** 
W3Y3 -0.017*** 0.005 -0.007*** -0.001 -0.006** 0.032 0.017*** 
W3Y4 -0.016*** -0.022*** -0.020*** -0.032*** -0.009** -0.074** 0.010* 
W3YS 0.015*** 0.012*** 0.006*** 0.011 *** 0.021 *** 0.011 * 0.001 
W4Yl -0.004** -0.005*** 0.001 -0.002 0.001 -0.001 0.016*** 
W4Y2 0.002* 0.008*** 0.005*** 0.003*** 0.011*** 0.013** 0.010*** 
W4Y3 0.010*** 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.002 -0.006*** 
W4Y4 0.002 -0.009*** -0.008*** 0.001 -0.009*** -0.010* -0.022*** 
W4YS -0.001 0.002*** -0.002** -0.002*** -0.011*** -0.013*** 0.002 
WSYl -0.004 -0.001 -0.011 ** -0.001 -0.009* -0.075** 0.001 
WSY2 -0.002 0.003 -0.001 0.003 0.001 0.048* 0.006 
WSY3 0.001 -0.001 0.002 0.005 -0.002 -0.014 -0.016** 
WSY4 -0.013* -0.004 0.003 0.005 -0.006 0.026 -0.011 
WsYs 0.003 -0.003 0.004* 0.001 0.003 0.001 0.023*** 
YIYl 0.063*** 0.055*** 0.079*** 0.118*** 0.131 *** 0.081*** 0.153*** 
YIY2 -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.011*** -0.029*** -0.028*** -0.002 -0.037*** 
YIY3 0.006** 0.003* -0.008*** -0.016*** -0.030*** -0.034*** -0.018*** 
YIY4 -0.014*** -0.018*** -0.049*** -0.081*** -0.087*** -0.113*** -0.104*** 
YIYS 0.001 0.002** 0.002 0.003* 0.005*** 0.011* 0.001 
Y2Y2 0.031*** 0.035*** 0.029*** 0.043*** 0.043*** 0.055*** 0.068*** 
Y2Y3 0.005*** 0.004*** -0.002* -0.002 -0.007*** -0.001 -0.003 
Y2Y4 -0.007*** -0.025*** -0.030*** -0.022*** -0.032*** -0.042*** -0.016*** 
p*<O.l, p**<O.05. p***<O.Ol 
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Table 3: Cont'd 
gl g2 g3 g4 g5 g6 g7 
Y2YS -0.003** -0.001* 0.001 0.002 -0.004*** 0.001 0.010*** 
Y3Y3 0.041 *** 0.042*** 0.048*** 0.043*** 0.042*** 0.035*** 0.028*** 
Y3Y4 -0.025*** -0.019*** -0.018*** -0.025*** -0.003 0.011* -0.003 
Y3YS 0.005*** 0.007*** 0.005*** 0.002* 0.003** 0.009*** -0.002 
Y4Y4 0.122* 0.142 0.153*** 0.148* 0.127 0.127 0.118 
Y4YS -0.003* 0.001 -0.005*** -0.003* 0.004 -0.003 -0.002 
YsYs 0.002* -0.001 0.003*** -0.005 0.002* -0.001 -0.009*** 
req -1.72*** -1.970*** -1.604*** -1.168*** -1.033*** -2.624*** 0.009 
rmnpl 2.707* 3.431 *** 2.139*** 0.522* 0.509 8.839*** -1.206 
req2 
-0.092* 0.016 0.001 0.027 -0.245*** -0.699*** -1.213*** 
rmnpl2 0.671* 0.157 -0.414* 0.512 -0.066 3.914*** 5.938*** 
tYl 0.002*** 0.001 *** 0.001 *** -0.001 0.001 *** -0.001 0.002*** 
tY2 -0.001 -0.003*** -0.001*** -0.002* -0.004*** 0.001* -0.001 *** 
tY3 0.001 ** 0.003*** 0.001 * 0.001 * 0.001*** -0.002 -0.005*** 
tY4 0.001 0.001 0.001 *** -0.001 -0.003* 0.002*** -0.002 
tys -0.001 *** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.005*** -0.001*** -0.001 -0.001 *** 
tWl 0.005*** 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.001 *** -0.004*** -0.003 0.005** 
tW2 0.002 0.001 *** 0.004** 0.002*** 0.003*** 0.006*** 0.003*** 
tW3 -0.001 ** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.009*** -0.001* 
tW4 0.005*** 0.001 0.003*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001 -0.002*** 
tws -0.005 -0.005* -0.004 -0.003* 0.001 0.004 -0.006 
t -0.032*** -0.015*** -0.009*** 0.003 0.006** 0.005 -0.004 
It2 2 0.002*** 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.001*** -0.001 0.002*** 0.0003* 
C 8.981 *** 11.004*** 8.044*** 2.862*** 1.343** 3.039* 1.834*** 
p*<O.l, p**<O.05, p***<O.01 
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Averaged Cost Efficiencies per Class-Regime 
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CHAPTER 5 
Commercial Banking Data 
The data on commercial banks used in this thesis are primarily extracted from 
the quarterly consolidated reports of condition (balance sheets) and income (in-
come statements), also known as the Call Reports, that are collected and adminis-
trated by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and are collectively 
available from the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago's website.1 Every national 
bank, state member bank, and insured state nonmember bank is required to file 
either a FFIEC 031 (Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income for a Bank 
with Domestic and Foreign Offices) or a FFIEC 041 (Consolidated Reports of Con-
dition and Income for a Bank with Domestic Offices Only) form on a quarterly 
basis as of the last calendar day of March, June, September, and December.2 Call 
Report contains detailed data on bank's various earning and non-earning assets, 
liability composition, capital structure, income, expenses, and other bank-specific 
structural and geographical characteristics. Office/branch-level data are available 
from the FDIC only on the amount of deposits, which are reported in Summary 
of Deposits each year (on June 30th) since 1994. Below, we provide a somewhat 
lwww.chicagofed.org 
2Initially, only a subset of banks were required to file two of the four Call Reports on surprise 
dates, or "on call" and this is how its name derived. 
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detailed description of the main banks' on-balance and off-balance sheet elements, 
income and expenses, as well as of the regulatory capital and environmental vari-
abIes. A particular care is provided to creating consistent time series of the relevant 
data, as the content and structure of the reports are frequently revised in light of 
global environmental and regulatory changes. Finally, following Kashyap and Stein 
(1995), Adams et al. (1999), Jayasuriya (2000), and Berger and Mester (2002), 
we detail the construction of the key variables used in this thesis. These mainly 
include output quantities, input prices and quantities, characteristics of banks and 
the regulatory environment in which they operate, as well as a number of measures 
of risk, asset quality, profitability, and performance. A comprehensive discussion 
of commercial banking industry and its functions can be found in Saunders and 
Cornett (2004). 
We merge quarterly files obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, 
which contain all the variables reported on the Call Reports and the structure and 
geographical variables, between 1984 (first quarter)-2010 (second quarter).3 This 
provided 1,057,545 observations after dropping reporting banks with non-positive 
total assets, total deposits, and total loans. All dollar values are converted to reflect 
2000 (first quarter) prices using the consumer price index (CPI).4 The majority of 
3The files are available starting in 1976. However, the definitions of certain variables have con-
siderably changed after 1984, because of the break in reporting forms, which makes it difficult 
to merge the files consistently from these two periods (see Kashyap and Stein, 1994, 1995 and 
"Notes on forming consistent time series" available at the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago's 
website for more discussion on these issues). 
4Quarterly series on CPI are available from the website of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis 
(FRED) at http://research.stlouisfed.org 
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banks in this sample are very small banks (below 90th percentile by asset size). 
As it is shown in figure 5.1 the nUlnber of these banks is declining over time, while 
the medium and large-sized banks grow both in numbers and importance. As 
of current analysis, approximately 21.5% of the commercial banks are nationally 
chartered and 34% of banks hold the Federal Reserve membership. 
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Figure 5.1. Number of banks in asset size percentiles 
5.1. Balance Sheet Data 
A balance sheet of a commercial bank, like of any other type of a business 
company, consists of two parts: total assets and total liability plus capital. Table 
5.1 illustrates the balance sheet of a typical comlnercial bank and provides the Call 
Report item definition for each of its components. The structure and the compo-
sition of the assets and liabilities, however, is very different in case of financial 
institutions, which also varies considerably for institutions of different asset sizes. 
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Tables (5.3)-(5.10) report the representative balance sheets for four different size 
categories over four different periods.5 
Total assets consist of cash, securities, total loans and leases, and other tan-
gible and intangible assets. Cash involves noninterest-bearing balances, currency 
and coin held by the bank primarily to perform its daily activities and to meet 
withdrawals. Due to the recent advances in online and internet banking systems, 
as well as the broad usage of credit cards, banks tend to hold fewer cash (as a per-
centage of their total assets). Securities consist of items such as interest-bearing 
deposits due from depository institutions (DIs), federal funds sold and all securities 
purchased under agreements to resell, and investment securities (book value). In-
vestment securities include U.S. Treasury securities, U.S. government agency and 
corporation obligations, securities issued by states and political subdivisions in 
the U.S., and other domestic and foreign debt and equity securities. Unlike the 
loans, securities are highly liquid, bear low default risk, and can be conventionally 
traded in the secondary markets. The majority of the smaller banks tend to hold 
significant amounts of securities, because of their inability to easily access short 
term money markets, such as the federal funds market. As a result of the recent 
liquidity crisis, banks (particularly large ones) have significantly increased their 
pools of investment securities to be able to meet unexpected liquidity needs. 
5 A bank is assigned to size categories whether its total asset falls into the following percentile 
ranges: [0,90], (90,95], (95,99], and (99,100j. The periods are: 1984 (first quarter), which is the 
beginning of the sample period, 1993 (first quarter) a year before Congress passed the interstate 
banking and branching law, 2000 (first quarter) which is the reference period, and 2010 (second 
quarter) which is the last period of observations. 
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Total loans fall into seven broad categories: real estate loans, commercial and 
industrial loans (C&I), agricultural or farm loans, lease financing receivables, loans 
to individuals, loans to depository institutions, and other loans. Real estate loans 
consist of loans to individuals and businesses that are secured by real estate. This 
type of loans constitute the largest component of the total loans for small banks. 
C&I loans include loans for commercial and industrial purposes to business enter-
prises (proprietorships, partnerships, and corporations), whether secured or unse-
cured, single payment or installment. Larger banks traditionally concentrate on 
wholesale banking and thus make fewer real estate loans and more C&I loans than 
smaller banks do. Recently large banks have substantially reduced the amount of 
the loans to corporations (as a percent of total assets) and as many banks in the 
industry were highly involved in the residential mortgage lending. Agricultural 
loans, which are almost exclusively provided by banks in the first category, include 
all loans issued to farmers for the purpose of financing agricultural production. 
Physical assets, such as buildings and vehicles, rented to a customer constitute 
bank's leases. These constitute a negligible percentage of bank's total assets and 
the vast bulk of industry leases are provided by large banks. Loans to individuals 
involve credit card, auto, student, and other miscellaneous personal loans. Larger 
banks consistently increase their share in the market for individual loans, espe-
cially the credit cards markets, over the smaller banks' share that traditionally 
used to have the advantage of providing personally based services to their clients. 
Loans to depository institutions and other loans include all loans to other banks 
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and depository institutions, nonbank associations and companies, as well as to 
state, local, and foreign governments. These type of loans loose their popularity 
in banks' loan compositions through time. Loans and leases are typically reported 
in dollar values, as their numbers are not available prior to 1993 (second quarter). 
Together with securities, loans and leases constitute bank's earning assets and are 
major components of bank's total assets. Net loans and leases are derived after 
deducting the unearned income on loans and the reserve for loan and lease loses 
from the total (gross) loans. Unearned income is the amount of income on loans 
earned but not yet reported on the bank's income statement. Whereas, the reserve 
for loan and lease losses reflect the management's assessment of the value of the 
defaulted assets in subsequent periods. 
Other assets on banks' balance sheet consist of premises and fixed assets, other 
real estate owned, intangible assets and other miscellaneous assets. Premises and 
fixed assets, which include equipment, furniture, fixtures, and capitalized leases, 
are typically considered as a proxy for bank's capital. Other real estate owned 
primarily consists of real estate acquired for collateral and previously contracted 
debts. Intangible assets involve items such as goodwill, trademarks, etc. Finally, 
other miscellaneous assets represent bank assets that cannot be properly included 
in any of the preceding items. Other assets constitute a small fraction of banks' 
total assets. 
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On the liability and equity capital side the items are even more diverse. Al-
though all banks are financed with deposits, purchased (borrowed) funds, and com-
mon equity, the structure and the compositions of these sources varies significantly 
across financial institutions. The primary source of funds, in particular for smaller 
banks, are the total deposits which can be classified as core and noncore deposits. 
Core deposits consist of demand deposits, negotiable order of withdrawal accounts 
(NOW accounts), money market deposit accounts (MMDAs), and retail certificate 
of deposits (CDs). Demand deposits include all noninterest-bearing transaction 
(checking) accounts. NOW accounts are interest-bearing checking accounts, which 
mayor may not require prior notice before withdrawal. Large banks in the last two 
size-categories tend to keep fewer demand deposits and NOW accounts as opposed 
to their smaller peers. MMDAs, which lately is considered as an attractive source 
of funds by banks of all sizes, refer to interest-bearing checkable deposits with cer-
tain restrictions imposed on the minimum balance, number and the denomination 
of checks. Retail CDs include all nontransaction time certificates of deposit and 
open account time deposits with balances of less than $100,000, regardless of ne-
gotiability or transferability. Smaller banks heavily rely on retail CDs, which on 
average constitute about 70 percent of their total assets. 
Purchased funds, as a second substantive source of funds, consist of wholesale 
CDs, federal funds purchased and all securities sold under agreements to repur-
chase, other borrowed money and notes issued to the U.S. Treasury, brokered 
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deposits, and subordinated notes and debentures. Wholesale CDs includes all out-
standing time deposits of $100,000 or more and can be conventionally traded in 
the secondary market to meet the depositor's liquidity or other needs. Wholesale 
CDs and the core deposits form bank's total deposits and play equally significant 
role in financing banks assets.6 Small banks in the first group have very limited 
access to capital markets and virtually do not participate in federal funds mar-
keto In contrast, larger banks have easier access to money markets and tend to 
have fewer core deposits. Similarly, small banks have limited ability to issue de-
mand notes to the U.S. Treasury and to be involved in other type of borrowings, 
such as discount window borrowing provided from Federal Reserve bank. Finally, 
brokered deposits, which are wholesale CDs from broker agencies, as well as the 
subordinated notes and debentures, which typically have long duration and bear 
relatively low withdrawal risk, make up only a small fraction of banks' totallia-
bility and equity capital compared to the other components of purchased funds. 
Other liabilities, on the other hand, consist of owed by the bank funds that do not 
require interest payment. 
The third source of funds is the total equity capital, which consists of common 
and preferred stocks, undivided profits, surplus, and capital reserve. The equity 
6 Alternatively, total deposits can be divided into transaction deposits (RCON2215), such as 
demand deposits and NOW accounts, and non-transaction deposits (RCON2385), such as retail 
or household savings and time deposits. Also, total deposits can be derived as the sum of 
interest-bearing deposits (RCON6636) and non-interest-bearing deposits (RCON2215). 
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capital is the most expensive source of funding, which drives larger banks make 
heavy use of purchased funds and hold less equity capital compared to small banks. 
Not all of the banks' activities are reported on their balance sheet. Banks, 
especially recently, are highly engaged in fee generated activities off their balance 
sheet to stay in the business, as the interest income generated from balance sheet 
items has a declining trend. Off-balance sheet activities of a typically commercial 
bank involve derivative contracts (futures and forwards, swaps, and options), loan 
commitments, letters of credit, and investment-structured vehicles. In addition to 
generating income to financial institutions, derivative contracts are used to hedge 
interest rate, credit, and foreign exchange risks exposures. 
5.2. Income Statement Data 
Income statement for a particular financial institution reports the total oper-
ating income (interest income and non-interest income) gained and the expenses 
(interest and non-interest) paid for its on and off balance sheet items and activities. 
The difference between these two, after deducting the provision for loan and losses, 
taxes, and any extraordinary items, constitutes the net income for the bank. Table 
5.11 summarizes the income statements for the representative bank in each size 
category through the time. 
The interest income includes interest and fee income on bank's loans and leases, 
as well as interest received from securities, while the noninterest income is com-
prised of items such as income from fiduciary activities, service charges on deposit 
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accounts in domestic offices, trading gains (losses) and fees from foreign exchange 
transactions, other foreign transaction gains (losses), gains (losses) and fees from 
assets held in trading accounts, and other noninterest income from off-balance 
sheet activities. The latter income-generating source constitutes the substantial 
portion of larger banks' income and it becomes increasingly important as banks' 
ability of generating income from traditional lending activities is somehow limited. 
The interest expense consists mainly of interest on core deposits and interest on 
purchased funds. The non-interest expense, which is generally large relative to in-
terest expense and non-interest income, includes the sum of salaries and employee 
benefits, expenses of premises and fixed assets, and other miscellaneous noninterest 
expenses that are not required to be reported by the bank. 
Prices for output and input services are not directly reported in the Call Re-
ports. By dividing the quarterly interest expenses and non-interest expenses of 
each subcategory item by its dollar amount, we can construct the respective prices 
similar to that used in the current thesis.7 Similar prices for outputs and services 
are difficult to obtain, because the income data generally include interest income 
and fees which will contaminate the pure proxies. Table 5.2 details the construction 
of these prices from Call Report items. 
7Prices are imputed under the assumption of uniform pricing, i.e., a bank pays the same price for 
its inputs in each of its operating markets. This assumption is somehow restrictive for banks with 
superregional activities. For example, the average wage paid by such bank to its employees in 
offices/branches located in different states or metropolitan statistical areas (MSA) are more likely 
to differ substantially. As Adams et al. (2007) state, this method will lead to some measurement 
errors which could be avoided if more disaggregated market-specific data used to proxy these 
prices. 
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Table 5.1. Balance Sheet Data 
Assets Call Report Liabilities&Capital Call Report 
Total Assets RCFD2170 Total deposits RCFD2200 
Cash RCFDOO80 Demand deposits RCON2210 
Interest-bearing balances RCFDOO70 NOW accounts RCON2398 
due from DIs MMDAs RCON6810 
Federal Funds sold RCFD1350 Retail CDs RCON6648 
and Repos 
Investment securities RCFD0390 
Gross Loans and Leases RCFD1400 Wholesale CDs RCON2604 
Real estate loans RCFD1410 Federal Funds RCFD2800 
C&I loans RCFD1766 purchased and Repos 
Agricultural loans RCFD1590 
Loans to Individuals RCFD1975 Other borrowed RCFD2835 
Lease financing receivables RCFD2165 money and 
Loans to DIs RCFD1489 U.S. Treasury notes 
Other loans RCFD2080 
Brokered deposits, RCON2365 
Net Loans and Leases RCFD2122 subordinated notes +RCON3200 
Uil RCFD2123 and debentures 
Rlll RCFD3123 
Other liabilities RCFD2930 
Premises and fixed assets RCFD2145 
Other real estate owned RCFD2150 
Intangible assets and other RCFD2143 Equity Capital RCFD3210 
+RCFD2160 
uil=unearned income on loans 
Rlll=reserve for loan and lease losses. 
Table 5.2. Average Input Prices 
Total interest-bearing 
deposits in total 
transaction accounts 
Total interest-bearing 
deposits in total 
non-transaction accounts 
NOW accounts 
MMDAs 
Interest expense on transaction accounts RIAD4508 
Total transaction accounts RCON2215 
Interest expense on non-transaction accounts RIAD4511' 
Total non-transaction accounts RCON0352 
Interest expense on transaction accounts" RIAD4508 
NOW aecount;; RCFD2398 
Interest expense on :\>IMDAs RIAD4509 
M:\>LDAs RCON6810 
189 
Retail CDs Interest expense on Retail CDs RIADA518'" 
Wholesale CDs 
Federal funds purchased 
and Repos 
Notes issued to U.S. Treasury 
and other borrowed money 
Subordinated notes 
and debentures 
Capital 
Labor****** 
Retail CDs RCON6648 
Interest expense on wholesale CDs RIADA517···· 
wholesale CD;; RCON2604 
Interest on federal funds purchased and Repos RIAD4180 
U.S. Treasury notes and other borrowed money RCFD2800 
Interest on trading liabilities"'" 
U.S. Treasury notes and other borrowed money 
Interest on subordinated notes and debentures 
subordinated notes and debentures 
Expenses of premises and fixed assets 
Capital 
Salaries and employee b,mefits 
Labor 
RIAD4185 
RCON2835 
RIAD4200 
RCON3200 
RIAD4217 
RCFD214;:; 
RIAD4135 
RIAD4150 
*Alternatively can be defined as (RIAD4509+RIAD4511)/(RCON6810+RCON0352) 
** Also includes interest on ATS accounts, and telephone and preauthorized transfer accounts 
*** Prior to 1997Ql the interest expense on retail CDs is derived as: 
RIAD4170-RIAD4508-RIAD451l-RIADA517-RIAD4172 
**** Prior to 1997Ql the interest expense on wholesale CDs is given by RIAD4174 item 
***** Includes Demand notes issued to the U.S. Treasury and other borrowed money 
****** Labor is defined as the number of full time equivalent employees on the payroll of the 
bank and its consolidated subsidiaries at the end of the report period. 
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Table 5.3. 1984Q1 Balance Sheet-Asset Side data (in millions of U.S. dollars) 
Asset size percentile [0,90] (90,95] (95,99] (99,100] 
Cash 2.9 (5.5) 42 (5.7) 182 (5.8) 222 (5.7) 
Securities 
-Interest-bearing balances 1.4 (2.5) 25 (3.4) 209 (5.7) 369 (9.1) 
due from DIs 
-Fed funds sold and Repos 2.6 (6.0) 35 (4.7) 115 (4.2) 1,011 (2.5) 
-Investment securities 15 (30) 140 (19) 404 (15) 2,258 (6.4) 
Gross Loans and Leases 28 (52) 431 (58) 1,680 (57) 25,400 (63) 
-Real estate loans 10 (18) 137 (18) 420 (15) 4,185 (12) 
-C&I loans 7.5 (13) 95 (13) 484 (16) 1,210 (27) 
-Agricultural loans 2.1 (7.5) 4.5 (0.6) 12 (0.4) 260 (0.6) 
-Loans to individuals 6.4 (12) 83 (11) 24 (0.8) 2,003 (5.1) 
-Leases 0.1 (0.1) 3.3 (0.4) 21 (0.6) 445 (1.1) 
-Loans to DIs 1.6 (2.5) 36 (6.2) 244 (9.1) 5,541 (15) 
and other loans 
Net Loans and Leases 27 (51) 423 (57) 1,665 (57) 25,200 (63) 
-un 0.49 (1.0) 6.9 (0.9) 15 (0.5) 190 (0.5) 
-Rlll 0.24 (0.5) 3.9 (0.5) 17 (0.5) 266 (0.7) 
Other Assets 
-Premises and fixed assets 1.0 (2.0) 11 (1.5) 37 (1.2) 434 (1.1) 
-Other real estate owned 0.17 (0.3) 1.6 (0.2) 4.9 (0.2) 61 (0.2) 
-Intangible assets and other 0.87 (2.1) 12 (1.7) 53 (1.8) 1,061 (2.5) 
Total Assets 
Mean 60 740 2,959 39,300 
Median 31 693 2,233 24,300 
Source: Author's calculations from the 1984.Ql FDIC Call Reports. Percentage of total assets 
in parentheses. 
Uil=unearned income on loans 
Rlll=reserve for loan and lease losses. 
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Table 5.4. 1984Q1 Balance Sheet-Liability and Equity Capital Side 
data (in millions of U.S. dollars) 
Asset size percentile [0,90] (90,95] (95,99] (99,100] 
Total Deposits 45 (88) 558 (75) 1,942 (69) 14,500 (43) 
Core Deposits 
-Demand deposits 8.2 (15) 106 (14) 412 (14) 4,237 (11) 
-NOW accounts NA NA NA NA 
-MMDAs* 6.5 (11) 70 (9.4) 239 (8.1) 2,493 (6.3) 
-Retail CDs 24 (58) 271 (29) 921 (22) 6,694 (19) 
Purchased Funds 
-Wholesale CDs 5.8 (10) 108 (14) 505 (18) 3,765 (12) 
-Fed funds purchased 1.1 (1.1) 57 (7.7) 350 (11) 3,131 (8.6) 
and Repos 
-Other borrowed money 0.2 (0.2) 31 (4.4) 138 (4.9) 2,105 (5.6) 
and notes issued 
to the U.S. Treasury 
-Brokered deposits, 0.12 (0.2) 1.2 (0.2) 45 (1.4) 251 (1.1) 
subordinated notes 
and debentures 
Other liabilities 0.64 (1.2) 8.1 (1.1) 44 (1.4) 1,420 (3.1) 
Equity Capital 4.1 (9.2) 43 (5.8) 135 (4.5) 1,747 (4.3) 
Number of Banks 13852 243 264 23 
Source: Author's calculations from the 1984.Ql FDIC Call Reports. Percentage of total assets 
in parentheses. 
*MMDAs are available beginning 1984.Q3. 
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Table 5.5. 1993Q1 Balance Sheet-Asset Side data (in millions of U.S. dollars) 
Asset size percentile [0,90] (90,95] (95,99] (99,100] 
Cash 3.0 (4.3) 30 (4.0) 139 (3.8) 145 (4.6) 
Securities 
-Interest-bearing balances 0.7 (1.4) 5.2 (0.7) 40 (1.0) 1,297 (4.0) 
due from DIs 
-Fed funds sold and Repos 3.1 (5.1) 33 (4.4) 144 (3.9) 1,388 (5.7) 
-Investment securities 24 (34) 162 (22) 684 (20) 4,277 (15) 
Gross Loans and Leases 40 (52) 440 (59) 1,994 (56) 16,900 (52) 
-Real estate loans 23 (28) 227 (30) 799 (24) 5,633 (18) 
-C&I loans 7.0 (8.7) 101 (13) 556 (14) 5,876 (19) 
-Agricultural loans 2.2 (5.5) 3.4 (0.4) 11 (0.3) 63 (0.2) 
-Loans to individuals 6.8 (8.7) 74 (10) 41 (1.1) 2,059 (5.9) 
-Leases 0.07 (0.1) 2.6 (0.4) 33 (0.8) 368 (1.1) 
-Loans to DIs 0.78 (0.8) 11 (2.0) 92 (3.1) 2,317 (7.0) 
and other loans 
Net Loans and Leases 39 (52) 438 (59) 1,989 (55) 16,870 (52) 
-Uil 0.20 (0.3) 1.9 (0.2) 4.9 (0.1) 53 (0.1) 
-RIll 0.53 (0.9) 8.2 (1.1) 46 (1.2) 491 (1.3) 
Other Assets 
-Premises and fixed assets 1.2 (1.6) 9.7 (1.3) 37 (1.4) 433 (1.2) 
-Other real estate owned 0.44 (0.5) 5.0 (0.7) 20 (0.6) 243 (0.5) 
-Intangible assets and other 0.87 (1.6) 12 (1.6) 70 (1.9) 1,484 (3.1) 
Total Assets 
Mean 73 742 3,564 31,130 
Median 49 709 2,622 19,800 
Source: Author's calculations from the 1993.Ql FDIC Call Reports. Percentage of total assets 
in parentheses. 
Uil=unearned income on loans. 
Rlll=reserve for loans and lease losses. 
193 
Table 5.6. 1993Q1 Balance Sheet-Liability and Equity Capital Side 
data (in millions of U.S. dollars) 
Asset size percentile [0,90] (90,95] (95,99] (99,100] 
Total Deposits 64 (88) 517 (72) 2,018 (59) 13,500 (46) 
Core Deposits 
-Demand deposits 9.2 (12) 83 (11) 383 (10) 3,485 (12) 
-NOW accounts 9.3 (13) 62 (8.4) 225 (6.5) 1,298 (4.7) 
-MMDAs 9.0 (11) 89 (12) 390 (11) 3,215 (10) 
-Retail CDs 45 (66) 421 (51) 1,736 (43) 9,600 (28) 
Purchased Funds 
-Wholesale CDs 5.7 (7.6) 61 (8.0) 382 (10) 2,076 (8.6) 
-Fed funds purchased 1.1 (0.9) 37 (4.7) 348 (8) 4,907 (10) 
and Repos 
-Other borrowed money 0.550 (0.5) 42 (6.0) 238 (7.4) 2,341 (6.3) 
and notes issued 
to the U.S. Treasury 
-Brokered deposits 0.23 (0.3) 3.8 (0.7) 65 (2.0) 291 (1.2) 
subordinated notes 
and debentures 
Other liabilities 0.58 (0.7) 7.6 (1.0) 55 (1.4) 1,474 (2.7) 
Equity Capital 6.6 (9.6) 51 (6.8) 222 (6.4) 1,874 (5.5) 
Number of Banks 10475 346 357 55 
Source: Author's calculations from the 1993.Ql FDIC Call Reports. Percentage of total assets 
in parentheses. 
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Table 5.7. 2000Q1 Balance Sheet-Asset Side data (in millions of U.S. dollars) 
Asset size percentile [0,90] (90,95] (95,99] (99,100] 
Cash 3.4 (3.7) 22 (3.0) 99 (2.8) 165 (3.0) 
Securities 
-Interest-bearing balances 0.6 (1.1) 2.7 (0.4) 18 (0.5) 892 (1.3) 
due from DIs 
-Fed funds sold and Repos 3.1 (4.5) 22 (3.0) 146 (3.9) 2,674 (5.7) 
-Investment securities 19 (20) 138 (19) 569 (17) 6,592 (14) 
Gross Loans and Leases 59 (60) 459 (63) 2,099 (60) 27,200 (57) 
-Real estate loans 36 (35) 286 (40) 978 (31) 9,595 (19) 
-C&I loans 10 (11) 88 (12) 586 (15) 9,099 (18) 
-Agricultural loans 3.3 (5.7) 5.7 (0.8) 14 (0.4) 110 (0.2) 
-Loans to individuals 7.5 (8.1) 55 (7.6) 348 (9.1) 3,783 (11) 
-Leases 0.14 (0.2) 4.4 (0.6) 39 (0.8) 1,445 (2.6) 
-Loans to DIs 0.76 (0.7) 8.1 (1.4) 45 (1.7) 2,853 (3.5) 
and other loans 
Net Loans and Leases 58 (60) 458 (63) 2,097 (60) 27,200 (57) 
-UiI 0.08 (0.1) 0.59 (0.1) 2.0 (0.1) 18 (0.1) 
-RIll 0.57 (0.8) 6.0 (0.8) 32 (0.9) 431 (0.9) 
Other Assets 
-Premises and fixed assets 1.8 (1.9) 10 (1.5) 34 (1.1) 475 (0.8) 
-Other real estate owned 0.08 (0.1) 0.61 (0.1) 1.7 (0.1) 18 (0.1) 
-Intangible assets and other 1.2 (1.8) 14 (1.9) 95 (2.4) 1,969 (3.3) 
Total Assets 
Mean 93 725 3,574 36,700 
Median 66 665 2,524 21,300 
Source: Author's calculations from the 2000.Ql FDIC Call Reports. Percentage of total assets 
in parentheses. 
lJil=unearned income on loans. 
Rlll=reserve for loan and lease losses. 
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Table 5.8. 2000Ql Balance Sheet-Liability and Equity Capital Side 
data (in millions of U.S. dollars) 
Asset size percentile [0,90] (90,95] (95,99] (99,100] 
Total Deposits 78 (84) 5114 (71) 1,850 (56.9) 19,600 (41) 
Core Deposits 
-Demand deposits 12 (13) 64 (8.8) 238 (6.8) 3,434 (6.9) 
-NOW accounts 9.9 (11) 29 (4.2) 61 (2.0) 436 (1.0) 
-MMDAs 11 (1O) 114 (16) 467 (13.9) 6,242 (12) 
-Retail CDs 56 (62) 431 (54) 1,794 (46) 17,700 (35) 
Purchased Funds 
-Wholesale CDs 11 (12) 84 (12) 559 (15) 5,477 (17) 
-Fed funds purchased 1.9 (1.4) 35 (4.6) 335 (8.0) 4,907 (10) 
and Repos 
-Other borrowed money 2.9 (2.4) 48 (6.5) 347 (8.9) 4,408 (11) 
and notes issued 
to the U.S. Treasury 
-Brokered deposits, 0.72 (0.6) 10 (1.7) 60 (2.4) 861 (3.3) 
subordinated notes 
and debentures 
Other liabilities 0.75 (0.8) 8.5 (1.2) 61 (1.6) 1,367 (2.2) 
Equity Capital 8.9 (11) 60 (8.3) 255 (7.5) 3,394 (6.4) 
Number of Banks 7578 405 331 79 
Source: Author's calculations from the 2000.Ql FDIC Call Reports. Percentage of total assets 
in parentheses. 
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Table 5.9. 2010Q2 Balance Sheet-Asset Side data (in millions of U.S. dollars) 
Asset size percentile [0,90] (90,95] (95,99] (99,100] 
Cash 3.5 (3.2) 5.6 (3.1) 68 (2.8) 1,765 (2.9) 
Securities 
-Interest-bearing balances 7.0 (5.6) 30 (5.3) 124 (5.4) 7,795 (6.1) 
due from DIs 
-Fed funds sold and Repos* NA NA NA NA 
-Investment securities 24 (18) 45 (18) 363 (17) 19,900 (17) 
Gross Loans and Leases 88 (62) 386 (68) 1,443 (67) 59,800 (61) 
-Real estate loans 64 (44) 299 (52) 1,043 (49) 21,800 (36) 
-C&I loans 12 (8.9) 53 (9.2) 236 (10) 10,300 (11) 
-Agricultural loans 5.0 (5.4) 9.4 (1.7) 18 (0.8) 185 (0.3) 
-Loans to individuals 4.9 (4.1) 16 (2.8) 100 (3.7) 13,400 (11) 
-Leases 0.20 (0.2) 1.2 (0.2) 9.0 (0.4) 1,108 (1.0) 
-Loans to DIs 0.75 (0.5) 6.8 (1.2) 34 (1.4) 3,746 (2.4) 
and other loans 
Net Loans and Leases 87 (62) 386 (67) 1,443 (66) 59,700 (61) 
-Uil 0.02 (0.02) 0.19 (0.03) 0.61 (0.03) 17 (0.02) 
-Rlll 0.90 (1.1) 7.7 (1.3) 35 (1.5) 2,386 (2.1) 
Other Assets 
-Premises and fixed assets 2.6 (1.9) 10 (1.8) 33 (1.7) 835 (1.0) 
-Other real estate owned 1.3 (0.8) 6.0 (1.1) 19 (1.0) 272 (0.3) 
-Intangible assets and other 2.1 (2.5) 19 (3.2) 92 (3.8) 7,155 (5.3) 
Total Assets 
Mean 134 727 3,328 110,000 
Median 110 673 2,232 32,000 
Source: Author's calculations from the 201O.Q2 FDIC Call Reports. Percentage of total assets 
in parentheses. 
Uil=unearned income on loans. 
Rlll=reserve for loan and lease losses. 
* Beginning 3/31/2002, this item is no longer reported on the FFIEC 031 and 041 reports. 
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Table 5.10. 2010Q2 Balance Sheet-Liability and Equity Capital Side 
data (in millions of U.S. dollars) 
Asset size percentile [0,90] {90,95] (95,99] (99,100] 
Total Deposits 113 (84) 469 (82) 1,659 (79) 58,000 (64) 
Core Deposits 
-Demand deposits 15 (12) 40 (7.0) 134 (6.2) 5,276 (4.9) 
-NOW accounts NA NA NA NA 
-MMDAs 19 (12) 105 (18) 534 (24) 30,900 (29) 
-Retail CDs 88 (61) 409 (65) 1,425 (63) 50,700 (49) 
Purchased FUnds 
-Wholesale CDs 25 (17) 99 (17) 312 (16) 5,504 (7.4) 
-Fed funds purchased NA NA NA NA 
and Repos 
-Other borrowed money NA NA NA NA 
and notes issued 
to the U.S. Treasury 
-Brokered deposits, 4.6 (2.8) 29 (5.2) 116 (5.5) 3,851 (6.0) 
subordinated notes 
and debentures 
Other liabilities 0.83 (0.6) 4.1 (0.7) 23 (0.9) 3,252 (1.9) 
Equity Capital 14 (11) 57 (9.9) 225 (9.9) 12,900 (11) 
Number of Banks 5314 701 494 85 
Source: Author's calculations from the 2010.Q2 FDIC Call Reports. Percentage of total assets 
in parentheses. 
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Table 5.11. Income Statement data (in millions of U.S. dollars) 
Asset size percentile [0,90] (90,95] (95,99] (99,100] 
1984.Ql 
-Interest income 1.320 14.058 58.508 860.008 
-Non-interst income 0.099 1.580 8.003 95.410 
-Interest expence 0.818 8.763 38.291 640.929 
-Non-interest expence 0.410 4.947 20.610 214.048 
Net Income 0.124 1.245 4.551 41.438 
1993.Ql 
-Interest income 1.301 9.929 47.482 461.023 
-Non-interst income 0.193 1.797 15.537 159.853 
-Interest expence 0.513 3.692 17.768 230.900 
-Non-interest expence 0.637 5.087 28.557 277.372 
Net Income 0.235 1.7556 8.841 77.608 
2000.Ql 
-Interest income 1.733 10.439 45.663 796.133 
-Non-interst income 0.224 2.780 16.676 346.582 
-Interest expence 0.772 4.689 21.230 418.034 
-N on-interest expence 0.745 5.307 23.497 422.212 
Net Income 0.273 1.931 9.484 157.617 
201O.Q2 
-Interest income 3.218 13.181 47.245 2,143.966 
-Non-interst income 0.509 2.409 11.567 1,111.319 
-Interest expence 0.858 3.609 11.950 375.627 
-Non-interest expence 2.109 8.351 31.245 1,573.607 
Net Income 0.270 1.077 1.255 357.292 
Source: Author's calculations from the quarterly FDIC Call Reports. 
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